Chapter 10: The 14th Amendment & Anti-Slavery Scam
Now that I’ve covered the beginning of the “slavery” issue and how we got into it, this chapter will explain just how we came out of it. We have reviewed how the Masons through the British East India Company, traded in slaves, and even brought them to the colonies to work in the cotton fields. Now, the issue was dividing the states because the British Masons and banksters wanted it that way. Freemasonry was the leading campaign to argue the issues before the public and create a Civil War based on it. What do you suppose the overall purpose of all of this was? What happened immediately after the Civil War? The slaves were freed, correct? Well, everyone knows this to be the case, right? But that is not entirely correct. Think again.
The slaves were never freed after the Civil War. The black people in America were never freed. There is evidence that exists, uncovered by countless hours spent researching, that proves that the 14th, 15th and 16th Amendments as well as others were never properly ratified, but I will not get into that here because legally, it is a moot point. We are all under equity law now by presumption. It is of little importance since the country has now been placed under Martial Law and the Constitution has been suspended for US citizens, at least. A little detail like improper ratification of an Amendment is of minute importance. So, let’s continue…
America was never intended to be a country of slavery. The Masons had planned for the slaves to be set free eventually, but this was not possible to force upon any of the states.
Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1774, the following quote regarding the future of slavery in America:
“The abolition of domestic slavery is the great object of desire in those colonies, where it was unhappily introduced in their infant state. But previous to the enfranchisement of the slaves we have, it is necessary to exclude all further importations from Africa; yet our repeated attempts to effect this by prohibitions, and by imposing duties which might amount to a prohibition, have been hitherto defeated by his majesty’s negative.” (1)
The 13th Amendment & the “Freeing” of the Slaves
On April 9, 1865, the Civil War was officially over. The 13th Amendment was passed by the Senate on April 8, 1864, and by the House on January 31, 1865. It was signed by Lincoln on Feb. 1, 1865. The amendment was ratified by the required number of states on December 6, 1865. We can place the passage of the 13th Amendment safely after the declaration of Martial law on April 24, 1863 and well after the creation of the Revenue Act of 1861-2. Therefore, one must wonder whether or not this 13th Amendment has actual validity. By February 1861, seven Southern states had seceded. On February 4 of that year, representatives from South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia and Louisiana met in Montgomery, Alabama, with representatives from Texas arriving later, to form the Confederate States of America. This marked the beginning of the Civil War. On April 24, 1863, Abraham Lincoln suspended the Constitution and declared Martial Law.
Just before Lincoln’s death, prior to the end of the Civil War, Lincoln said the following words:
“Yes; we may all congratulate ourselves that this cruel war is nearing its close. It has cost a vast amount of treasure and blood. The best blood of the flower of American youth has been freely offered upon our country’s altar that the Nation might live. It has been, indeed a trying hour for the Republic; but I see in the future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and causes me to tremble for the safety of my country. As a result of the war, corporations have been enthroned and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and the money power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until wealth is aggregated in a few hands and the Republic is destroyed. I feel at this moment more anxiety for the safety of my country than ever before, even in the midst of war.” (2)
On April 15, 1865, Lincoln was assassinated two and a half months after the signing of the 13th Amendment.
(1) A Summary View of the Rights of British America. – Published in 1774 by Williamsburg printer Clementina Rind – (Verified) – https://www.history.org/almanack/life/politics/sumview.cfm
(2) Verified from Charles Lindbergh Money Trust book, 1913
The Civil Rights Act of 1866
Following the Civil War on April 9, 1866 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was the first federal law to define citizenship. Prior to this there was no class of United States citizens. This is why it’s difficult to say who exactly the United States citizens were who the IRS laws were applying to in 1862. It could be that the idea for creating a new class of citizenship was being put together, and those citizens would be the ones who would eventually be taxed. Or it could be that they intended from the start to only tax those residents of the District of Columbia.
Here is the introduction to the Civil Rights Act:
THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS. Sass. I. CH. 31. 1866.
CHAP. X –An Act to protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication.
“Be it enacted… That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make their rights and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of per-son and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.”
This previous section is interesting when one considers that the States were never “in” the United States to begin with so which “state” are they referring to? The District of Columbia perhaps?
The next part is extremely important to understand. It conveys that this new class of citizens are not to be tried in state courts and may even have their cases removed to federal courts, if they feel the need arises. That means these are not state citizens being discussed, but an entirely new class of citizen.
“SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the district courts of the United Courts, within their respective districts, shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences against the provisions of this act, and also, concurrently with the circuit courts of the United States, of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any of the rights secured to them by the first section of this act; and if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, has been or shall be commenced in any State court any such person, for any cause whatsoever, or against any officer, civil or military, or other person, for any arrest or imprisonment, trespasses, or wrongs done or committed by virtue or under color of authority derived from this act or the act establishing a Bureau for the relief’ of Freedmen and Refugees, and all acts amendatory thereof, or for refusing to do any act upon the ground that it would be inconsistent with this act, such defendant shall have the right to remove such cause for trial to the proper district or circuit court in the manner prescribed by the “Act relating to habeas corpus and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases,” approved March three, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, and all acts amendatory thereof.”
Some representatives complained about this injustice or inequality being created which never existed previously. Johnson originally vetoed the bill because it strengthened the powers of the bureau, giving more jurisdiction over anyone who deprived Blacks of their rights. (3) By prohibiting the rights of states to restrict cases brought by black Plaintiffs, they were extending federal jurisdiction to this new group of people. This jurisdiction expansion was heavily debated at the time since it was an attempt to further weaken state’s rights.
The Civil Rights Act specifically protects “all persons” not people. It says in its header “An Act to Protect all Persons.” We will get to the definition of “person” shortly.
People defined in case law, as opposed to “Persons.”
“All political power is inherent in the people,” (Art. I, Sec. 2, of the Constitution,) and those who are not of the people can have no share in it. The people are such as are born upon the soil, by whom and for whom in the first place the Government was ordained, and such persons of foreign birth as may elect to assume the obligations of a citizen by complying with the laws of naturalization as enacted by Congress.” – Otto Walther v. Leopold Rabolt 30 Cal. 185 July 1, 1866 (4)
On March 2, 1867, Congress passed the first of the Reconstruction Acts over the veto of President Johnson. The March 2nd Act reads as follows:
Chap. CLIII – An Act to provide for the more efficient Government of the Rebel States
On March 23, 1867, Congress passed the second of the Reconstruction Acts also over President Johnson’s veto. The March 23rd Act reads as follows:
Chap. VI. An Act supplementary to an Act entitled “An Act to provide for the more efficient Government of the Rebel States,” passed March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and to facilitate Restoration.
It was this provision which mandated the creation of new state constitutions and governments. Here is a portion of it which states that elections shall be held under a “commanding general,” which is a military assignment under Martial Law.
“Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That after the completion of the registration hereby provided for in any State, at such time and places therein as the commanding general shall appoint and direct, of which at least thirty days’ public notice shall be given, an election shall be held of delegates to a convention for the purpose of establishing a constitution and civil government for such States loyal to the Union, said convention in each State, except Virginia, to consist of the same number of members as the most numerous branch of the State legislature of such State in the year eighteen hundred and sixty, to be apportioned among the several districts, counties, or parishes of such State by the commanding general, giving to each representation in the ratio of voters registered as aforesaid as nearly as may be. The convention in Virginia shall consist of the same number of members as represented the territory now constituting Virginia in the most numerous branch of the legislature of said State in the year eighteen hundred and sixty, to be apportioned as aforesaid.”
The Reconstruction Acts had forced ALL states to create constitutions and legislatures. This was all being done militarily. Without the President’s approval, by members of Congress who themselves had gone rogue on the Constitution and had preemptively decided on their own, or with the help of British bankers, to keep the United States in a state of perpetual Martial Law, so it could be reorganized to suit their needs. But a complete takeover could never be accomplished therefore, the country was kept to the appearance that the Constitution was still being followed.
On July 19, 1867, the next part of the Reconstruction Acts were passed, again over Johnson’s veto, which read in part, as follows:
Chap. XXX. An Act supplementary to an Act entitled “An Act to provide for the more efficient Government of the Rebel States,” passed on the second day of March, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and the Act supplementary thereto, passed on the twenty-third day of March, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven.
In this section was included the following provision;
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the General of the army of the United Sates shall be invested with all the powers of suspension, removal, appointment, and detail granted in the preceding section to district commanders.
This means the military was still in charge and this is why Johnson’s veto did not matter at all. In other words, all of this was being done in contravention to the Constitution. Congress was operating under the assumption there was no operational Constitution in place.
The 14th Amendment and the Creation of a Franchisee or Member Corporation
On July 9, 1868, the 14th Amendment was adopted. I will not say “ratified” because it was never ratified.
The text of the 14th Amendment reads in part;
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
The reason I included Section two is to illustrate that Indians not taxed were not included and this applied to representatives in each state for voting US citizens. These newly created citizens were going to be given the right to vote on the President and members of Congress even though they could not be state citizens, so this new class of citizenship was giving them special privileges. Congress knew that these people could not vote on the President or members of Congress of the United States, but they could vote in a corporation, if they were members of that corporation. The mere mention of not including Indians (not taxed), supposes that this issue relates to taxed individuals. Section 4 is even more telling. It reads as follows;
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
What this was going to do, it appears, was to place the burden of taxation and interest for that taxation, on the heads of these newly “freed” member corporations since excise taxes were the only ones allowed by Congress to levy. The newly created 14th Amendment citizens would carry the burden of the debt that the European bankers wanted to force on the people of America, and the members of Congress, by this time, had become their lackeys through bribery, loans and investments.
Congress would make this offer so appealing to people by extending these rights and privileges which would include provisions for due process, that people who didn’t know there was a difference years later, would give up their claim to state citizenship and take US citizenship instead.
Here is what the court said concerning due process for 14th Amendment citizens. The following is an excerpt from a report from the government printing office on the 14th Amendment. I am not sure of the date, but it was post Roe v Wade:
“CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES The citizenship provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment may be seen as a repudiation of one of the more politically divisive cases of the nineteenth century. Under common law, free persons born within a State or nation were citizens thereof. In the Dred Scott Case, however, Chief Justice Taney, writing for the Court, ruled that this rule did not apply to freed slaves. The Court held that United States citizenship was enjoyed by only two classes of individuals: (1) white persons born in the United States as descendants of ‘‘persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognized as citizens in the several States and [who] became also citizens of this new political body,’’ the United States of America, and (2) those who, having been ‘‘born outside the dominions of the United States,’’ had migrated thereto and been naturalized therein. Freed slaves fell into neither of these categories.
Con’t: “The Court further held that, although a State could confer state citizenship upon whomever it chose, it could not make the recipient of such status a citizen of the United States. Thus, the ‘‘Negro,’’ as an enslaved race, was ineligible to attain United States citizenship, either from a State or by virtue of birth in the United States. Even a free man descended from a Negro residing as a free man in one of the States at the date of ratification of the Constitution was held ineligible for citizenship. Congress subsequently repudiated this concept of citizenship, first in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and then in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, Congress set aside the Dred Scott holding, and restored the traditional precepts of citizenship by birth.” (5)
Now, if I read this correctly, the government admits that the Congress, a legislative body, set aside a Supreme Court decision from 1857 when creating this Act. This means they did not hold the ruling to be invalid, they just legislated anyways, to create a new class of citizenship for the newly freed blacks slaves. On March 6, 1857, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney read the majority opinion of the Court, which stated that slaves were not citizens of the United States and, therefore, could not expect any protection from the Federal Government or the courts. The opinion also stated that Congress had no authority to ban slavery from a Federal territory. It is popularly assumed that the 13th and 14th Amendment overturned Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). But it is never explained how Congress can overturn a Supreme Court ruling with an Amendment to the Constitution, and if so, those Amendments would have to be shown and proven to have been properly ratified and that will be a problem considering what we now know about the missing original 13th Amendment and the way things changed after the war. We might suspect that Martial Law was actually in place and the US Constitution had been suspended and possibly never brought back into use.
In Dred Scott, the court ruled, in part, “8. A State, by its laws passed since the adoption of the Constitution, may put a foreigner or any other description of persons upon a footing with its own citizens as to all the rights and privileges enjoyed by them within its dominion and by its laws. But that will not make him a citizen of the United States, nor entitle him to sue in its courts, nor to any of the privileges and immunities of a citizen in another State.
Therefore, apparently, what the 13th and 14th amendments did was to give the slaves United States citizenship, which was not previously available to them under the Constitution and the lawfulness of this is questioned.
The following is extracted from the Cornell Law website and defines persons. It appears here, the government is saying that the 14th Amendment does NOT extend to corporations, however, we will see some court cases which contradict this.
“Persons” Defined. — Notwithstanding the historical controversy that has been waged concerning whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended the word ”person” to mean only natural persons, or whether the word was substituted for the word ”citizen” with a view to protecting corporations from oppressive state legislation, the Supreme Court, as early as the Granger Cases, decided in 1877, upheld on the merits various state laws without raising any question as to the status of railway corporation plaintiffs to advance due process contentions. There is no doubt that a corporation may not be deprived of its property without due process of law, and although prior decisions had held that the “liberty” guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons, nevertheless a newspaper corporation was sustained, in 1936, in its objection that a state law deprived it of liberty of press. As to the natural persons protected by the due process clause, these include all human beings regardless of race, color, or citizenship.
Con’t: “Ordinarily, the mere interest of an official as such, in contrast to an actual injury sustained by a natural or artificial person through invasion of personal or property rights, has not been deemed adequate to enable him to invoke the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against state action. Similarly, municipal corporations are viewed as having no standing “to invoke the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment in opposition to the will of their creator,” the State. However, state officers are acknowledged to have an interest, despite their not having sustained any “private damage,” in resisting an “endeavor to prevent the enforcement of laws in relation to which they have official duties,” and, accordingly, may apply to federal courts for the “review of decisions of state courts declaring state statutes which [they] seek to enforce to be repugnant to the” Fourteenth Amendment.” (6)
And here is the definition from the Law Dictionary of “persons” defined Blacks Law 4th ed.
A man considered according to the rank he holds in society, with all the right to which the place he holds entitles him, and the duties which it imposes. The word in its natural and usual signification includes women as well as men. Term may include artificial beings, as corporations, quasi-corporations, territorial corporations, and foreign corporations under statutes, forbidding the taking of property without due process of law and giving to all persons the equal protection of the laws; concerning claims arising from Indian depredations; relating to taxation and the revenue laws; to attachments; usurious contracts; applying to limitations of actions; and concerning the admissibility as a witness of a party in his own behalf when the opposite party is a living person. A corporation is also a person under a penal statute. Corporations are “persons” as that word is used in the first clause of the XIV Amendment. But a corporation of another state is not a “person” within the jurisdiction of the state until it has complied with the conditions of admission to do business in the state, and a statutory requirement of such conditions is not in conflict with the XIV Amendment.
(Based on what we just read here, it reverses the opinion that is given on the Cornell Law site, which makes sense because that site was put together by government lawyers, whose interest it is to keep this hush hush.)
Continuing from Black’s 4th Ed:
It may include partnerships. Also firms.
“Persons” are of two kinds, natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.
It has been held that when the word person is used in a legislative act, natural persons will be intended unless something appears in the context to show that it applies to artificial persons; but as a rule, corporations will be considered persons within the statutes unless the intention of the legislature is manifestly to exclude them.
(This is a complete two faced statement that contradicts itself. On the one hand, a person is understood to be natural unless otherwise stated, but at the same time, a corporation is understood to be a person, unless it’s explicitly forbidden. How is anyone supposed to interpret that? – THIS IS WHY THEY INTRODUCED THE PROHIBITION ON TITLES OF NOBILITY, i.e, LIARS/LAWYERS)
A county is a person in a legal sense;
“In the United States bankruptcy act of 1898, it is provided that the word “persons” shall include corporations, except where otherwise specified, and officers, partnerships, and women, and, when used with reference to the commission of acts which are therein forbidden, shall include persons who are participants in the forbidden acts, and the agents, officers, and members of the board of directors or trustees, or their controlling bodies of corporations.” (Black’s 4th)
The effect of the 14th Amendment was that corporations were made “persons” under the law.
Corporations were made Persons
Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific (1886):
“The defendant Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids a state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. – Syllabus
“Before argument, MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE said:
“The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution which forbids a state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.”
Inalienable or civil rights?
The Difference between Inalienable Rights and Civil Rights:
Inalienable. A right that cannot be transferred or surrendered; esp., a natural right such as the right to own property.
– Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 1999
Article I, Section of the California Constitution declares: All men are by nature free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety, and happiness.
Civil Rights. A term applied to certain rights secured to citizens of the United States by the 13th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution, and by various acts of Congress made in pursuance therof. – Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (Third Revision, 1914)
Based on what we have just read there is a clear and distinct difference between inalienable rights guaranteed under the Constitution and Privileges and Immunities granted by the Constitution. The state citizen retains all his or her inalienable rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the newly freed black slaves and those who signed up for national citizenship received the benefit of privileges and immunities granted by the Constitution for the District of Columbia, the National Government Constitution for the Territories.
Here is a court case which illustrates this point. A Supreme court case from 1939, Colgate v. Harvey”
“A citizen of the United States is ipso facto and at the same time a citizen of the State in which he resides. While the 14th Amendment does not create a national citizenship, it has the effect of making that citizenship “paramount and dominant’.” — Supreme Court, Colgate vs. Harvey 296 U.S. 404, 427; 80 L. Ed. 299 1935; See page 309 Lawyers Ed. (Verified)
And another one:
The Court Case, Wadleigh v. Newhall (March 13, 1905) reads in part: “The rights, privileges and immunities which the fourteenth constitutional amendment and Rev. St. at 1979 [U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p.1262], for its enforcement, were designed to protect, are such as belong to citizens of the United States, as such, and not citizens of a state.” [Note: For cases in point see Vol. 10 Cen. Dig. Constitutional Law, at 625] (Verified)
Also: “…Parents have no right to the custody of their infant children, except subject to the paramount right of the state, to be exercised whenever deemed for the best interest of the children.” (From the same case) (Lt. Ed. 442. Wadleigh v. Newhall, 136 F. 941 (1905)).
Another case Wadleigh v. Newhall (1905,) reads as follows:
“The rights, privileges, and immunities which the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States guaranties, and which sec. 1979 of the Revised Statutes was designed to protect, jurisdiction for the redress of which is given by this paragraph, were the rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to citizens of the United States as such, but not the rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to the citizens of the state. There are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States in that relation and character, and it is these and these alone, that the state is forbidden to abridge.” – Wadleigh v. Newhall, 136 F. 941 (1905); Bradwell v. The State, 16 Wall. 130-138, 139, 21 L Ed 442 (1873)
What they are saying here, is that there are two kinds of citizens. At least during this time, there were also “state citizens.” Those were the original freemen that elected to participate in the state governments. The reason they used to create this “new citizenship” was the fact that people born in the District of Columbia were not citizens of any particular state.
Here in the “Slaughterhouse Cases, April 14, 1873,” the court explains:
Mr. Justice Miller observed: “It had been said by eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the United States except as he was a citizen of one of the states composing the Union. Those, therefore, who had been born and resided always in the District of Columbia or in the territories, though within the United States, were not citizens. Whether this proposition was sound or not had never been judicially decided.” And he said the question was put to rest by the amendment, (14th Amendment) and the distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a state was clearly recognized and established. “Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a state, but an important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the state to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized within the United States to be a citizen of the Union.” – The Supreme Court Reporter, Volume 21
What they are admitting here is that there was no class of actual “citizenship” of the United States prior to the 14th Amendment.
Here is a further extract from the Slaughterhouse cases (1872):
“The constitutional provision there alluded to did not create those rights, which it called privileges and immunities of citizens of the States. It threw around them in that clause no security for the citizen of the State in which they were claimed or exercised. Nor did it profess to control the power of the State governments over the rights of its own citizens.
“Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States that, whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.
“It would be the vainest show of learning to attempt to prove by citations of authority that, up to the adoption of the recent amendments, no claim or pretence was set up that those rights depended on the Federal government for their existence or protection beyond the very few express limitations which the Federal Constitution imposed upon the States — such, for instance, as the prohibition against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. But, with the exception of these and a few other restrictions, the entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States, as above defined, lay within the constitutional and legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal government. Was it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, by the simple declaration that no State should make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the States to the Federal government? And where it is declared that Congress Shall have the power to enforce that article, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States? –
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (7)
Here is some more from the Supreme Court Reporter, on the 14th Amendment. The next year, in 1874, the Court had this to say in the case of Cory et. al v. Carter (Nov. 1874):
In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court of the United States say, this is a declaration “that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular state, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt. The phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign states born within the United States.” It recognizes and establishes a “distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a state.”
“Of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States, and of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the state, and what they respectively are, we will, presently consider; but we wish to state here that it is only the former, which are placed by this clause under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the latter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph of the amendment. — Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 350 (Ind. 1874) (Verified)
Here is what Thurgood Marshall had to say in 1987, concerning the 14th Amendment and its effects on the United States and the Constitution:
“While the Union survived the Civil War, the Constitution did not…in its place arose a more promising basis for justice and equality, the 14th Amendment.” — Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall, May 6th 1987 (Verified)
Congressional Record, 1967 – Illegality of the 14th Amendment
How about the legality of the passage of this 14th Amendment? Here is a quote from a law journal showing that the 14th Amendment was never properly ratified. — From the Congressional Record – House, June 13, 1967, Page 15641:
“THE 14TH AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTECTION LAW OR TOOL OF USURPATION Mr. PRYOR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. RARICK] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arkansas? There was no objection.
Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, arrogantly ignoring clearcut expressions in the Constitution of the United States, the declared intent of its drafters notwithstanding, our unelected Federal judges read out prohibitions of the Constitution of the United States by adopting the fuzzy haze of the 14th amendment to legislate their personal ideas, prejudices, theories, guilt complexes, aims, and whims. Through the cooperation of intellectual educators, we have subjected ourselves to accept destructive use and meaning of words and phrases. We blindly accept new meanings and changed values to alter our traditional thoughts. We have tolerantly permitted the habitual misuse of words to serve as a vehicle to abandon our foundations and goals. Thus, the present use and expansion of the 14th amendment is a sham serving as a crutch and hoodwink to precipitate a quasi-legal approach for over-throw of the tender balances and protections of limitation found in the Constitution. But, interestingly enough, the 14th amendment–whether ratified or not–was but the expression of emotional outpouring of public sentiment following the War Between the States. Its obvious purpose and intent was but to free human beings from ownership as a chattel by other humans. Its aim was no more than to free the slaves. “
“As our politically appointed Federal judiciary proceeds down their chosen path of chaotic departure from the peoples’ government by substituting their personal law rationalized under the 14th amendment, their actions and verbiage brand them and their team as secessionist rebels with pens instead of guns–seeking to divide our Union. They must be stopped. Public opinion must be aroused. The Union must and shall be preserved. Mr. Speaker, I ask to include in the RECORD, following my remarks, House Concurrent Resolution 208 of the Louisiana Legislature urging this Congress to declare the 14th amendment illegal. Also, I include in the RECORD an informative and well-annotated treatise on the illegality of the 14th amendment–the play toy of our secessionist judges–which has been prepared by Judge Leander H. Perez, of Louisiana.” (8)
(This next section is taken from the same document. Prepared by Judge Perez.)
“Whereas the Reconstruction Acts of Congress unlawfully overthrew their existing governments, removed their lawfully constituted legislatures by military force and replaced them with rump legislatures which carried out military orders and pretended to ratify the 14th Amendment; and … ”
Further down we read more:
“The 14th Amendment is Unconstitutional — The purported 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution is and should be held to be ineffective, invalid, null, void and unconstitutional for the following reasons:
1. The Joint Resolution proposing said Amendment was not submitted to or adopted by a Constitutional Congress, Article 1, Section 3 and Article 5 of the U.S. Constitution.
2. The Joint Resolution was not submitted to the President for his approval. Article 1, Section 7.
3. The proposed 14th Amendment was rejected by more than one-fourth of all the states then in the Union, and it was never ratified by three-fourths of all the states in the Union. Article V (9)
(Further down we read more explicit details)
“5. Faced with the positive failure of ratification of the 14th Amendment, both Houses of Congress passed over the veto of the President three Acts known as Reconstruction Acts, between the dates of March 2 and July 19, 1867, especially the third of said Acts, 15 Stat. p. 14 etc., designed legally to remove with … “Military force” the lawfully constituted State Legislatures of the Southern States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas. In President Andrew Johnson’s Veto message on the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, he pointed out these unconstitutionalities: “If ever the American citizen should be left to the free exercise of his own judgment, it is when he is engaged in the work of forming the fundamental law under which he is to live. That work is his work, and it cannot properly be taken out of his hands. All this legislation proceeds upon the contrary Assumption that the people of each of these States shall have no constitution, except such as may be arbitrarily dictated by Congress, and formed under the restraint of military rule. A plain statement of facts makes this evident.”
“In all these States there are existing constitutions, framed in the accustomed way by the people. Congress, however, declares that these constitutions are not ‘loyal and republican,’ and requires the people to form them anew. What, then, in the opinion of Congress, is necessary to make the constitution of a State ‘loyal and republican?’ The original act answers the question: ‘It is universal negro suffrage, a question which the federal Constitution leaves exclusively to the States themselves. All this legislative machinery of martial law, military coercion, and political disfranchisement is avowedly for that purpose and none other. The existing constitutions of the ten States conform to the acknowledged standards of loyalty and republicanism. Indeed, if there are degrees in republican forms of government, their constitutions are more republican now, than when these States, four of which were members of the original thirteen, first became members of the Union.”
This is what President Johnson had to say regarding his veto of the July 19, 1867 Reconstruction Act:
“The veto of the original bill of the 2d of March was based on two distinct grounds, the interference of Congress in matters strictly appertaining to the reserved powers of the States, and the establishment of military tribunals for the trial of citizens in time of peace.
“It is now too late to say that these ten political communities are not States of this Union. Declarations to the contrary made in these three acts are contradicted again and again by repeated acts of legislation enacted by Congress from the year 1861 to the year 1867.
“During that period, while these States were in actual rebellion, and after that rebellion was brought to a close, they have been again and again recognized as States of the Union. Representation has been apportioned to them as States. They have been divided into judicial districts for the holding of district and circuit courts of the United States, as States of the Union only can be districted. The last act on this subject was passed July 23, 1866, by which every one of these ten States was arranged into districts and circuits.”
So, it was not a question of whether or not the states were in rebellion at the time, and not members of the union and needed Congress to step in. This was made clear by President Johnson when he vetoed the Reconstruction Acts.
Johnson then goes on to clarify the constitutionality of the 13th Amendment vs. the unconstitutionality of the proposed 14th Amendment:
“They have been called upon by Congress to act through their legislatures upon at least two amendments to the constitution of the United States. As States they have ratified one amendment, which required the vote of twenty-seven States of thirty-six then composing the Union. When the requisite twenty-seven votes were given in favor of that amendment–seven of which votes were given by seven of these ten States–it was proclaimed to be a part of the Constitution of the United States, and slavery was declared no longer to exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction. If these seven States were not legal States of the Union; it follows as an inevitable consequence that in some States slavery -yet exists. It does not exist in these seven States, for they have abolished it also in their State constitutions; but Kentucky not having done so, it would still re-main in that State. But, in truth, if this assumption that these States have no legal State governments be true, then the abolition of slavery by these illegal governments binds no one, for Congress now denies to these States the power to abolish slavery by denying to them the power to elect a legal State legislature, or to frame a constitution for any purpose, even for such a purpose as the abolition of slavery.”
“As to the other constitutional amendment having reference to suffrage, it happens that these States have not accepted it. The consequence is, that it has never been -proclaimed or understood, even by Congress, to be a part of the Constitution of the United States. The Senate of the United States has repeatedly given its sanction to the appointment of judges, district attorneys, and marshals for every one of these States; yet, if they are not legal States, not one of these judges is authorized to hold a court. So, too, both houses of Congress have passed appropriation bills to pay all these judges, attorneys and officers of the United States for exercising their functions in these States. Again, in the machinery of the internal revenue laws, all these States are districted, not as ‘Territories,’ but as ‘States.’
There you have it. Actual proof from President Andrew Johnson, from July 19, 1867, saying that the 14th Amendment is unlawful and that tax districts are now called “States.” This is how Congress intended to levy income tax on the private individual. Through trickery and deception.
President Johnson continues:
“To me these considerations are conclusive of the unconstitutionality of this part of the bill now before me, and I earnestly commend their consideration to the deliberate judgment of Congress. [And now to the Court.] “Within a period less than a year the legislation of Congress has attempted to strip the executive department of the government of some of its essential powers. The Constitution, and the oath provided in it, devolve upon the President the power and duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. The Constitution, in order to carry out this power, gives him the choice of the agents, and makes them subject to his control and supervision. But in the execution of these laws the constitutional obligation upon the President remains, but the powers to exercise that constitutional duty is effectually taken away. The military commander is, as to the power of appointment, made to take· the place of its President, and the General of the Army the place of the Senate; and any attempt on the part of the President to assert his own constitutional power may, under pretense of law, be met by official insubordination. It is to be feared that these military officers, looking to the authority given by these laws rather than to the letter of the Constitution, will recognize no authority but the commander of the district and the General of the Army.”
Congress continues, from 1967:
“No one can contend that the Reconstruction Acts were ever upheld as being valid and constitutional. They were brought into question, but the Courts either avoided decision or were prevented by Congress from finally adjudicating upon their constitutionality.”
“Johnson replaced Stanton with Ulysses S. Grant. The Senate passed a measure in protest and Grant stepped down and handed the post back to Stanton. Johnson attempted to have Stanton replaced again on February 21, 1868 and appointed General Lorenzo Thomas, as secretary of war.
“On March 2, 1867, the Tenure Act was passed by Congress over the veto of United States President Andrew Johnson. The Tenure of Office Act was a United States federal law that was intended to restrict the power of the President of the United States to remove certain officeholders without the approval of the Senate and was designed to shield members of Johnson’s Cabinet like Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, who had been a leading Republican in the Lincoln administration. Stanton refused to leave, and Congress initiated formal impeachment proceedings against the president. On February 24, Johnson was impeached, and on March 13 his impeachment trial began in the Senate under the direction of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase. The impeachment did not succeed, however. In a joint action, the states of Georgia and Mississippi brought suit against the President and the Secretary of War, (6 Wall. 50-78, 154 U.S. 554). The Court said that: “The bill then sets forth that the intent and design of the Acts of Congress, as apparent on their face and by their terms, are to overthrow and annul this existing state government, and to erect another and different government in its place, unauthorized by the Constitution and in defiance of its guaranties; and that, in furtherance of this intent and design, the defendants, the Secretary of War, the General of the Army, and Major-General Pope, acting under orders of the President, are about setting in motion a portion of the army to take military possession of the state, and threaten to subvert her government and subject her people to military rule; that the state is holding inadequate means to resist the power and force of the Executive Department of the United States; and she therefore insists that such protection can, and ought to be afforded by a decree or order of his court in the premises.”
What this means is that the states were being overthrown by Congress as well, and the President wasn’t having any of it and neither was Georgia or Mississippi.
Pausing to interject here – The Act they are referring to as follows which stripped the Supreme Court of its authority and limited its jurisdiction was ‘An Act to amend “An Act to amend the judiciary act . . . (Habeas Corpus Act of 1868), March 27, 1868 –
Con’t from the Congressional Record, 1967:
“When William H. McCardle used the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 to challenge his imprisonment, members of Congress feared his case could test the legality of Reconstruction. While the Supreme Court considered McCardle’s arguments, Congress amended the 1867 act to repeal the court’s habeas corpus power. The court recognized Congress’s authority to limit its jurisdiction and dismissed McCardle’s appeal.”
Continuing: “In another case, ex parte William H. McCardle (7 Wall. 506-515), a petition for the writ of habeas corpus for unlawful restraint by military force of a citizen not in the military service of the United States was before the United States Supreme Court. After the case was argued and taken under advisement, and before conference in regard to the decision to be made, Congress passed an emergency Act, (Act March 27, 1868, 15 Stat. at L. 44), vetoed by the President and repassed over his veto, repealing the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court in such case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without passing upon the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts, under which the non-military citizen was held by the military without benefit of writ of habeas corpus, in violation of Section 9, Article I of the U.S. Constitution which prohibits the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. That Act of Congress placed the Reconstruction Acts beyond judicial recourse and avoided tests of constitutionality.”
Con’t: “It is recorded that one of the Supreme Court Justices, Grier, protested against the action of the Court as follows: “This case was fully argued in the beginning of this month. It is a case which involves the liberty and rights, not only of the appellant but of millions of our fellow citizens. The country and the parties had a right to expect that it would receive the immediate and solemn attention of the court. By the postponement of this case we shall subject ourselves, whether justly or unjustly, to the imputation that we have evaded the performance of a duty imposed on us by the Constitution, and waited for Legislative interposition to supersede our action, and relieve us from responsibility. I am not willing to be a partaker of the eulogy or opprobrium that may follow. I can only say … I am ashamed that such opprobrium should be cast upon the court and that it cannot be refuted.”
“The ten States were organized into Military Districts under the unconstitutional “Re-construction Acts,” their lawfully constituted Legislature illegally were removed by “military force,” and they were replaced by rump, so-called Legislatures, seven of which carried out military orders and pretended to ratify the 14th Amendment, as follows: Arkansas on April 6, 1868; North Carolina on July 2, 1868; Florida on June 9, 1868; Louisiana on July 9, 1868; South Carolina on July 9, 1868; Alabama on July 13, 1868; and Georgia on July 21, 1868.” (10)
Therefore, based on what our own Congressmen have said in the Congressional record, we can conclude, with all certainty, that the Constitution was suspended in 1863, was never changed back to bring about the return of lawful government and furthermore, the government that did carry on, acted under the presumption that no Constitution existed. This was all under Martial Law. The states were then made subordinate to the Federal Government and new state constitutions were forced upon the states, through “freedom of choice.”
Following this entire period of history, more court decisions came down nullifying the validity of the 14th Amendment. Continuing from the Congressional Record of 1967:
“In what is considered the leading case, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 448, 59 S. Ct. 972 (1939), the U.S. Supreme Court did not uphold the validity of the 14th Amendment.
“In that case, the Court brushed aside constitutional questions as though they did not exist. For instance, the Court made the statement that: “The legislatures of Georgia, North Carolina and South Carolina had rejected the amendment in November and December, 1866. New governments were erected in those States (and in others) under the direction of Congress. The new legislatures ratified the amendment, that of North Carolina on July 4, 1868, that of South Carolina on July 9, 1868, and that of Georgia on July 21, 1868.”
(The precise reasoning this violated the Constitution is put forth in this statement, from the Congressional Record)
“Those Reconstruction Acts of Congress and all acts and things unlawfully done there under were in violation of Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, which required the United States to guarantee every State in the Union a republican form of government. They violated Article I, Section 3, and Article V of the Constitution, which entitled every State in the Union to two Senators, because under provisions of these unlawful Acts of Congress, 10 States were deprived of having two Senators, or equal suffrage in the Senate.”
(The final words from the Congressional Record are as follows)
“The federal courts actually refuse to hear argument on the invalidity of the 14th Amendment, even when the issue is presented squarely by the pleadings and the evidence as above. Only an aroused public sentiment in favor of preserving the Constitution and our institutions and freedoms under constitutional government, and the future security of our country, will break the political barrier which now prevents judicial consideration of the unconstitutionality of the 14th amendment.”
We can see that the state legislatures had been replaced by Congress and therefore not entitled to their vote in regards to the 14th Amendment. According to Congress’s own intent, to exclude those states and institute other state legislatures to vote, this would extinguish the legality of the seven southern states which had voted to ratify the 13th Amendment. This creates a little bit of a problem, either the states, which had succeeded by 1861 were legally included in the Union of states who voted on the 13th Amendment, and were not included in the passage of the 14th, or the 13th Amendment is invalid, because those States were not included. Do you see the dilemma?
This is what was stated in the Congressional Record in 1967:
“If further proof were needed that these States were operating under legally constituted governments as member States in the Union, the ratification of the 13th Amendment by December 8, 1865 undoubtedly supplies this official proof. If the Southern States were not member States of the Union, the 13th Amendment would not have been submitted to their Legislatures for ratification.” (11)
Now we are going to go through a number of cases relating to State vs US citizenship both before and after the passage of the 14th Amendment. Prior to 1868, a “citizen of the United States was considered a citizen of one of the several states, only.
Here’s what the court had to say about the existence of a “US Citizen” in 1855 in Ex Parte Frank Knowles:
“By metaphysical refinement, in examining the form of our government, it might be correctly said that there is no such thing as a citizen of the United States. But constant usage — arising from convenience, and perhaps necessity, and dating from the formation of the Confederacy — has given substantial existence to the idea which the term conveys. A citizen of any one of the States of the Union, is held to be, and called a citizen of the United States, although technically and abstractly there is no such thing. To conceive a citizen of the United States who is not a citizen of some one of the States, is totally foreign to the idea, and inconsistent with the proper construction and common understanding of the expression as used in the Constitution, which must be deduced from its various other provisions. The object then to be attained, by the exercise of the power of naturalization, was to make citizens of the respective States.”
“What, however, are the courts of competent jurisdiction? To answer this, we must turn to the Act of Congress of 1802, and be governed by the rule there established. Congress having power under the Constitution to make the rule, certainly had the right to make the exercise of it a judicial power, and fix upon the class of courts which might be invested with the jurisdiction. This it could do as a part of the rule, although it might not directly confer the jurisdiction. By the third section of the Act of 1802, it is enacted ‘that every court of record in any individual State, having common law jurisdiction and a seal, and clerk or prothonotary, shall be considered as a District Court within the meaning of this Act.’ We have already determined that this court has not the jurisdiction: because its powers are, exclusively, appellate. The District Courts of this State are courts of original and common law jurisdiction; are courts of record; and have a seal and clerk, and consequently come fully within the description of the rule laid down by the act of 1802; and, therefore, under the act of this State of 1853, are fully invested with power and jurisdiction to naturalize foreigners who exhibit the qualifications fixed by the laws of the United States. The other courts of this State are inferior and of limited powers. They are made courts of record by our statutes, but they have only statute and not common law jurisdiction; and, therefore, not coming within the class enumerated by the act of Congress, have no power to grant naturalization, and any attempt of the kind would be necessarily coram non judiee and void.” –
Ex Parte Frank Knowles 5 Cal. 300 (1855) (12)
Another case which differentiates between state’s citizen’s rights and US citizens privileges. From 1872 – Ellen Van Valkenburg v. Edward Brown:
“STATUS OF CITIZENSHIP NOT CONFERRRED BY RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
“No white person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, or born without those limits, and subsequently naturalized under their laws, owes the status of citizenship to the recent amendments to the Federal Constitution.
#1. It is claimed that the plaintiff (a white female) is a citizen of the United States and of this State. Undoubtedly she is. It is argued that she became such by force of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, already recited. This, however, is a mistake. It could as well be claimed that she became free by the effect of the Thirteenth Amendment, by which slavery was abolished; for she was no less a citizen than she was free before the adoption of either of these amendments. No white person born within the limits of the Unites States, and subject to their jurisdiction, or born without those limits, and subsequently naturalized under their laws, owes the status of citizenship to the recent amendments to the Federal Constitution. The history and aim of the Fourteenth Amendment is well known, and the purpose it had in view of its adoption well understood. The purpose was to confer the status of citizenship upon a numerous class of persons domiciled within the limits of the United States, who could not be brought within the operation of the naturalization laws because native born, and whose birth , though native, had at the same time left them without status of citizenship. These persons were not white persons, but were, in the main, persons of African descent, who had been held in slavery in this country, or, if having themselves never been held in slavery, were the native born descendants of slaves. Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment it was settled that neither slaves, nor those who had been such, nor the descendants of these, though native and free born, were capable of becoming citizens of the United States. Dred Scott v Sandford, 19 How 393. The Thirteenth Amendment, though conferring the boon of freedom upon native-born persons of African blood, had yet left them under an insuperable bar as to citizenship; and it was mainly to remedy this condition that the Fourteen Amendment was adopted. –
Ellen Van Valkenburg v. Edward Brown 43 Cal 43, 47 (1872) (Verified) (13)
The following case demonstrates the status of both state and US citizens and differentiates them both. United States v Anthony (1873):
“3. The 14th amendment defines and declares who shall be citizens of the United States, and protects only such rights as are rights belonging to persons as citizens of the United States, and not rights belonging to persons as citizens of a state.
“The fourteenth amendment creates and defines citizenship of the United States. It had long been contended, and had been held by many learned authorities, and had never been judicially decided to the contrary, that there was no such thing as a citizen of the United States, except as that condition arose from citizenship of some state. No mode existed, it was said, of obtaining a citizenship of the United States, except by first becoming a citizen of some state. This question is now at rest. The fourteenth amendment defines and declares who shall be citizens of the United States, to wit, “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” The latter qualification was intended to exclude the children of foreign representatives and the like. With this qualification, every person born in the United States or naturalized is declared to be a citizen of the United States and of the state wherein he resides.
“The rights of citizens of the state, as such, are not under consideration in the fourteenth amendment. They stand as they did before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, and are fully guaranteed by other provisions. The rights of citizens of the states have been the subject of judicial decision on more than one occasion. Cornfield v. Coryell [Case No.3, 230]; Ward v. Maryland, 12Wall. [79U.S.) 418,430; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. [73U.S.] 108.
Con’t: “If the state of New York should provide that no person should vote until he had reached the age of thirty years, or after he had reached the age of fifty, or that no person having gray hair, or who had not the use of all his limbs, should been titled to vote, I do not see how it could be held to be a violation of any right derived or held under the constitution of the United States. We might say that such regulations were unjust, tyrannical, unfit for the regulation of an intelligent state but, if rights of a citizen are thereby violated, they are of that fundamental class, derived from his position as a citizen of the state, and not those limited rights belonging to him as a citizen of the United States; and such was the decision in Cornfield v. Coryell [supra].
United States v Anthony. (1873) [11 Blatchf .200; 5 Chi. Leg. News. 462, 493; 17 Int. Rev. Rec. 197; 30 Leg. Int. 266; 5 Leg. Op. 63; 20 Pittsb. Leg. J. 199.]1 (Verified) (14)
From the wording of the case we just read through, as early as 1873, the court held that the privileges and immunities of the US citizen were far better in their effect of rights than the rights of state citizens therefore it would behoove anyone to join the US citizenry as opposed to being subject to voter restrictions until the age of 50 or being excluded from voting because of grey hair. At this point in history, people were not suspecting a bait and switch, which is exactly what occurred.
Here is a case from 1874 – Cory v Carter:
“Second. “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”
This clause does not refer to citizens of the states. It embraces only citizens of the United States… It places the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States under protection of the Federal Constitution, and leaves the privileges and immunities of citizens of a state under protection of the state constitution. This is fully shown by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36.
– Cory v Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 349-350, Supreme Court 1874 (15)
Another case from 1875, United States v. Cruikshank, lays out the premise that citizenship of the national government does not guarantee a right to bear arms or several other rights mentioned in the Bill of Rights. These US citizens have an entirely different constitution, or they have been only granted privileges which can be revoked at any time:
“2. There is in our political system a government of each of the several States, and a Government of the United States. Each is distinct from the others, and has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of those governments will be different from those he has under the other.
“6. The right to bear arms is not granted by the Constitution; neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The Second Amendments means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress, and has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the National Government.
- Sovereignty, for the protection of the rights of life and personal liberty within the respective States, rests alone with the States.
– United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (16)
Another case, shortly after the Civil War and the creation of the corporate state of Washington DC, further delineated the federal government’s scope of power and upon whom it was intended to affect, being 14th Amendment citizens. The following case is from 1883 – United States v. Harris:
“The indictment in the case charged two inspectors of a municipal election in the State of Kentucky with refusing to receive and count at such election the vote of William Garner, a citizen of the United States, of African descent. It was contended by the defendants that it was not within the constitutional power of Congress to pass the section upon which the indictment was based.
Con’t: “Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, says: “Whenever, therefore, a question arises concerning the constitutionality of a particular power, the first question is whether the power be expressed in the Constitution. If it be, the question is decided. If it be not expressed, the next inquiry must be whether it is properly an incident to an express power and necessary to its execution. If it be, then it may be exercised by Congress. If not, Congress cannot exercise it.” Sect. 1243, referring to Virginia Reports and Resolutions, January, 1800, pp. 33, 34; President Monroe’s Exposition and Message of May 4, 1822, p. 47; 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 287, 288; 5 Marshall’s Wash. App., Note 3; 1 Hamilton’s Works, 117, 121.
“The purpose and effect of the two sections of the Fourteenth Amendment above quoted were clearly defined by Mr. Justice Bradley in the case of United States v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308, as follows: “It is a guaranty of protection against the acts of the State government itself. It is a guaranty against the exertion of arbitrary and tyrannical power on the part of the government and legislature of the State, not a guaranty against the commission of individual offences; and the power of Congress, whether express or implied, to legislate for the enforcement of such a guaranty does not extend to the passage of laws for the suppression of crime within the States. The enforcement of the guaranty does not require or authorize Congress to perform “the duty that the guaranty itself supposes it to be the duty of the State to perform, and which it requires the State to perform.”
“The duty of protecting all its citizens in the enjoyment of an equality of rights was originally assumed by the States, and it remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the States do not deny the right. This the amendment guarantees, and no more. The power of the national government is limited to this guaranty.” 92 U.S. 542.
“In the indictment in this case, for instance, which would be a good indictment under the law if the law itself were valid, there is no intimation that the State of Tennessee has passed any law or done any act forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. On the contrary, the gravamen of the charge against the accused is that they conspired to deprive certain citizens of the United States and of the State of Tennessee of the equal protection accorded them by the laws of Tennessee.
“As, therefore, the section of the law under consideration is directed exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State or their administration by her officers, we are clear in the opinion that it is not warranted by any clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
“But the question with which we have to deal is, does the Thirteenth Amendment warrant the enactment of sect. 5519 of the Revised Statutes. We are of opinion that it does not. Our conclusion is based on the fact that the provisions of that section are broader than the Thirteenth Amendment would justify.
“The court, speaking by the Chief Justice, said: “It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government. The courts enforce the legislative will, when ascertained, if within the constitutional grant of power. But if Congress steps outside of its constitutional limitation and attempts that which is beyond its reach, the courts are authorized to, and when called upon must, annul its encroachment upon the reserved rights of the States and the people.”
“And the court declared that it could not limit the statute so as to bring it within the constitutional power of Congress, and concluded: “We must, therefore, decide that Congress has not as yet provided by appropriate legislation for the punishment of the offences charged in the indictment.”
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 Supreme Court of the United States – Filed: January 22nd, 1883 (Verified) (17)
Basically the court reiterates here that the Congress can make no law regarding the punishment of crimes committed in the states. The way the Congress got around this was to create artificial states under the federal government and to extend that jurisdiction to the citizens through the 14th Amendment franchise.
Here is a case from 1891-92 – Boyd v State of Nebraska Thayer:
“But in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 404, Mr. Chief Justice TENEY, delivering the opinion of the court, said: ‘The words ‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizens,’ are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the ‘sovereign people,’ and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. * * * In discussing this question, we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a state may confer within its own limits and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a state, that he must be a citizen of the United States. He may have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a state, and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other state; for, previous to the adoption of the constitution of the United States, every state had the undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen, and to endow him with all its rights. But this character, of course, was confined to the boundaries of the state, and gave him no rights or privileges in other states beyond those secured to him by the laws of nations and the comity of states. Nor have the several states surrendered the power of conferring these rights and privileges by adopting the constitution of the United States. Each state may still confer them upon an alien, or any one it thinks proper, or upon any class or description of persons; yet he would not be a citizen in the sense in which that word is used in the constitution of the United States, nor entitled to sue as such in one of its courts, nor to the privileges and immunities of a citizen in the other states. The rights which he would acquire would be restricted to the state which gave them. The constitution has conferred on congress the right to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and this right is evidently exclusive, and has always been held by this court to be so. Consequently no state, since the adoption of the constitution, can, by naturalizing an alien, invest him with the rights and privileges secured to a citizen of a state under the federal government, although, so far as the state alone was concerned, he would undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a citizen, and clothed with all the rights and immunities which the constitution and laws of the state attached to that character.” (Verified) (18)
Boyd v State of Nebraska Thayer. 1891-92
Here is another one from 1908 – Twining v. New Jersey:
“In each case, the Slaughter-House Cases were cited by the court, and in the latter case, the rights described by Mr. Justice Washington were again treated as rights of state citizenship under state protection. If then it be assumed, without deciding the point, that an exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is what is described as a fundamental right belonging to all who live under a free government, and incapable of impairment by legislation or judicial decision, it is, so far as the States are concerned, a fundamental right inherent in state citizenship, and is a privilege or immunity of that citizenship only. Privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, on the other hand, are only such as arise out of the nature and essential character of the National Government, or are specifically granted or secured to all citizens or persons by the Constitution of the United States.” Slaughter-House Cases, supra, p. 83 U. S. 79; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 136 U. S. 448; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 152 U. S. 382. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (19) (Verified)
The ideas being conveyed here is that the right against self-incrimination was held to be a state citizen “inalienable right,” and not a US citizen “benefit.”
Here is more from Twining v New Jersey, illustrating how US citizens are not given the right to bear arms guaranteed by the 2nd Amendment, the right against self-incrimination guaranteed by the 5th Amendment, or the “trial by Jury” guaranteed by the 7th Amendment.
“The 14th Amendment, it is observed by Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the court, removed the doubt whether there could be a citizenship of the United States independent of citizenship of the state, by recognizing or creating and defining the former. ‘It is quite clear, then,’ he proceeds to say (p. 74), ‘that there is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a state, which are distinct from each other and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.’ The description of the privileges and immunities of state citizenship, given by Mr. Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, Fed. Cas. No. 3,230, is then quoted, approved, and said to include ‘those rights which are fundamental,’ to embrace ‘nearly every civil right for the establishment and protection of which organized government is instituted,’ and ‘to be the class of rights which the state governments were created to establish and secure.’
“The distinction between national and state citizenship and their respective privileges there drawn has come to be firmly established. And so it was held that the right of peaceable assembly [211 U.S. 78, 97] for a lawful purpose (it not appearing that the purpose had any reference to the national government) was not a right secured by the Constitution of the United States, although it was said that the right existed before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, and that ‘it is and always has been one of the attributes of citizenship under a free government.’ United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 , 23 S. L. ed. 588, 591. And see Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 , 51 L. ed. 65, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6. In each case the Slaughter-House Cases were cited by the court, and in the latter case the rights described by Mr. Justice Washington were again treated as rights of state citizenship, under state protection. If, then, it be assumed, without deciding the point, that an exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is what is described as a fundamental right belonging to all who live under a free government, and incapable of impairment by legislation or judicial decision, it is, so far as the states are concerned, a fundamental right inherent in state citizenship, and is a privilege or immunity of that citizenship only. Privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, on the other hand, are only such as arise out of the nature and essential character of the national government, or are specifically granted or secured to all citizens or persons by the Constitution of the United States. Slaughter- House Cases, supra, p. 79; Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 , 34 S. L. ed. 519, 524, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 930; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 , 38 S. L. ed. 485, 487, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570. Thus, among the rights and privileges of national citizenship recognized by this court are the right to pass freely from state to state (Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L. ed. 745); the right to petition Congress for a redress of grievances (United States v. Cruikshank, supra); the right to vote for national officers (Ex parte Yarbrought, 110 U.S. 651 , 28 L. ed. 274, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 , 45 L. ed. 84, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 17); the right to enter the public lands (United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 , 28 L. ed. 673, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35); the right to be protected against violence while in the lawful custody of a United States marshal (Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 , 36 L. ed. 429, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617); and the right to inform the United States authorities of violation of its laws (Re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 , 39 L. ed. 1080, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 959). [211 U.S. 78, 98]
“The right of trial by jury in civil cases, guaranteed by the 7th Amendment (Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 , 23 L. ed. 678), and the right to bear arms, guaranteed by the 2d Amendment (Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 , 29 L. ed. 615, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580), have been distinctly held not to be privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, guaranteed by the 14th Amendment against abridgment by the states, and in effect the same decision was made in respect of the guaranty against prosecution, except by indictment of a grand jury, contained in the 5th Amendment (Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 , 28 L. ed. 232, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 292), [211 U.S. 78, 99] and in respect of the right to be confronted with witnesses, contained in the 6th Amendment (West v. Louisiana, 191 U.S. 258 , 48 L. ed. 965, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650). In Maxwell v. Dow, supra, where the plaintiff in error had been convicted in a state court of a felony upon an information, and by a jury of eight persons, it was held that the indictment, made indispensable by the 5th Amendment, and the trial by jury, guaranteed by the 6th Amendment, were not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as those words were used in the 14th Amendment. … If it be possible to render the principle which governed the decision more clear, it is done so by the dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan. We conclude, therefore, that the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship guaranteed by this clause of the 14th Amendment against abridgment by the states.
“These principles grow out of the proposition universally accepted by American courts on the authority of Coke, that the words ‘due process of law’ are equivalent in meaning to the words ‘law of the land,’ contained in that chapter of Magna Charta which provides that ‘no freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or any wise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.’ Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. 272, 15 L. ed. 372; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 , 24 L. ed. 616; Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329; Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. 500; McGehee, Due Process of Law, 16.
(Ed. Note: Applicable only in a general sense, not for the point of the case itself.)
“The states had guarded the privilege [211 U.S. 78, 114] to the satisfaction of their own people up to the adoption of the 14th Amendment. No reason is perceived why they cannot continue to do so. The power of their people ought not to be fettered, their sense of responsibility lessened, and their capacity for sober and restrained self-government weakened, by forced construction of the Federal Constitution. We do not pass upon the conflict, because, for the reasons given, we think that the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the states is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitution. –
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)
Here is another case from 1909 – Gardina v. Board of Registrars of Jefferson County:
“There are, then, under our republican form of government, two classes of citizens, one of the United States and one of the state”. –
Gardina v. Board of Registrars of Jefferson County, 160 Ala. 155; 48 So. 788 (1909) (Unverified- Good source)
Once again, now in Tashiro v Jordan, a 1928 case, the Supreme Court website has removed or edited the important sections out.
“That there is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a state, and the privileges and immunities of one are not the same as the other is well established by the decisions of the courts of this country. The leading cases upon the subjects are those decided by the supreme court of the United States and reported in 16 Wall. 36, and known as the Slaughter-House cases.”
Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928) (Verified) (20)
(20)https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/278/123/ (Sourced from elsewhere)
Case involving differences between state citizen’s rights and 14th Amendments US citizen “privileges.” 1966 – Crosse v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore City:
“Both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, it has not been necessary for a person to be a citizen of the United States in order to be a citizen of his state. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73-74 (1873); and see Short v. State, 80 Md. 392, 401-02, 31 Atl. 322 (1895). See also Spear, State Citizenship, 16 Albany L.J. 24 (1877). Citizenship of the United States is defined by the Fourteenth Amendment and federal statutes, but the requirements for citizenship of a state generally depend not upon definition but the constitutional or statutory context in which the term is used. Risewick v. Davis, 19 Md. 82, 93 (1862); Halaby v. Board of Directors of University of Cincinnati, 162 Ohio St. 290, 293, 123 N.E.2d 3 (1954) and authorities therein cited.” – Crosse v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore City 243 Md. 555 (1966) (21)
Excellent recent state citizens’ rights case – 1993 – Jones v. Temmer:
“To overcome the Article III limitation on standing, often referred to as the “injury in fact” requirement, a plaintiff must at a minimum show an actual or threatened injury caused by the defendant and that a favorable judicial decision is likely to redress the injury. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S. Ct. 752, 758, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1982). There are, in addition, prudential principles applying to standing that limit the class of persons who may invoke a courts’ powers. Id. at 474, 102 S. Ct. at 759-60. In Valley Forge Christian College, the court listed the three “prudential principles”: (1) the plaintiff must assert his own rights and may not rely on the constitutional rights of third parties; (2) the court must not adjudicate “generalized grievances” that are more appropriately addressed by the executive or legislative branches of government; and (3) the plaintiff must come within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. Id. at 474-75, 102 S. Ct. at 759-60.
“By its terms, § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment protects only “persons born or naturalized in the United States.”
“Defendants further argue that all plaintiffs lack standing to bring the privileges and immunities portion of the first claim for relief because that clause protects nonresidents of Colorado from discrimination based on their nonresident status, and here, each plaintiff is a resident of Colorado. Plaintiffs respond that defendants have confused the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with the privileges and immunities clause under Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution.
“The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects very few rights because it neither incorporates any of the Bill of Rights nor protects all rights of individual citizens. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873). Instead, this provision protects only those rights peculiar to being a citizen of the federal government; it does not protect those rights which relate to state citizenship.
“The Supreme Court has established two necessary elements for recovery of damages under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim. A plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the United States Constitution and, second, that the defendant deprived plaintiff of this right under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1604, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). Here, defendants do not dispute that all actions were taken under color of state law; the only issue is whether plaintiffs suffered a constitutional deprivation. Plaintiffs allege violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. I will address, seriatim, plaintiffs claims relating to privileges and immunities, substantive due process and equal protection.
Con’t: “The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects very few rights. To my knowledge, in the history of the United States Supreme Court, only one decision determined that a state violated this provision and that decision was overruled within a few years. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252, 80 L. Ed. 299 (1935), overruled in Madden v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 60 S. Ct. 406, 84 L. Ed. 590 (1940). In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873), the Supreme Court held that this clause neither incorporates the Bill of Rights nor protects all rights of individual citizens. Rather the provision protects only those rights peculiar to being a citizen of the United States; it does not protect those rights which relate to state citizenship. As a court of this district noted, “the argument that the clause creates a substantive right to pursue one’s lawful occupation or profession free from state limitations was laid to rest long ago by the United States Supreme Court.” Galahad v. Weinshienk, 555 F. Supp. 1201, 1207 (D.Colo.1993).
– Jones v. Temmer, 829 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1993) (22)
There is a difference between state and US citizens laid out in the immigration statutes as well:
“Immigration and naturalization act 66 stat., 163
PUBLIC LAW 4 14 – JUNE 27, 1952
AN ACT To revise the laws relating to immigration, naturalization, and nationality; [H.R. 5678] and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act, divided into titles, chapters, and sections according to the following table of contents, may be cited as the “Immigration and Nationality Act”.
TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE I—GENERAL See. 101. Definitions.
(21) The term “national” means a person owing permanent allegiance to a state.
(22) The term “national of the United States” means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.”
In the following “California Government Code” I isolate the sovereignty of the people, who those people are, and then I bring up a small controversy of what is the exact “state” being referred to here? This may be slightly confusing, so if it is, don’t worry, it’s not all that important. I’m simply being a completionist here by including this as there may be something important here and I don’t want to overlook it.
California Code, Government Code – GOV CA GOVT § 100 (2017)
(a) The sovereignty of the state resides in the people thereof, and all writs and processes shall issue in their name.
(b) The style of all process shall be “The People of the State of California,” and all prosecutions shall be conducted in their name and by their authority.
California Code, Government Code – GOV CA GOVT § 240
The people, as a political body, consist of:
(a) Citizens who are electors.
(b) Citizens not electors.
(Amended by Stats. 1966, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 161.)
California Code, Government Code – GOV CA GOVT § 241
The citizens of the State are:
(a) All persons born in the State and residing within it, except the children of transient aliens and of alien public ministers and consuls.
(b) All persons born out of the State who are citizens of the United States and residing within the State.
The way it is being done here is VERY twisted, but I have investigated this and followed up on the research of Thomas; Marvin Maxwell, in his book ‘Identity Fraud,’ and I agree with his interpretation. It took a little bit for me to understand this, but he is actually correct, I can see clearly.
In the first instance, in the government code section 100 they are referring to the ‘people’ as the sovereignty. “the sovereignty of the state resides in the people.”
In the second instance at section 240, it defines who the ‘people’ are. Both citizens who are electors and citizens not electors.
Pages 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100 Not Included in Free Edition – To Order the FULL Version in either Softcover or E-Book, Please Visit the Store.