Chapter 11: Surprise! The United States is Now A Corporation
Shortly after the Civil War was over, we had a change of government in the United States and the legal jargon got even more confused. The purpose of this appears to have been to establish a way to turn people into property. An illustrious magic trick by all decent standards. The citizen of the United States, which included the newly freed black slaves and anyone who wanted the benefits of the same, could become a franchise of the corporate business called… are you ready for this? The UNITED STATES. This corporation would be located… guess where? In the same 68 square miles that the federal government has jurisdiction over. But now, the jurisdiction could be extended to millions of franchisees not yet established.
The Residence Act in 1790 created a federal district that became the capital of the United States. It was formed from land donated by the states of Maryland and Virginia. This was the previous seat of Washington, named after George Washington.
According to Wiki: “The District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801, officially An Act Concerning the District of Columbia (6th Congress, 2nd Sess., ch. 15, 2 Stat. 103, February 27, 1801), is an organic act enacted by the United States Congress in accordance with Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. It formally placed the District of Columbia under the control of the United States Congress and organized the unincorporated territory within the District into two counties: Washington County to the north and east of the Potomac River and Alexandria County to the west and south.”
And further, we read: “On May 3, 1802, the City of Washington was granted a municipal government consisting of a mayor appointed by the President of the United States. The portion of the District of Columbia ceded by Virginia was returned to that state in 1846-47. The District of Columbia Organic Act of 1871 replaced the municipal governments of the City of Washington, Georgetown, and Washington County with a single, unified government for the whole District.”
Here is the Act that set up the new Corporate Government in 1871, after the Civil War:
16 United States Statutes at Large 419
FORTY FIRST CONGRESS SESSION III
CHAPTER 62, 1871
CHAP. LXII. — An Act to provide a government for the District of Columbia.
Then it goes on to read:
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, That all that part of the territory of the United States included within the limits of the District of Columbia be, and the same is hereby, created into a government by the name of the District of Columbia, by which name it is hereby constituted a body corporate for municipal purposes, and may contract with, sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, have a seal, and exercise all other powers of a municipal corporation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the provisions of this act.”
In 20 Corpus Juris Secundum [Corporations] at 1786:
“The United States government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state.”
28 U.S. Code § 88. District of Columbia
Notes. The District of Columbia constitutes one judicial district. Court shall be held at Washington. (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 875.)
Congress repealed the territorial government in 1874. The Act of 1871 had created a municipal government for the federal district. (1) So, there it is, The United States federal government is a CORPORATION and corporations have stock, members, franchises, and employees, all of which are subject to taxation.
(1) Tindall, William (1909). Origin and government of the District of Columbia. J. Byrne & co. p. 9
Here is a court case that illustrate the position of our current administration: Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia (1824)
“It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted. Thus, many States of this Union who have an interest in Banks, are not suable even in their own Courts; yet they never exempt the corporation from being sued. The State of Georgia, by giving to the Bank the capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign character, so far as respects the transactions of the Bank, and waives all the privileges of that character. As a member of a corporation, a government never exercises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and exercises no other power in the management of the affairs of the corporation, than are expressly given by the incorporating act.” –
US Supreme Court decision in Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia (1824) 22 US (9 Wheat) 904, 6 L.Ed 244 (Verified) (2)
Here are two more cases which basically illustrates the same thing. United States v. Cook (1873):
“Laches is not imputable to the government, in its character as sovereign, by those subject to its dominion. United States v. Kilpatrick, 9 Wheat. 735; Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269. Still a government may suffer loss through the negligence of its officers. If it comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there. – United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. 591 (1873) (Verified) (3)
And one more – United States v. Bostwick (1876):
“The United States, when they contract with their citizens, are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf. All obligations which would be implied against citizens under the same circumstances will be implied against them. –
United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53 (1876) (Verified) (4)
Now you may want to ask yourself the following question. Can a corporation have citizens? Doesn’t a corporation have franchises?
Well, the federal government, residing in the District of Columbia, which today has become a monster of gigantic proportions, started off with very little power. Here is a court case citing the feds limited lawmaking or enforcing role: Caha v. United States (1894):
“This statute is one of universal application within the territorial limits of the United States, and is not limited to those portions which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government, such as the District of Columbia. Generally speaking, within any state of this Union the preservation of the peace and the protection of person and property are the functions of the state government, and are no part of the primary duty, at least, of the nation. The laws of congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national goverment.” —
Caha v. United States (March 5, 1894) (Verified) (5)
And here, is a more recent interpretation of this limited power, but this is still, in 1942, from People v. Kelley:
“An act of Congress does not have sanctity of constitutional provision, and even though the act is valid within orbit of activities of Congress, the operation of the act can effect only those subjects over which the central government had jurisdiction.”
“The provision in California Constitution making California an inseparable part of American union and acknowledging federal constitution as supreme law of land does not deprive California of its own sovereignty and of power to regulate its own adjective law.”
“The purpose of framers of federal constitution was to establish a government which would be supreme within its own sphere of action but which should not usurp any of the powers reserved to the states.” —
People v. Kelley, 122 P.2d 655 (1942) (Unverified)
So, how did the federal government ever get “into” the states, to encroach upon their power?
Now we have a corporation that can actually have “franchises” and then they created the Birth Certificate. The original purpose of vital statistics was for tax purposes and for the determination of available military man-power. In England, registration was not compulsory until 1875, following the Registration of Births and Deaths Act 1874, which made registration of a birth the responsibility of those present at the birth. The US got on a standardized system in 1902 Congress officially established the U.S. Census Bureau as a permanent government agency.
What is a “Certificate”? One type of certificate is a “Warehouse Receipt,” like a Silver or Gold certificate. A Birth Certificate is therefore a “warehouse receipt,” and the goods being stored at the warehouse are the bodies of the newly freed black slaves. This did not happen all at once though. At first, the registration of live births was not done in all-capital letters. They were all hand-written in upper and lower case letters. The name in all-capital letters was created to register on this Certificate, because this is a Corporate Tradename.
Speaking of all-capital letter “Trade Names,” remember how we just learned about taxing districts being now called “states”? On July 19, 1867, Johnson, during his veto of the Reconstruction Acts, was quoted as saying, “Again, in the machinery of the internal revenue laws, all these States are districted, not as ‘Territories, ‘but as ‘States.’
And also, remember, earlier, how we read, “The ten States were organized into Military Districts under the unconstitutional “Re-construction Acts,” their lawfully constituted Legislature illegally were removed by “military force,” and they were replaced by rump, so-called Legislatures, seven of which carried out military orders and pretended to ratify the 14th Amendment.”
What happened to the States? They became incorporated in 1879. Every state underwent a new constitution shortly after the Civil War. In California, our original constitution is from 1849, not 1879. Notice the change in the preamble.
The original Constitution for California was adopted at the California Constitutional Convention on October 10, 1849, and ratified on November 13, 1849, and reads as follows: “Constitution of California 1849” – “We, the people of California, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, in order to secure its blessings, do establish this Constitution.” (6)
California’s current constitution was ratified on May 7, 1879 and has been amended over 480 times. It reads as follows: ”CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA”
“WE, the People of the State of California, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, in order to secure and perpetuate its blessings, do establish this Constitution.” (7)
The main difference, which anyone can clearly see, is the use of the phrase “We, the people of California” vs the phrase, “We, the people of the state of California”. This indicates and conveys two completely separate ideas. One is the people of the California Republic, the other being voting members of the corporate Democracy called the “State,” a political subdivision of the United States.
In the following case, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital from 1923 we can see how and why the Social Security Act was implemented:
“The question in this case is the broad one, whether Congress can establish minimum rates of wages for women in the District of Columbia with due provision for special circumstances, or whether we must say that Congress has no power to meddle with the matter at all.
5. That the right to contract about one’s affairs is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fifth Amendment, is settled by repeated decisions of this Court. P. 261 U. S. 545.
6. Within this liberty are contracts of employment of labor. In making these, generally speaking, the parties have equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can by private bargaining. Id.
- Legislative abridgment of this freedom can only be justified by the existence of exceptional circumstances. P. 261 U. S. 546.
8. Review of former decisions concerning interferences with liberty of contract, by (a) Statutes fixing the rates and charges of businesses affected by a public interest. P. 261 U. S. 546. (b) Statutes relating to the performance of contracts for public work. P. 261 U. S. 547. (c) Statutes prescribing the character, methods and time for payment of wages. Id. (d) Statutes fixing hours of labor. Id.
11. The Minimum Wage Act of Sept.19, 1918, c. 174, 40 Stat. 960, in assuming to authorize the fixing of minimum wage standards for adult women, in any occupation in the District of Columbia, such standards to be based wholly upon what a board and its advisers may find to be an adequate wage to meet the necessary cost of living for women workers in each particular calling and to maintain them in good health and protect their morals, is an unconstitutional interference with the liberty of contract. P. 261 U. S. 554.
(At this point we can see that the federal government needed a way to force compliance in this area, so the Social Security Act fixed all that. By assuming a Federal Number, and receiving benefits, one would be contracting and subject therefore to all of those rules and regulations which previously Congress could not assume authority over. But this was given or sold to the people as a right for them to be able to contract independently.)
“Finally, it may be said that if, in the interest of the public welfare, the police power may be invoked to justify the fixing of a minimum wage, it may, when the public welfare is thought to require it, be invoked to justify a maximum wage. The power to fix high wages connotes, by like course of reasoning, the power to fix low wages. If, in the face of the guaranties of the Fifth Amendment, this form of legislation shall be legally justified, the field for the operation of the police power will have been widened to a great and dangerous degree.
“It has been said that legislation of the kind now under review is required in the interest of social justice, for whose ends freedom of contract may lawfully be subjected to restraint. The liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent matters, is not absolute. It must frequently yield to the common good, and the line beyond which the power of interference may not be pressed is neither definite nor unalterable, but may be made to move, within limits not well defined, with changing need and circumstance. Any attempt to fix a rigid boundary would be unwise, as well as futile. But, nevertheless, there are limits to the power, and when these have been passed, it becomes the plain duty of the courts in the proper exercise of their authority to so declare. To sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by the Constitution is not to strike down the common good, but to exalt it, for surely the good of society as a whole cannot be better served than by the preservation against arbitrary restraint of the liberties of its constituent members. –
Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (Verified) (8)
Here is another way the states were included in federal jurisdiction. In 1935 the Social Security Act, was passed. In 1939, the Public Salary Tax Act was passed and in 1940 the Buck Act was passed.
The Social Security Act set up a program which tied the Employee Identification Number with the Birth Certificate.
The Social Security Act provided the following benefits of assistance:
* Grants to States for Old-Age Assistance
* Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits
* Grants to States for Unemployment
* Compensation Administration
* Grants to States for Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children and for Child-Welfare Services
* Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant
* Special Benefits for Certain World War II Veterans
* Grants to States for Aid to the Blind
Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled
* Grants for Planning Comprehensive Action to Combat Mental Retardation
* Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled
State Children’s Health Insurance Program
No one would deny these are beneficial programs for the needy and any just government would provide them. However, they are benefits still, and if these were public benefits for the people, it might be different, but they are corporate benefits for employees. That is where the trick lies. People do not realize when they adopt these benefits, they are in fact claiming employee status, as a franchise.
Next, the Public Salary Tax Act in 1939 which reads as follows:
“An Act Relating to the taxation of the compensation of public officers and employees.
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act maybe cited as the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939.”
“Section 1. Section 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code (relating to the definition of “gross income”) is amended by inserting after the words “compensation for personal service” the following: (“including personal service as an officer or employee of a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing”).
“SEC. 4. The United States hereby consents to the taxation of compensation, received after December 31, 1938, for personal service as an officer or employee of the United States, any Territory or possession or political subdivision thereof, the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing, by any duly constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction to tax such compensation, if such taxation does not discriminate against such officer or employee because of the source of such compensation. (9)
Now, for the very first time, as of 1939, income tax may be assessed within the District of Columbia upon franchises made up of people who elected to join the business of the United States corporation. It’s really not that complicated to understand once all the facts and details are put into place. It makes perfect sense how they did this. What doesn’t make sense is how they got away with it.
What the Buck Act of 1940 did was create a federal fictional “state within a state.” It made all areas within the state overlapping federal jurisdictions, when in conjunction with items like Social Security numbers and zip codes, which are federal.
Just for clarification, here are the provisions within the Buck Act which establish taxing within the federal area:
“4 U.S. Code § 105. State, and so forth, taxation affecting Federal areas; sales or use tax
(a) No person shall be relieved from liability for payment of, collection of, or accounting for any sales or use tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, on the ground that the sale or use, with respect to which such tax is levied, occurred in whole or in part within a Federal area; and such State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect any such tax in any Federal area within such State to the same extent and with the same effect as though such area was not a Federal area.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall be applicable only with respect to sales or purchases made, receipts from sales received, or storage or use occurring, after December 31, 1940
“4 U.S. Code § 106. Same; income tax
(a) No person shall be relieved from liability for any income tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, by reason of his residing within a Federal area or receiving income from transactions occurring or services performed in such area; and such State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect such tax in any Federal area within such State to the same extent and with the same effect as though such area was not a Federal area.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall be applicable only with respect to income or receipts received after December 31, 1940.
In this next Court Case citation, from 1953, Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, you can see where they refer to a “state within a state,” which is what the Buck Act had just created:
“A state may conform its municipal structures to its own plan, so long as the state does not interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction within the federal area by the United States. Kentucky’s consent to this acquisition gave the United States power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within the area. A change of municipal boundaries did not interfere in the least with the jurisdiction of the United States within the area or with its use or disposition of the property. The fiction of a state within a state can have no validity to prevent the state from exercising its power over the federal area within its boundaries, so long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government. The sovereign rights in this dual relationship are not antagonistic. Accommodation and cooperation are their aim. It is friction, not fiction, to which we must give heed.” —
Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624; 73 S. Ct. 465 (1953) (Verified Cite) (10)
In the next part of this cite, the court admits that an “occupational tax” or a “license fee” is an “income tax” because it represents a tax on “net income, gross income, or gross receipts.” The court concluded this tax constituted an “income tax” within the Buck Act!:
“But the appellants next argue that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the City’s occupational tax or license fee was an ‘income tax’ within the meaning of the Buck Act, though holding that this tax or fee was not an income tax under the Constitution of Kentucky.
Con’t: “Was this tax an ‘income tax’ within the meaning of the Buck Act? In a prior case, Kentucky had held this tax was not an ‘income tax’ within the meaning of the Constitution of Kentucky but was a tax upon the privilege of working within the City of Louisville. City of Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 429—431, 214 S.W.2d 248, 253—254. But the right to tax earnings within the area was not given Kentucky in accordance with the Kentucky law as to what is an income tax. The grant was given within the definition of the Buck Act, and this was for any tax measured by net income, gross income, or gross receipts. In the instant case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals correctly stated that the question was whether the tax was an income tax within the meaning of the federal law. We hold that the tax authorized by this ordinance was an income tax within the meaning of the Buck Act. The City, it is conceded, can levy such a tax within its boundaries outside the federal area. By virtue of the Buck Act, the tax can be levied and collected within the federal area, just as if it were not a federal area.
Since the area is within the boundaries of the City of Louisville, and this tax is an income tax within the meaning of the Buck Act, the tax is valid. The judgment is affirmed.”-
Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624; 73 S. Ct. 465 (1953)
At this juncture, the feds are sharing power with the state, and there is supposed to be no conflict. So, how then did the Federal Government move to a position where they dictate the terms instead of the state? Or how did they get fully into the state in order to call it all a “federal area?” This court case might help to explain things from 1972, Carlson v. Superior Court of the State of California For the County of Sacramento, Golden Gate Welfare Rights Organization Inc.:
“States are not required to participate in AFDC program but once state chooses to join it and take advantage of the substantial federal resources available, state must comply with mandatory requirements established by the Social Security Act as interpreted and implemented by regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare.” (hereinafter, ‘DHEW’). (King v. Smith (1968), 392 U.S. 309, 316—317, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2133, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118, 1125; County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 738—739, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953.) —
Carlson v. Superior Court of the State of California For the County of Sacramento, Golden Gate Welfare Rights Organization Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 824; 27 Cal. App. 3d 1 (1972). (Verified)
Therefore, it is through “benefits” that the states become subservient to the feds, and then the Social Security number extends federal jurisdiction throughout all the states to those who elect to be franchises under the US citizenship. Now the federal government has a perfectly taxable artificial entity without ever having to invade into the personal private jurisdiction of the sovereign free person. They just drastically reduced the potential that people would remain in an un-enfranchised position for very long.
How can all this be? It is so confusing to ponder at first, isn’t it? The reason is because we actually have two independent and separate governments operating side by side. One is the original one, set up for us, in our private capacity, in the “organic” state, and the other is the one set up in 1879, the new federal constitution, created after the incorporation of the District of Columbia in 1871, specifically for the new “corporate” federal government. Here is a quote from a court case which proves this fact – Downes vs. Biswell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901):
“The idea prevails with some, indeed it has expression in arguments at the bar, that we have in this country substantially two national governments; one to be maintained under the Constitution, with all its restrictions; the other to be maintained by Congress outside and independently of that instrument, by exercising such powers as other nations of the earth are accustomed to…. I take leave to say that, if the principles thus announced should ever receive the sanction of a majority of this court, a radical and mischievous change in our system will result. We will, in that event, pass from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and protected by a written constitution into an era of legislative absolutism…. It will be an evil day for American Liberty if the theory of a government outside the Supreme Law of the Land finds lodgment in our Constitutional Jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violation of the principles of the Constitution.” –
Downes vs. Biswell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (Verified)
In this next section from this case, the issue of jurisdiction over territories and citizens is being addressed and the reader can see that even the US district courts only had jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different states. The issue of whether or not the District of Columbia could be considered a “state” is also addressed. – Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)
“The earliest case is that of Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445, in which this Court held that, under that clause of the Constitution limiting the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States to controversies between citizens of different states, a citizen of the District of Columbia could not maintain an action in the circuit court of the United States. It was argued that the word “state,” in that connection, was used simply to denote a distinct political society. “But,” said the Chief Justice,
“as the act of Congress obviously used the word ‘state’ in reference to that term as used in the Constitution, it becomes necessary to inquire whether Columbia is a state in the sense of that instrument. The result of that examination is a conviction that the members of the American confederacy only are the states contemplated in the Constitution, . . . and excludes from the term the signification attached to it by writers on the law of nations.”
Obviously this debate was over whether or not a corporation could become a “state” by the legal definition currently used. Continuing:
“This case was followed in Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280, and quite recently in Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U. S. 395. The same rule was applied to citizens of territories in New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91, in which an attempt was made to distinguish a territory from the District of Columbia. But it was said that “neither of them is a state in the sense in which that term is used in the Constitution.” In Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343, and in Miners’ Bank v. Iowa, 12 How. 1, it was held that, under the Judiciary Act, permitting writs of error to the Supreme Court of a state in cases where the validity of a state statute is drawn in question, an act of a territorial legislature was not within the contemplation of Congress.”
Also, from the same case we learn: “In line with Loughborough v. Blake is the case of Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, in which the provisions of the Constitution relating to trial by jury were held to be in force in the District of Columbia. Upon the other hand, in De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, the District of Columbia, as a political community, was held to be one of “the states of the Union” within the meaning of that term as used in a consular convention of February 23, 1853, with France.”
So, given the meaning of the District of Columbia as a “state of the Union,” this implies there are dual governments in place. A United States Government and also one for the District of Columbia. Otherwise there would be no need to include the Trial by Jury for them, in this paragraph.
In this next paragraph we learn about the difference between Territorial Courts and US Courts; citing a different case, American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511;
“The opinion of the circuit court was delivered by Mr. Justice Johnson, of the Supreme Court, and is published in full in a note in Peters’ Reports. It was argued that the Constitution vested the admiralty jurisdiction exclusively in the general government; that the Legislature of Florida had exercised an illegal power in organizing this Court, and that its decrees were void. On the other hand, it was insisted that this was a court of separate and distinct jurisdiction from the courts of the United States, and, as such, its acts were not to be reviewed in a foreign tribunal such as was the court of South Carolina.”
Another very important quote from this same case demonstrates the difference between our Judicial Courts under Article III of the Constitution and Article I courts under the Legislature:
“On behalf of the purchaser, it was argued that the Constitution and laws of the United States were not per se in force in Florida, nor the inhabitants citizens of the United States; that the Constitution was established by the people of the United States for the United States; that if the Constitution were in force in Florida, it was unnecessary to pass an act extending the laws of the United States to Florida. “What is Florida?” said Mr. Webster.
“It is no part of the United States. How can it be? How is it represented? Do the laws of the United States reach Florida? Not unless by particular provisions.”
Con’t: “The opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in this case should be read in connection with Art. 3, secs. 1 and 2, of the Constitution, Page 182 U. S. 266 vesting “the judicial power of the United States” in “one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges both of the Supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior,” etc. He held that the Court “should take into view the relation in which Florida stands to the United States;” that territory ceded by treaty “becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed, either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession, or on such as its new master shall impose.”
That Florida, upon the conclusion of the treaty, became a territory of the United States and subject to the power of Congress under the territorial clause of the Constitution. The acts providing a territorial government for Florida were examined in detail. He held that the judicial clause of the Constitution, above quoted, did not apply to Florida; that the judges of the superior courts of Florida held their office for four years;
that “these courts are not, then, constitutional courts in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government can be deposited;
“that “they are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government,” or in virtue of the territorial clause of the Constitution; that the jurisdiction with which they are invested is not a part of judicial power of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress in the exercise of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States, and that, in legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and of a state government. The act of the territorial legislature creating the court in question was held not to be “inconsistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States,” and the decree of the circuit court was affirmed.”
It appears from what we have read in the preceding quotes that Congress considers the District of Columbia a Territory, since it is also considered a “state” but never admitted into the Union, therefore it would not qualify legally as a “state,” in that sense.
The maze which enslaves us is twisted and convoluted. The way all of this attaches to the average free individual, is very complex but once you follow the laws as they have been laid down and read the rulings and cites, and opinions, it does make a lot more sense.
“As the only judicial power vested in Congress is to create courts whose judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, it necessarily follows that if Congress authorizes the creation of courts and the appointment of judges for a limited time, it must act independently of the Constitution and upon territory which is not part of the United States within the meaning of the Constitution. In delivering his opinion in this case Mr. Chief Justice Marshall made no reference whatever to the prior case of Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, in which he had intimated that the territories were part of the United States. But if they be a part of the United States, it is difficult to see how Congress could create courts in such territories except under the judicial clause of the Constitution. The power to make needful rules and regulations would certainly not authorize anything inconsistent with the Constitution if it applied to the territories. Certainly no such court could be created within a state except under the restrictions of the judicial clause. It is sufficient to say that this case has ever since been accepted as authority for the proposition that the judicial clause of the Constitution has no application to courts created in the territories, and that, with respect to them, Congress has a power wholly unrestricted by it. We must assume as a logical inference from this case that the other powers vested in Congress by the Constitution have no application to these territories, or that the judicial clause is exceptional in that particular.”
What the court just admitted here is the crux of the dilemma and misunderstanding among the people of this nation. The legislative courts which exercise jurisdiction for the US citizens in the District of Columbia ARE NOT BOUND by the Constitution for the United States whatsoever! It hardly matters if Martial law is in place or not, and I would suggest it is not. I suggest instead, that the people are now for the most part, ruled by courts which have no obligation under the Constitution to protect any of the United States citizens. Continuing:
“This case was followed in Benner v. Porter, 9 How. 235, in which it was held that the jurisdiction of these territorial courts ceased upon the admission of Florida into the Union, Mr. Justice Nelson remarking of them (p. 50 U. S. 242), that
“they are not organized under the Constitution nor subject to its complex distribution of the powers of government as the organic law, but are the creations exclusively of the legislative department, and subject to its supervision and control. Whether or not there are provisions in that instrument which extend to and act upon these territorial governments it is not now material to examine. We are speaking here of those provisions that refer particularly to the distinction between federal and state jurisdiction. . . . (p. 50 U. S. 244). Neither were they organized by Congress under the Constitution, as they were invested with powers and jurisdiction which that body were incapable of conferring upon a court within the limits of a state.”
Now, the same case mentions the fact that the Constitution was never intended to extend to the Territories, and never did until 1852:
“While there is much in the opinion of the Chief Justice which tends to prove that he thought all the provisions of the Constitution extended of their own force to the territories west of the Mississippi, the question actually decided is readily distinguishable from the one involved in the cause under consideration. The power to prohibit slavery in the territories is so different from the power to impose duties upon territorial products, and depends upon such different provisions of the Constitution, that they can scarcely be considered as analogous unless we assume broadly that every clause of the Constitution attaches to the territories as well as to the states — a claim quite inconsistent with the position of the Court in the Canter case. If the assumption be true that slaves are indistinguishable from other property, the inference from the Dred Scott case is irresistible that Congress had no power to prohibit their introduction into a territory. It would scarcely be insisted that Congress could with one hand invite settlers to locate in the territories of the United States, and with the other deny them the right to take their property and belongings with them. The two are so inseparable from each other that one could scarcely be granted and the other withheld without an exercise of arbitrary power inconsistent with the underlying principles of a free government. It might indeed be claimed with great plausibility that such a law would amount to a deprivation of property within the Fourteenth Amendment. The difficulty with the Dred Scott case was that the Court refused to make a distinction between property in general and a wholly exceptional class of property. Mr. Benton tersely stated the distinction by saying that the Virginian might carry his slaves into the territories, but he could not carry with him the Virginian law which made him a slave.”
It would be good to take note at this point that the court here was saying that slaves were equal to property and therefore they could not be prohibited from being taken into the Territories. The whole point of setting the slaves free was to create a new class of slavery. An economic class people now sometimes mockingly refer to as a “wage slave.” Remember, this is no different than real slavery, except the British thought it much simpler because the care and shelter and feeding and health of the slave were no longer a concern to the master. The slave would fend for himself and the economic control over wages through centralized banking would handle the rest. Fiat money of promissory notes for indentured servants. Borrowed money for debt slaves. Continuing:
“In his history of the Dred Scott case, Mr. Benton states that the doctrine that the Constitution extended to territories as well as to states first made its appearance in the Senate in the session of 1848-1849, by an attempt to amend a bill giving territorial government to California, New Mexico, and Utah (itself “hitched on” to a general appropriation bill), by adding the words “that the Constitution of the United States and all and singular the several acts of Congress [describing them] be, and the same hereby are, extended and given full force and efficacy in said territories.”
Says Mr. Benton:
“The novelty and strangeness of this proposition called up Mr. Webster, who repulsed as an absurdity and as an impossibility the scheme of extending the Constitution to the territories, declaring that instrument to have been made for states, not territories; that Congress governed the territories independently of the Constitution and incompatibly with it; that no part of it went to a territory but what Congress chose to send; that it could not act of itself anywhere, not even in the states for which it was made, and that it required an act of Congress to put it in operation before it had effect anywhere. Mr. Clay was of the same opinion, and added:
“Now, really, I must say the idea that, eo instanti upon the consummation of the treaty, the Constitution of the United States spread itself over the acquired territory and carried along with it the institution of slavery is so irreconcilable with my comprehension or any reason I possess that I hardly know how to meet it.”
Several of the principles held in this case, mentioned in the case itself, are the following:
“the following propositions may be considered as established:
- That the District of Columbia and the territories are not states within the judicial clause of the Constitution giving jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different states;
- That territories are not states within the meaning of Rev. Stat. sec. 709, permitting writs of error from this Court in cases where the validity of a state statute is drawn in question;
- That the District of Columbia and the territories are states as that word is used in treaties with foreign powers with respect to the ownership, disposition, and inheritance of property;
In other words, as we just read from the quote from the case, Congress tried to use its Treaty making power to bring the Constitutional protection from slavery into the Territories.
And, citing the Dred Scott case:
“Finally, in summing up the results of the decisions holding the invalidity of the Missouri Compromise and the self-extension of the Constitution to the territories, he declares
“that the decisions conflict with the uniform action of all the departments of the federal government from its foundation to the present time, and cannot be received as rules governing Congress and the people without reversing that action, and admitting the political supremacy of the court, and accepting an altered Constitution from its hands and taking a new and portentous point of departure in the working of the government.”
In this next section of the same case, it is admitted that the governments for the Territories resembled more of British Crown colonies than American republics:
“Indeed, the practical interpretation put by Congress upon the Constitution has been long continued and uniform to the effect that the Constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase or conquest only when and so far as Congress shall so direct. Notwithstanding its duty to “guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government” Art. IV, sec. 4, by which we understand, according to the definition of Webster, “a government in which the supreme power resides in the whole body of the people, and is exercised by representatives elected by them,” Congress did not hesitate, in the original organization of the Territories of Louisiana, Florida, the Northwest Territory, and its subdivisions of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin, and still more recently in the case of Alaska, to establish a form of government bearing a much greater analogy to a British Crown colony than a republican state of America, and to vest the legislative power either in a governor and council, or a governor and judges, to be appointed by the President. It was not until they had attained a certain population that power was given them to organize a legislature by vote of the people. In all these cases, as well as in territories subsequently organized west of the Mississippi, Congress thought it necessary either to extend to Constitution and laws of the United States over them, or to declare that the inhabitants should be entitled to enjoy the right of trial by jury, of bail, and of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as other privileges of the bill of rights. – Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (11)
Now, we can fully understand what happened and how there are actually three forms of governments in place. The states, which no longer operate in their 1860 capacity, the United States government and the government for the Territories, being really just Congress.
What happened is this. April 7, 1874, Congress passed:
CHAP. 80.- An act concerning, the practice in territorial courts, and appeals therefrom.
Whereas, by the organic acts establishing several of the Territories of the United States, it is provided that certain courts thereof shall have common-law and chancery jurisdiction, and doubts have been entertained whether said jurisdictions must be exercised separately, or whether they may be exercised together in the same proceeding, and whether the codes and rules of practice adopted in said Territories which have authorized a mingling of said jurisdictions in the same proceeding, or a uniform course of proceeding in all cases legal and equitable, are repugnant to the said organic acts respectively: Therefore, Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it shall not be necessary in any of the courts of the several Territories of the United States to exercise separately the common-law and chancery jurisdictions vested in said courts; and that the several codes and rules of practice adopted in said Territories respectively, in so far as they authorize a mingling of said jurisdictions or a uniform course of proceeding in all cases whether legal or equitable, be confirmed; and that all proceedings heretofore had or taken in said courts in conformity with said respective codes and rules of practice, so far as relates to the form and mode of proceeding, be, and the same are hereby, validated and confirmed; Provided, That no party has been or shall be deprived of the right of trial by jury in cases cognizable at common-law. SEC. 2. That the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States over the judgments and decrees of said Territorial courts in cases of trial by jury shall be exercised by writ of error, and in all other cases by appeal according to such rules and regulations as to form and modes of proceeding as the said Supreme Court have prescribed or may hereafter prescribe.” – April 7, 1874 – There is more on the rules of the Supreme Court and appellate courts. (12)
So there you have it. That explains how our courts carry dual functions today. One of Territorial courts and one of Unites States Constitutional courts.
Now, here is what I pulled from the Cornell Law website on Legislative Courts:
“Legislative courts, so-called because they are created by Congress pursuant to its general legislative powers, have comprised a significant part of the federal judiciary. The distinction between constitutional courts and legislative courts was first made in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, which involved the question of the admiralty jurisdiction of the territorial court of Florida, the judges of which were limited to a four-year term in office. Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court: “These courts, then, are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the constitution on the general government, can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the constitution, but is conferred by congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States.” The Court went on to hold that admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the states only in those courts that are established pursuant to Article III, but that the same limitation does not apply to the territorial courts, for in legislating for them “Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state government.”
The next section from the same website location on Legislative Courts concerns “Status of Courts of the District of Columbia:”
“Through a long course of decisions, the courts of the District of Columbia were regarded as legislative courts upon which Congress could impose nonjudicial functions. In Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, the Court sustained an act of Congress which conferred revisory powers upon the Supreme Court of the District in patent appeals and made its decisions binding only upon the Commissioner of Patents. Similarly, the Court later sustained the authority of Congress to vest revisory powers in the same court over rates fixed by a public utilities commission. Not long after this the same rule was applied to the revisory powers of the District Supreme Court over orders of the Federal Radio Commission. These rulings were based on the assumption, express or implied, that the courts of the District were legislative courts, created by Congress pursuant to its plenary power to govern the District of Columbia. In dictum in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,104 while reviewing the history and analyzing the nature of the legislative courts, the Court stated that the courts of the District were legislative courts.”
A little further down, we read about the changes made in 1933, when Congress combined the courts, confusing matters even more:
“In 1933, nevertheless, the Court abandoned all previous dicta on the subject and found the courts of the District of Columbia to be constitutional courts exercising the judicial power of the United States, with the result that it assumed the task of reconciling the performance of nonjudicial functions by such courts with the rule that constitutional courts can exercise only the judicial power of the United States. This task was accomplished by the argument that, in establishing courts for the District, Congress performs dual functions pursuant to two distinct powers: the power to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, and its plenary and exclusive power to legislate for the District of Columbia. However, Article III, § 1, limits this latter power with respect to tenure and compensation, but not with respect to vesting legislative and administrative powers in such courts. Subject to the guarantees of personal liberty in the Constitution, “Congress has as much power to vest courts of the District with a variety of jurisdiction and powers as a state legislature has in conferring jurisdiction on its courts.”
(Continuing a little further down)
“In 1970, Congress formally recognized two sets of courts in the District: federal courts (the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, created pursuant to Article III), and courts equivalent to state and territorial courts (including the District of Columbia Court of Appeals), created pursuant to Article I. Congress’s action was sustained in Palmore v. United States. When legislating for the District, the Court held, Congress has the power of a local legislature and may, pursuant to Article I, § 8, cl. 17, vest jurisdiction to hear matters of local law and local concerns in courts not having Article III characteristics. The defendant’s claim that he was denied his constitutional right to be tried before an Article III judge was denied on the basis that it was not absolutely necessary that every proceeding in which a charge, claim, or defense based on an act of Congress or a law made under its authority need be conducted in an Article III court. State courts, after all, could hear cases involving federal law as could territorial and military courts. “[T]he requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment.” (13)
I think that clearly lays out the foundation of how the courts got all confused, and why we are being tried under Article I courts which may or may not grant justice. There is no guaranteed Due Process under the 5th Amendment if it’s not an Article III court and Article III courts are still only federal constitutional courts, not courts of Justice being administered by a Justice of the Peace, which would be a common law court under original jurisdiction in the “Republic” or “state”.
In relation to Territorial Jurisdiction, Cornell has the following to say:
“Territorial jurisdiction is the court’s power to bind the parties to the action. This law determines the scope of federal and state court power. State court territorial jurisdiction is determined by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment and the federal court territorial jurisdiction is determined by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and its amendments) clarifies how the question of territorial jurisdiction should be answered in Federal Court. Case law decisions relevant to questions of territorial jurisdiction include Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).” (14)
We may assume from the preceding paragraph quote that the writer means the “state” in this case to be the federal district “state” because of the use of the 14th Amendment in defining it.
The following quote is from a dedicated Constitutional Law scholar, Howard Freeman:
“Our national Congress works for two nations foreign to each other…one is the Union of sovereign states, under the Constitution…the other is a Legislative Democracy which has its origin in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution of the federal United States.” – Howard Freeman (Researcher)
Territorial courts are administrative courts. Administrative courts only hear matters of fact, not matters of law. This is one reason why you cannot bring up the Constitution in traffic or criminal cases, in administrative courts. The only issue is whether or not the facts asserted are true or not.
In this next paragraph the court spells out how a corporation’s existence is bound by the jurisdiction of its creation. A federal government corporation only has jurisdiction where it was created. Washington DC is where the District of Columbia was created and that is the limit of its jurisdiction.
“It is very true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law and by force of the law, and where that law ceases to operate and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty.”
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839) (15)
Same with this next one.
91 Corpus Juris Secumdum, United States Section 4
“Powers in General – The governmental powers of the United States to the extent that they are conferred or not withheld by the Constitution, are supreme and paramount. The United States has no inherent sovereign powers, and no legislative powers other than those conferred by the Constitution.”
“The Constitution does not, however, make any general grant of power…”
“This is a government of enumerated or delegated powers, and that it has only such powers as have been conferred upon it, expressly or by necessary implication.”
“The United States has no inherent sovereign powers and no inherent common-law prerogatives, and it has no power to interfere in the personal or social relations of citizens by virtue of authority deducible from the general nature of sovereignty…”
“…when the United States enters into commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation….”
And another definition, this time from California Jurisprudence in which the “state” is considered a part of the District of Columbia, further proving that the use of the word “state” in certain cases may not mean a “state of the Union” at all.
17 Cal Jur. 3d (Rev) Part 1, Criminal Law, Section 16
“The Penal Code sets forth the definitions of a number of terms used throughout the code.”
“The word “state,” when applied to the different parts of the United States, includes the District of Columbia and the territories, and the words “United States” may include the district and territories.”
In the following case, United States v. Coe, (1894) the difference between an appeal and a Writ of Error is described as well as the jurisdiction of the legislative courts:
“Causes in the Court of Private Land Claims are in effect equity causes, and brought to this Court by appeal, and, as observed by Chief Justice Ellsworth, in Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dall. 321:
“An appeal is a process of civil law origin and removes a cause entirely, subjecting the fact, as well as the law, to a review and retrial, but a writ of error is a process of common law, and it removes nothing for examination but the law.”
“The argument is that the court thus created, composed of judges holding office for a time limited, is not one of the courts mentioned in Article III of the Constitution, whereby the judicial power of the United States is vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time establish, the judges of which hold their offices during good behavior, receiving at stated times for their services a compensation that cannot be diminished during their continuance in office, and are removable only by impeachment, and that the appellate power of this Court cannot be extended to the revision of the judgments and decrees of such a court. Granting that the Court of Private Land Claims does not come within the third article, the conclusion assumes either that the power of Congress to create courts can only be exercised in virtue of that article or that judicial tribunals otherwise established cannot be placed under the supervisory power of this Court. It must be regarded as settled that Section 1 of Article III does not exhaust the power of Congress to establish courts. The leading case upon the subject is American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 26 U. S. 546, in which it was held in respect of territorial courts (Chief Justice Marshall delivering the opinion) that while those courts are not courts in which the judicial power conferred by Article III can be deposited, yet that they are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government over the territories, or of the clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The authorities are referred to and commented on by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN in McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174.
– United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894) (16)
United States Code USC
This next statement was made by Mr. Justice Walter S. Cox of the Supreme Court, in 1898, and deals with the implementation of the Revised Statutes of 1874, or the US CODE:
“In June, 1866, an act was passed authorizing the President to appoint 3 commissioners to revise and bring together all the statutes and parts of statutes which ought to be brought together, omitting redundant or obsolete enactments, and making such alterations as may be necessary to reconcile contradictions, supply the omissions, and mend the imperfections of the original text.
“The act does not seem, in terms, to allude to the District of Columbia or even embrace it.
“Such commissioners were appointed and proceeded with their work, which was not completed for 7 years. Without having any express authority to do so, they made a separate revision and collection of acts of Congress relating to the District, besides the collection of general statutes relating to the whole [sic] United States. Each collection was reported to Congress, to be approved and enacted into law. The concluding paragraphs of each virtually repeal every part of any act of Congress passed before December 1873, which is not included in this collection, and the whole is enacted into law, as the body of the statute law of the United States, under the title of “Revised Statutes.” As of the date June 22, 1874.
“The laws relating to the District begin with the one establishing the Territorial government, of February 21, 1871, and the whole collection occupies only 149 pages in the authorized publication. This is the first collection of state law that ever received congressional approbation. Every law previously passed was an individual act, called for by some emergency, or supposed so to be, without the least consideration of its consistency with other existing laws or its fitness to be part of a system.
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