Chapter 18: Commerce & Commercial Law
Over and over again, in the past chapters of this book, the topic of “Equity Law and the Law Merchant” have been discussed, but they have not been explained or identified very well. This chapter will accomplish that. There will be lots of definitions at the end, for checking up on words you are unfamiliar with. All of the definitions apply to this chapter, and more. Most deal with “money” and “commercial transactions.” Ever since the bankruptcy of 1933, when we were taken off the “gold standard,” the paper loaned to us by the Federal Reserve has been “used as money,” however, it is not money. Not only is it not money, it is “debt” because it is borrowed from the Federal Reserve and loaned to the people through the United States bankrupt corporation.
Before we go any further, though, you do understand that we are on a “credit system” don’t you? That means we pay with credit, not “dollars,” like we used to. This has been ever since 1933, and the bankruptcy. There are two kinds of credits. There are Positive Credits and Negative credits, or Debits. That is it. Positive and Negative Currency. Actually, it can even be viewed as an “electrical system” with positive and negative current, if that makes it easier, since the entire system has been geared to the electrical system of the human body. This may have something to do with the reason we call some courts “circuit courts.”
As a matter of fact, it is now illegal for any contract to call for payment in gold or anything of substance even: We went over this Public Law just a couple of chapters back, but let’s review:
Here is a reproduction of a very important document:
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT
Issued April 5, 1933
All persons are required to deliver ON OR BEFOR MAY 1, 1933, all GOLD COIN, GOLD BULLION, AND GOLD CERTIFICATES now owned by them to a Federal Reserve Bank, branch or agency, or to any member bank of the Federal Reserve System.
JOINT RESOLUTION TO SUSPEND THE GOLD STANDARD AND ABROGATE THE GOLD CLAUSE. JUNE 5, 1933 – H.J. Res. 192. 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. Joint resolution to assure uniform value to the coins and currencies of the United States.
“Whereas the holding of or dealing in gold affect the public interest, and therefore subject to proper regulation and restriction, and
“Whereas the existing emergency has disclosed that provisions of obligations which purport to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or any particular kind of coin or currency of the United States, or in an amount of money of the United States measured thereby, obstruct the power of the Congress to regulate the value of money of the United States, and are inconsistent with the declared policy of the Congress to maintain at all times the equal power of every dollar, coined or issued by the United States, in the markets and in the payment of debts. Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (My Emphasis added)
That (a) every provision contained in or made with respect to any obligation which purports to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in money of the United States measured thereby, is declared to be against public policy, and no such provision shall be contained in or made with respect to any obligation hereafter incurred. Every obligation, heretofore or hereafter incurred, whether or not any such provisions is obtained therein or made with respect thereto, shall be discharged upon payment dollar for dollar, in any such coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts. Any such provision contained in any law authorizing obligations to be issued by or under authority of the United States, is hereby repealed, but the repeal of any such provision shall not invalidate any other provision or authority contained in such law.”
Don’t you just love the liars, I mean lawyers, and their legalese? If they don’t thoroughly confuse you, then they keep going until you give up. Anyways, if you can’t tell what they are saying here, basically, they are saying that any contract put forth that calls for any “substance” type of payment, is null and void and that everything must be “discharged dollar for dollar.”
First of all, you need to understand the difference between types of “payment” and “discharges.” A bill paid with a debt is not a bill “paid,” but the obligation is “discharged.” That is because it was paid with (-)(Negative) currency. You cannot pay a debt with a debt. So, basically, every bill paid in this country for the last 100 years has not really been paid. That is the reason for the national debt, although most university economics professors don’t even know this and can’t figure it out. The politicians just lie about it all the time to keep it covered up. This is a fact though, and it is so simple to figure out, that almost everyone overlooks it.
There are different ways to pay for things, (we’ll still use the term “pay” loosely, for now), like with a “check,” “draft,” or a “promissory note,” although most people still use Federal Reserve notes. Well, what exactly is a Federal Reserve note? It is a “Promissory Note.” A “note” is a “promissory note,” and it is a “promise to pay,” but it is not the actual payment in fact, it is only a “promise” that the bill will be “paid” in the future. So, when we are passing these Federal Reserve notes around, what we are doing, in fact, is “discharging” our “obligations” to another person, who then holds the debt, instead of us. In other words, if you have $50 in your pocket, you are not in possession of $50, you are in fact, evidencing that you owe $50 by the fact that it is in your possession. You owe it to the Federal Reserve because it was borrowed from them, and it is in your possession. That is “prima facie evidence” that you are the “debtor.” (Evidence on its face) Debtors have no rights, they are at the mercy of their creditors, and their creditors control the direction of their business affairs.
The opposite of charge; hence to release; liberate; annul; unburden; disencumber. In the law of contracts. To cancel or unloose the obligation of a contract; to make an agreement or contract null and inoperative. Discharge is a generic term; its principal species are rescission, release, accord and satisfaction, performance, judgment, composition, bankruptcy, merger. (Black’s 1st)
practice. The act by which a person in confinement, under some legal process, or held on an accusation of some crime or misdemeanor, is set at liberty; the writing containing the order for his being so set at liberty, is also called a discharge.
- The discharge of a defendant, in prison under a ca. sa, when made by the plaintiff, has the operation of satisfying the debt, the plaintiff having no other remedy. 4 T. R. 526. But when the discharge is in consequence of the insolvent laws, or the defendant dies in prison, the debt is not satisfied. In the first place the plaintiff has a remedy against the property of the defendant, acquired after his discharge, and, in the last case, against the executors or administrators of the debtor. Bac. Ab. Execution, D; Bingh. on Execution, 266. – (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
Did you read that one carefully? You may want to re-read it over again. Especially the second part. They are saying a “defendant” can be held in prison when the plaintiff has no other remedy, to recover a debt. And when the defendant is released, he is then said to be “discharged.”
As we get into this, the lines will blur, like in the movie “The Matrix,” where the green lines started to appear, as reality sets in, and the two worlds converged. The world of law and government, and the world of business and money are going to become one in the reader’s eyes, very soon, if they haven’t begun to already. But now is the time to start looking for the Matrix to disappear and for reality to start appearing before your very eyes.
In 1938, an extremely important Supreme Court decision was handed down. This case is called Erie RR V. Tompkins. In his book, The Pied Pipers of Babylon, author Verl Speer expels on the points of this landmark decision and another one that followed, “Clearfield.” Verl is extremely well studied in law, a legal scholar, to say the least. This is what he says about Erie RR. v. Tompkins; (ALL CAPS in the next few paragraphs are used by Speer for emphasis)
“Part V: Erie Railroad v. Tompkins – The Judicial Coup De Grace (1938);
“In 1938, the Supreme Court decided what a member of the Court quite justifiably called “one of the most important cases at law in American legal history.” The case was Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, and since that decision there has developed what is commonly called the “Erie Doctrine.”
“The core of the Erie Doctrine is the substantive law to be applied by the federal courts in any case is State law, EXCEPT when the matter before the court is governed by the United States Constitution, an Act of Congress, a treaty, international law, the domestic law of another country, or, in special circumstances, by “federal common law.”
“The Erie decision, and the doctrine subsequently developed, modified the conception of federal authority that prevailed prior to Erie under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. [M](2). The central issue in Swift v. Tyson and in Erie was the proper construction of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 — the famous Rules of Decision Act. This statute provided:
“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”
“Although amended in 1948, the Rules of Decision Act has remained substantially unchanged to this day.”
“The crucial question of construction, posed by the Act, is whether “laws of the several states” encompasses not only state legislative enactments but also the decisions of state courts; and therefore, whether state courts decisions are controlling at least in some situations in the federal courts. Swift v. Tyson held that:
“….laws of the several states that the federal courts were bound to apply to the Rules of Decision Act included, in addition to state constitutions and statutes, only those state judicial decisions that either construes state constitutional or statutory provisions or dealt with questions of real property or other immovable matters. The decisions of state courts on matters of commercial law, however, could be disregarded by the federal courts in favor of the general principle and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence. The Swift v. Tyson decision could have been limited to questions of commercial law, but was not so limited by the Court:
“In addition to questions of purely Commercial law, ‘general law’ was held to include the obligations under contracts entered into and to be performed within a State, the extent to which a carrier operating within a State may stipulate for exemption from liability for his own negligence or that of his employee; the liability for torts committed within the state upon persons resident or properly located there, even where the question of liability depended upon the scope of a property right conferred by the State; and the right to exemplary or punitive damages. Furthermore, state decisions construing local deeds, mineral conveyance, and even devises of real estate, were disregarded. [Erie R.R. v. Tomkins (supra) – The Court’s footnotes 11-19]“
In case you didn’t understand the essence of what was said, basically, the court is saying that in all cases whatsoever, the “obligations of contracts entered into” takes precedence over all court decisions. Continuing:
“Justice Brandeis discusses the new principle which was to become the heart of the Erie Doctrine:
“EXCEPT in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether be they local in nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts…”
Con’t: “In disapproving (the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson) … we do not hold unconstitutional section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other Act of Congress. We merely declare that in applying the doctrine this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several states. [Erie (supra)]”
Speer then goes on to add: “On the surface, the ruling appears innocuous enough. How then, did this decision change our entire system of jurisprudence, both state and federal, and create the federal giant we have today, while purportedly returning to the states a power that for nearly a century had been exercised by the federal government?”
“Henry J. Friendly, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit subsequently gave us the following insights into the significance of this decision:
“The clarion yet careful pronouncement of Erie, ‘There is no federal general common law’ opened the way to what, for want of a better term, we may call SPECIALIZED FEDERAL COMMON LAW. I doubt that we sufficiently realize how far this development has gone — let alone where it is likely to go.
“Since most cases relating to federal matters were in the federal courts and involved ‘general law,’ the familiar rule of Swift v. Tyson usually gave federal judges all the freedom they required in pre-Erie days and made it unnecessary to consider a MORE ESOTERIC SOURCE OF POWER … BY FOCUSING ATTENTION ON THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT BEING ENFORCED, ERIE CAUSED THE PRINCIPLE OF A SPECIALIZED FEDERAL COMMON LAW , BINDING IN ALL COURTS BECAUSE OF IT’S SOURCE, to develop within a quarter century into a powerful unifying force. Just as federal courts do not conform to state decisions on issues properly for the states, state courts must conform to federal decisions in areas where Congress, acting within powers granted to it, has manifested, be it ever so lightly, an intent to that end … The federal giant …, ‘Professor Gilmore’ has written, ‘is just beginning to stir with its long delayed entrance we are, it may be, at last catching sight of the principle character. [M](3).’
It sounds more like a dragon beast from hell than a giant of any sort, but what they are really saying here is that contracts and “THE RIGHT BEING ENFORCED” takes precedence over all court decisions, in state or federal courts, and this is the “federal common law,” because there is none normally. See, the common law provides for certain remedies not afforded by federal laws, so they have to include the rules of “simple contracts.”
Then there is a little bit more…Speer continues a little ahead: “It should be noted that in its 1981 decision in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, the Supreme Court took pains to emphasize that THE LAWMAKING ROLE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY IN ADMIRALTY SUITS WAS ‘SPECIAL,’ and it stood in contrast to the general presumption against lawmaking by courts of limited jurisdiction. The Northwest Airlines decision did recognize that admiralty law is judge-made to a great extent (an esoteric source of power?) but, in emphasizing the deference owed by federal courts to the legislative branch, the Court said:
“Even in admiralty, however, where federal judicial lawmaking power be well be at its strongest, it is our duty to respect the will of Congress.” [101 S. Ct. 1571; 67 L. Ed. 2d 750]”
Here is a definition to consider:
A phrase used to indicate judicial decisions which construe away the meaning of statutes, or find meaning in them the legislature never intended. It is sometimes used as meaning, simply, the law established by judicial precedent. (Black’s 4th)
So they are admitting that “Admiralty” is “judge-made law!” Getting back to Speer now, he comments on what was to become the “Clearfield Doctrine”:
“The best known Supreme Court case that serves to illustrate the operation of these principles is Clearfield Trust Company v. United States. A check issued by the United States had been stolen and cashed on the basis of a forged endorsement. The United States sued a bank that had presented the check for payment and had guaranteed prior endorsements. The district court held that under the law of Pennsylvania, where the transaction had taken place, the delay of the United States in notifying the bank that the endorsement was forgery would bar recovery from the bank. The court of appeals reversed and the reversal was affirmed by a unanimous Supreme Court, which held that the rights and duties of the United States on its commercial paper are governed by federal common law. This case is reported in the Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts as follows:
“…a unanimous court held that the rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper that it issues are governed by federal rather than local law. This does not mean that in choosing the applicable federal rule the courts may not occasionally select state law. But it was thought that such a course would be singularly inappropriate in the Clearfield case. The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale and transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will commonly occur in several states …
“The desirability of a uniform rule is plain. To find such uniform rule the court looked to the federal law merchant …
“Federal courts have made similar decisions for themselves as to what the controlling rule is to be in other cases where the United States is a party and the suit involved commercial paper, or bonds issued by the United States, government contracts, or the effect of a federal lien …
“If any issue is controlling by federal common law, this is binding on both state and federal courts. A case ‘arising under’ federal common law is a federal question case, and is within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts as such …
“The burgeoning of a federal common law binding on federal and state courts alike has occurred at the same time as the development of the Eerie Doctrine …
“It is frequently said that the Erie doctrine applies only in cases in which jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Indeed in an action for wrongful death caused by a maritime tort committed on navigable waters, the Court curtly dismissed Erie as “irrelevant”, since the district court was exercising its admiralty jurisdiction, even though it was enforcing a state-created right “Despite repeated statements implying the contrary, it is the source of the right sued upon, and not the ground, on which federal jurisdiction is founded, which determines the governing law.”
Wow! Did they really say that? “The source of the [right] sued upon?” Who has rights? Whoever is enforcing the contract!! That’s who. Who are the parties to the contract, and who is enforcing their rights? That’s what it all boils down to. They admit everything, if you just know where to look, and how to read what they are saying.
Therefore, what this means is that the only thing being “tried” is the “rights to enforce the contract,” in a sense. Have you ever contracted to smoke cannabis for the government, either state or federal? How about to sell cannabis or to grow it? — Oh, but those are “criminal” offenses, right? — Well, we already figured out what they think of you and how they relate to you, through your strawman and it’s a corporation in ALL CAPS. They figure you are a franchise, a vessel, a piece of property, right? And anything you do against the laws of the United States you can be tried for, found guilty and locked away because it’s “criminal,” right? — Well, what if I could show you a citation in the law that says distinctly that “marijuana crimes are commercial crimes?” What would you think? Would that make sense? After all, the government is dealing in commerce, correct?
Here is the citation from Chapter 27, Code of Federal Regulations Subpart B – Definitions – Section 72.11 Meaning of terms: Then it goes on to a section titled “Commercial Crimes”:
“Any of the following types of crimes (Federal or State): Offenses against the revenue laws; burglary; counterfeiting; forgery; kidnapping; larceny; robbery; illegal sale or possession of deadly weapons; prostitution (including soliciting, procuring, pandering, white slaving, keeping ill house of fame, and like offenses); extortion; swindling and confidence games and attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or compounding any of the foregoing crimes. Addiction to narcotic drugs and the use of marihuana will be treated as if such were commercial crime.”
Now, I know there are very few people out there who have ever read that before, so you may want to re-read it several times. It is too obvious to warrant further explanation. Now that we know that the feds consider marijuana a commercial crime, and everything else in the book that doesn’t apply, it becomes clearer that they are relying on a contract of some kind, probably the Birth Certificate, or maybe the Social Security Number, or the Voter Registration, or maybe the Driver’s License. Could it be something as simple as a Driver’s License? Take a look at this court case and quotations from a book called The American Constitutional or Common Law with a Commentary Concerning Equity and Merchant Law by the North American Freedom Council:
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States from (1973):
“However, ‘A central difference between those cases and this one is that businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade, whereas the petitioner here was not engaged in any regulated or licensed business. The businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.”
“As the Court stated in Biswell:
‘It is also plain that inspections for compliance with the Gun Control Act pose only limited threats to the dealer’s justifiable expectations of privacy. When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection. Each licensee is annually furnished with a revised compilation of ordinances that describe his obligations and define the inspector’s authority. . . . The dealer is not left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task.
“It is well to recall the words of Mr. Justice Jackson, soon after his return from the Nuremberg Trials:
“These [Fourth Amendment rights], I protest, are not mere second-class rights, but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 338 U. S. 180 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
“Mr. Chief Justice Taft’s opinion for the Court distinguished between searches at the border and in the interior, and clearly controls the case at bar:
“It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.” 267 U.S. at 267 U. S. 153-154. – Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 US 266, 271. (1973)
Returning now to the authors of The American Constitutional or Common Law with a Commentary Concerning Equity and Merchant Law:
“There was no doubt that Sanchez was guilty of hauling marihuana in violation of Federal Code but was stopped and searched without probable cause by law enforcement officers. The U.S., in attempting to support the illegal search, referred to two other cases where the high court had ruled that searches could be made without a warrant. However, the court quickly pointed out that in the Sanchez case, he was not in a regulated enterprise nor licensed which would automatically waive his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court, then, has ruled that if Sanchez had been licensed or in a regulated business, the stop and search would have been legal, but since he was not so regulated the stop and search was unconstitutional.”
And this one as well from American & English Encyclopedia of Law:
“The legislature cannot legislate demands upon a citizen forcing, under threat of criminal action, the carrying or producing of documents nor a specific performance by what is referred to as implied consent legislation as: “…no consent can be given which will deprive the consenter of any inalienable rights.” – American & English Encyclopedia of Law, Desty, Cr. L. Section 33
That is another example of the federal government’s limited executive authority, except in matters of commerce concerning contracts. I just wanted to point out that this is not a widely known case and very few marijuana activists or lawyers even, have ever heard of it. Well, we know why the lawyers don’t want to know about it.
The following are some definitions to get familiar with. They are very important to understanding commerce:
Account means any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance. All rights to payment earned or unearned under a charter or contract involving the use or rights of a vessel and all rights incident to the charter or contract are accounts. UCC 9-106
Literally to grow to; as the interest accrues on the principal. Accruing costs are those which become due and are created after judgment of an execution.
- – To accrue means also to arise, to happen, to come to pass; as the statute of limitations does not commence running until the cause of action has accrued. 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 861; 2 Rawle, 277; 10 Watts, 363; Bac. Abr. Limitation of Actions, D 3. (Bouviers 1856, 6th Ed.)
When the three basic prerequisites of security interest exist (agreement, value, and collateral) the security agreement becomes enforceable between the parties and is said to “attach.” (Blacks 6th) – UCC 9-203
The act or process of taking, apprehending, or seizing persons or property, by virtue of a writ, summons, or other judicial order, and bringing the same into the custody of the law; used either for the purpose of bringing a person before the court, of acquiring jurisdiction over the property seized, to compel an appearance, to furnish security for debt or costs, or to arrest a fund
in the hands of a third person who may become liable to pay it over. Also the writ or other process for the accomplishment of the purposes above enumerated, this being the more common use of the word. A remedy ancillary to an action by which plaintiff is enabled to acquire a lien upon property or effects of defendant for satisfaction of judgment which plaintiff may obtain. Though sometimes called an ancillary or auxiliary proceeding, it is in all essential respects, a suit. The purpose is to take defendant’s property into legal custody, so that it may be applied on defendant’s debt to plaintiff when established.
At common law, “attachment” was procedure whereby sheriff was commanded to attach a defendant who, after being personally served, disobeyed original writ of summons, by keeping certain of his goods which he would forfeit if he did not appear, or by making him find securities who would be amerced if he continued his nonappearance, and, if after such attachment he still neglected to appear, he would not only forfeit this security, but was compelled by a writ of distringas infinite. (Black’s 4th)
“Bank” means any person engaged in the business of banking. UCC 1-201
A bench or seat; the bench of justice; the bench or tribunal occupied by the judges; the seat of judgment; a court. The full bench, or full court; the assembly of all the judges of a court.
An acclivity; an elevation or mound of earth, especially that which borders the sides of a water course.
An institution, of great value in the commercial world, empowered to receive deposits of money to make loans, and to issue its promissory notes (designated to circulate as money, and commonly called “bank-notes” or “bank-bills,”) or to perform any one or more of these functions.
The house or place where the business of banking is carried on. (Blacks 4th
Draft drawn on and accepted by bank. (Bouviers 3rd
A private person who keeps a bank; one is who engaged in the business of banking.
Individual Banker — Under some statutes, an individual banker, as distinguished from a “private banker” (q.v.), is a person who having complied with the statutory requirements, has received authority from the state to engage in the business of banking, while a private banker is a person is engaged in banking without having any special privileges or authority from the state.
Private Banker — One who carries on the business of banking without being incorporated. One who carries on the business of banking by receiving money on deposit with or without interest, by buying and selling bills of exchange, promissory notes, gold or silver coin, bullion, uncurrent money, bonds or stock, or other securities, and by loaning money without being incorporated. (Blacks 4th)
A bill of exchange draft payable at maturity that is drawn by a creditor against his or her debtor. Bankers acceptances are short-term credit instruments most commonly used by persons or firms engaged in international trade. They are comparable to short-term government securities (for example, Treasury Bills) and may be sold on the open market at a discount. (Blacks 6th)
contracts. In England a distinction is made between bank notes, (q. v.) and bankers’ notes. The latter are promissory notes, and resemble bank notes in every respect, except that they are given by persons acting as private bankers. 6 Mod. 29; 3 Chit. Com. Law, 590; 1 Leigh’s N. P. 338. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
Popularly defined as insolvency, the inability of a debtor to pay his debts as they become due. Technically, however, it is the legal process under the Federal Bankruptcy Act by which assets of the debtor are liquidated as quickly as possible to pay off his creditors and to discharge the bankruptcy, or free him of his debts, so he can start anew. In reorganization, on the other hand, liquidation may be avoided and the debtor may continue to function, pay his creditors, and carry on business. (Barron’s 3rd)
Bill of Exchange:
A written order from A. to B., directing B. to pay C. a certain sum of money therein named. A bill of exchange is an instrument, negotiable in form, by which one, who is called the “drawer,” requests another, called the “drawee,” to pay a specified sum of money. A bill of exchange is an order by one person, called the “drawer” or “maker,” to another, called the “drawee” or “acceptor,” to pay money to another, (who may be the drawer himself,) called the “payee,’ or his order, or to the bearer. If the payee, or a bearer, transfers the bill by endorsement, he then becomes the “endorser.” (Black’s 1st
A certificate or evidence of a debt on which the issuing company or governmental body promises to pay the bondholders a specified amount of interest for a specified length of time, and to repay the loan on the expiration date. A long term debt instrument that promises to pay the lender a series of periodic interest payments in addition to returning the principal at maturity. In every case a bond represents debt – its holder is a creditor of the corporation and not a part owner as is the shareholder. (Black’s 6th)
Slavery; involuntary personal servitude; captivity (Black’s 4th)
The term “business” has no definite or legal meaning. (Black’s 4th)
The period from January 1st to December 31, inclusively. (Black’s 4th)
- Contract language.
As used in contract, means demand for payment of, especially by formal notice.
A visible natural object or landmark designated in a patent, entry, grant, or other conveyance of lands, as a limit or boundary to the land described, with which the points of surveying must correspond. Also the courses and distances designated.
A demand by directors upon subscribers for shares for payment of a portion or installment; in this sense, it is capable of three meanings: (1) The resolution of the directors to levy the assessment; (2) its notification to the persons liable to pay; (3) the time when it becomes payable. Although the terms “call” and “assessment” are often used synonymously, the latter term applies with peculiar aptness to contributions above the par value of stock or the subscription liability of the stockholders
Dealings in Futures
Deposit of more margin.
Dealings in Securities or Grain
Option or right to demand a certain amount of securities or grain at a fixed price at or within certain time agreed on. (Black’s 4th)
To summon or demand by name; to demand the presence and participation of a number of persons by calling aloud their names, either in a pre-arranged and systematic order or in a succession determined by chance. Terms “called” and “sold” are equivalent.
Call of the House, Calling a Summons, Calling an Election, Calling the Docket
The public calling of the docket or list of causes at commencement of term of court for setting a time for trial or entering orders of continuance, default, non-suit, etc. (Black’s 4th)
practice. A Contested question before a court of justice; it is a Suit or action. Causes are civil or criminal. Wood’s Civ. Law, 302; Code, 2, 416. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
Cause of Action:
By this phrase is understood the right to bring an action, which implies, that there is some person in existence who can assert, and also a person who can lawfully be sued; for example, where the payee of a bill was dead at the time when it fell due, it was held the cause of action did not accrue, and consequently the statute of limitations did not begin to run until letters of administration had been obtained by someone. 4 Bing. 686.
- There is no cause of action till the claimant can legally sue, therefore the statute of limitations does not run from the making of a promise, if it were to perform something at a future time, but only from the expiration of that time, though, when the obligor promises to pay on demand, or generally, without specifying day, he may be sued immediately, and then the cause of action has accrued. 5 Bar. & Cr. 860; 8 Dowl. & R. 346. When a wrong has been committed, or a breach of duty has occurred, the cause of action has accrued, though the claimant may be ignorant of it. 3 Barn. & Ald. 288, 626 5 B. & C. 259; 4 C. & P. 127. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
Chamber of Commerce:
A society of the principal merchants and traders of a city, who meet to promote the general trade and commerce of the place. Some of these are incorporated, as in Philadelphia. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
Charge and Discharge:
Under former equity practice, in taking an account before a master, a written statement of items for which plaintiff asked credit and a counter-statement, exhibiting claims or demands defendant held against plaintiff. (Black’s 4th)
Clearing House, com. law:
Among the English bankers, the clearing house is a place in Lombard Street, in London, where the bankers of that city daily settle with each other the balances which they owe, or to which they are entitled. Desks are placed around the room, one of which is appropriated to each banking house, and they are occupied in alphabetical order. Each clerk has a box or drawer alongside of him, and the name of the house he represents is inscribed over his head. A clerk of each house comes in about half past three o’clock in the afternoon, and brings the drafts or checks on the other bankers, which have been paid by his house that day, and deposits them in their proper drawers. The clerk at the desk credits their accounts separately which they have against him, as found in the drawer. Balances are thus struck from all the accounts, and the claims transferred from one to another, until they are so wound up and cancelled, that each clerk has only to settle with two or three others, and the balances are immediately paid. When drafts are paid at so late an hour that they cannot be cleared that day, they are sent to the houses on which they are drawn, to be marked, that is, a memorandum is made on them, and they are to be cleared the next day. – See Gilbert’s Practical Treatise on Banking, pp. 16-20, Babbage on the Economy of Machines, n. 173, 174; Kelly’s Cambist; Byles, on Bills, 106, 110; Pulling’s Laws and Customs of London, 437. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
commerce, contract. A person in the employ of a merchant, who attends only to a part of his business, while the merchant himself superintends the whole. He differs from a factor in this, that the latter wholly supplies the place of his principal in respect to the property consigned to him. Pard. Dr. Com. n. 38, 1 Chit. Pract. 80; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1287. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
“Collateral” means the property subject to a security interest, and includes accounts and chattel paper which have been sold. UCC 9-105(c)
trade, contracts. The exchange of commodities for commodities; considered in a legal point of view, it consists in the various agreements which have for their object to facilitate the exchange of the products of the earth or industry of man, with an intent to realize a profit. Pard. Dr. Coin. n. 1. In a narrower sense, commerce signifies any reciprocal agreements between two persons, by which one delivers to the other a thing, which the latter accepts, and for which he pays a consideration; if the consideration be money, it is called a sale; if any other thing than money, it is called exchange or barter. Domat, Dr. Pub. liv. 1, tit. 7, s. 1, n. 2. Congress have power by the constitution to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. 1 Kent. 431; Story on Const. Sec. 1052, et seq. The sense in which the word commerce is used in the constitution seems not only to include traffic, but intercourse and navigation. Story, Sec. 1057; 9 Wheat. 190, 191, 215, 229; 1 Tuck. Bl. App. 249 to 252. Vide 17 John. R. 488; 4 John. Ch. R. 150; 6 John. Ch. R. 300; 1 Halst. R. 285; Id. 236; 3 Cowen R. 713; 12 Wheat. R. 419; 1 Brock. R. 423; 11 Pet. R. 102; 6 Cowen, R. 169; 3 Dana, R. 274; 6 Pet. R. 515; 13 S. & R. 205. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
A phrase used to designate the whole body of substantive jurisprudence (e.g. Uniform Commercial Code, Truth in Lending Act) applicable to the rights, intercourse, of persons engaged in commerce, trade or mercantile pursuits. (Black’s 6th)
Bills of exchange, promissory notes, bank-checks, and other negotiable instruments for the payment of money, which, by their form and on their face, purport to be such instruments as are, by the law-merchant, recognized as falling under the designation of “commercial paper.” Negotiable paper given in due course of business, whether the element of negotiability be given it by the law-merchant or by statute. (Black’s 4th)
A public officer of a state or municipal corporation, charged with certain duties in relation to the fiscal affairs of the same, principally to examine and audit the accounts of collectors of the public money, to keep records, and report the financial situation from time to time. There are also officers bearing this name in the treasury department of the United States. (Black’s 4th)
Practice. A technical term indicating that a tribunal has heard and judicially determined matters submitted to it.
Contracts. The inducement to a contract. The cause, motive, price, or impelling influence which induces a contracting party to enter into a contract. The reason or material cause of a contract. (Black’s 4th)
The ability of a business man to borrow money, or obtain goods on time, in consequence of the favorable opinion held by the community, or by the particular lender, as to his solvency and reliability. That influence connected with certain social positions. Time allowed to the buyer of goods by the seller, in which to make payment for them. The correlative of a debt; that is, a debt considered from the creditor’s standpoint, or that which is incoming or due to one. That which is due to a person, as distinguished from debit, that which is due by him. Claim or cause of action for specific sum of money. A sum credited on the books of a company to person who appears to be entitled to it. (Black’s 4th)
common law, contracts. The ability to borrow, on the opinion conceived by the lender that he will be repaid. This definition includes the effect and the immediate cause of credit. The debt due in consequence of such a contract is also called a credit; as, administrator of the goods, chattels, effects and credits, &c.
- The time extended for the payment of goods sold, is also called a credit; as, the goods were sold at six months credit.
- In commercial law, credit is understood as opposed to debit; credit is what is due to a merchant, debit, what is due by him.
4. According to M. Duvergier, credit also signifies that influence acquired by intrigue connected with certain social positions. 20 Toull. n. 19. This last species of credit is not, of such value as to be the object of commerce. Vide generally, 5 Taunt. R. 338. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
That which is extended to a buyer or borrower on the seller’s or lender’s belief that that which is given will be repaid. The term can be applied to unlimited types of transactions. Under the UCC, any credit transaction creating a security interest in property is called a “secured transaction.” (Barron’s 3rd)
A person to whom a debt is owing by another person who is the “debtor.” One who has a right to require the fulfillment of an obligation or contract; one to whom money is due, and, in ordinary acceptation, has reference to financial or business transactions. (Black’s 4th)
A term of universal application to obligations due and to become due. A term used in taxation statutes to designate certain forms of personal property. It includes every claim and demand for money and every sum of money receivable at stated periods, due or to become due, but not un-accrued rents to issue out of land. (Black’s 4th)
Coined money and such banknotes or other paper money as are authorized by law and do in fact circulate from hand to hand as the medium of exchange.
The term “money” is synonymous with “currency” and imports any currency, token, bank notes, or other circulating medium in general use as the representative of value. (Black’s 4th)
A sum charged as due or owing. The term is used in book-keeping to denote the left page of the ledger, or the charging of a person or an account with all that is supplied to or paid out for him or for the subject of the account. Also, the balance of an account where it is shown that something remains due to the party keeping the account. (Black’s 4th)
A sum of money due by certain and express agreement; as by bond for a determinate sum, a bill or note, a special bargain, or a rent reserved on a lease, where the amount is fixed and specific, and does not depend upon any subsequent valuation to settle it.
The term “demand” is of much broader import than “debt,” and embraces rights of action belonging to the debtor beyond those which could appropriately be called “debts.” In this respect the term “demand” is one of very extensive import.
Nevertheless, “debt” may be synonymous with “claim”; and may include any kind of a just demand.
The word dues is equivalent to “debts,” or that which is owing and has a contractual significance.
Con’t: “Debt” is not exactly synonymous with “duty.” A debt is a legal liability to pay a specific sum of money; a duty is a legal obligation to perform some act.
“Obligation” is a broader term than “debt.” Every obligation is not a debt, though every debt is an obligation.
The words “debt” and “liability” are not necessarily synonymous. As applied to the pecuniary relations or parties, liability is a term of broader significance than debt. Liability is responsibility; the state of one who is bound in law and justice to do something which may be enforced by action. This liability may arise from contracts either express or implied, or in consequence of torts committed. “Liability” ordinarily means an obligation which may or may not ripen into a debt. Yet “debt” may sometimes include various kinds of liabilities. (Black’s 4th)
contracts. A sum of money due by certain and express agreement. 3 Bl. Com. 154. In a less technical sense, as in the “act to regulate arbitrations and proceedings in courts of justice” of Pennsylvania, passed the 21st of March, 1806, s. 5, it means a claim for money. In a still more enlarged sense, it denotes any kind of a just demand; as, the debts of a bankrupt. 4 S. & R. 506.
- Debts arise or are proved by matter of record, as judgment debts; by bonds or specialties; and by simple contracts, where the quantity is fixed and specific, and does not depend upon any future valuation to settle it. 3 Bl. Com. 154; 2 Hill. R. 220.
- According to the civilians, debts are divided into active and passive. By the former is meant what is due to us, by the latter, what we owe. By liquid debt, they understand one, the payment of which may be immediately enforced, and not one which is due at a future time, or is subject to a condition; by hypothecary debt is meant, one which is a lien over an estate and a doubtful debt, is one the payment of which is uncertain. Clef des Lois Rom. h.t.
- Debts are discharged in various ways, but principally by payment. See Accord and Satisfaction; Bankruptcy; Confusion Compensation; Delegation; Defeasance; Discharge of a contract; Extinction; Extinguishment; Former recovery; Lapse of time; Novation; Payment; Release; Rescission; Set off.
- In payment of debts, some are to be paid before others, in cases of insolvent estates first, in consequence of the character of the creditor, as debts due to the United States are generally to be first paid; and secondly, in consequence of the nature of the debt, as funeral expenses and servants’ wages, which are generally paid in preference to other debts. See Preference; Privilege; Priority. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
“Debtor” means the person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured, whether or not he or she owns or has rights in the collateral, and includes the seller of accounts or chattel paper. UCC 9-105(d)
One who owes a debt; he who may be compelled to pay a claim or demand. Anyone liable on a claim, whether due or to become due.
The term may be used synonymously with “obligor,” “mortgagor,” and the like. (Black’s 4th)
contracts. One who owes a debt; he who may be constrained to pay what he owes.
- A debtor is bound to pay his debt personally, and all the estate he possesses or may acquire, is also liable for his debt.
- Debtors are joint or several; joint, when they all equally owe the debt in solido; in this case if a suit should be necessary to recover the debt, all the debtors must be sued together or, when some are dead, the survivors must be sued, but each is bound for the whole debt, having a right to contribution from the others; they are several, when each promises severally to pay the whole debt; and obligations are generally binding on both or all debtors jointly and severally. When they are severally bound each may be sued separately, and on the payment of debt by one, the others will be bound to contribution, where all had participated in the money or property, which was the cause of the debt.
- Debtors are also principal and surety; the principal debtor is bound as between him and his surety to pay the whole debt, and if the surety pay it, he will be entitled to recover against the principal. Vide Bouv. Inst. Index, h.t.; Vin. Ab. Creditor and Debtor; Id. Debt; 8 Com. Dig. 288; Dig. 50, 16, 108 Id. 50, 16, 178, 3; Toull. liv. 2, n. 250. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
A term applied to the non-fulfillment of commercial engagements. To dishonor a bill of exchange or promissory note, is to refuse or neglect to pay it at maturity. (Bouveir’s 3rd)
In mercantile law and usage. To refuse or decline to accept a bill of exchange, or to refuse or neglect to pay a bill or note at maturity. A negotiable instrument is dishonored when it is either not paid or not accepted, according to its tenor, on presentment for that purpose, or without presentment, where that is excused. Civil Code Cal. Section 3141 (Black’s 1st)
The unit employed in the United States in calculating money values. It is of the value of one hundred cents. Money or currency issued by lawful authority and intended to pass and circulate as such. (Black’s 4th)
A silver coin of the United States of the value of one hundred cents, or tenth part of an eagle.
- It weighs four hundred and twelve and a half grains. Of one thousand parts, nine hundred are of pure silver and one hundred of alloy. Act of January 18, 1837, ss. 8 & 9, 4 Sharsw. Cont. of Story’s L. U. S. 2523, 4; Wright, R. 162.
- In all computations at the custom-house, the specie dollar of Sweden and Norway shall be estimated at one hundred and six cents. The specie dollar of Denmark, at one hundred and five cents. Act of May 22, 1846. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
A system of mercantile bookkeeping, in which the entries in the day-book, etc., are posted twice into the ledger. First, to a personal account, that is, to the account of the person with whom the dealing to which any given entry refers has taken place; secondly, to an impersonal account, as “goods.” (Black’s 1st)
A system of bookkeeping, in which the entries are posted twice into the ledger, once as a credit and once as a debit. (Black’s 6th)
A term used among merchants to signify that books of account are kept in such a manner that they present the debit and credit of everything. The term is used in contradistinction to single entry.
- Keeping books by double entry is more exact, because, presenting all the active and all the passive property of the merchant, in their respective divisions, there cannot be placed an article to, an account, which does not pass to some correspondent account elsewhere. It presents a perfect, view of each operation, and, from the relation and comparison of the divers accounts, which always keep pace with each other, their correctness is proved; for every commercial operation is necessarily composed of two interests, which are connected together. The basis of this mode of keeping books, and the only condition required, is to write down every transaction and nothing else; and to make no entry without putting it down to the two agents of the operation. By this means a merchant whose transactions are extensive, comprising a great number of subjects, is able to known not only the general situation of his affairs, but also the situation of each particular operation. For example, when a merchant receives money, his cash account becomes debtor, and the person who has paid it, or the merchandise sold, is credited with it; when he pays money, the cash account, is credited, and the merchandise bought, or the obligation paid, is debited with it. See Single entry. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
An order in writing directing a person other than the maker to pay a specified sum to a named person. Drafts may or may not be negotiable instruments, depending on where the elements of negotiability are satisfied. Draft is synonymous with bill of exchange. (Barron’s 3rd)
“Draft” means a draft as defined in Section 3-104 or an item, other than an instrument, that is an order. UCC 4-104(7)
An instrument is a “note” if it is a promise, and is a “draft” if it is an order. UCC 3-104(e)
The common term for a bill of exchange; as being drawn by one person on another.
An order for the payment of money drawn by one person on another. It is said to be a nomen generalissimum and to include all such orders.
The term includes a cashier’s check; but a draft is distinguishable from a cashier’s check in that a draft is a bill of exchange payable on demand purporting to be drawn on deposit while a cashier’s check is a primary obligation of a bank which issues it and constitutes its written promise to pay it on demand. It is distinguished from “check” by the fact that in a draft the drawer is a bank, while in the ordinary check, the drawer is an individual. (Black’s 4th)
Most generally “justice.” Historically, “equity” developed as a separate body of law in England in reaction to the inability of the common law courts, in their strict adherence to writs and forms of action, to entertain or provide a remedy for every injury. The king therefore established the high court of chancery, the purpose of which was to administer justice according to principles of fairness in cases where the common law would give no or inadequate redress. Equity law, to a large extent, was formulated in maxims, such as “equity suffers not a right without a remedy” or “equity follows the law,” meaning that equity will derives a means to achieve a lawful result when legal procedure is inadequate. Equity and law are no longer bifurcated but are now merged in most jurisdictions, though equity jurisprudence and equitable doctrines are still independently viable. (Barron’s 3rd)
To barter; to swap. To part with, give or transfer for an equivalent.
A negotiation by which one person transfers to another, funds which he has in a certain place, either at a price agreed upon or which is fixed by commercial usage.
The process of settling accounts or debts between parties residing at a distance from each other, without the intervention of money, by exchanging orders or drafts, called bills of exchange; the payment of debts in different places by an exchange or transfer of credits. (Black’s 4th)
civil law. A contract by which we sell a thing to someone, that is, transmit to him the property of the thing, with the solemn forms of emancipation, on condition that he will sell it back to us. This species of contract took place in the emancipation of children, in testaments, and in pledges. Poth. Pand. h.t. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
The term is derived from the Roman law, and means, (as a noun) a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee, in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor which it requires. A person having duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another’s benefit in matters connected with such undertaking. (Black’s 4th)
One is said to act in a “fiduciary capacity,” or to receive money or contract a debt in a “fiduciary capacity,” when the business which he transacts, or the money or property which he handles, is not his own or for his own benefit, but for the benefit of another person, as to whom he stands in a relation implying and necessitating great confidence and trust on one part and a high degree of good faith on the other part. The term is not restricted to technical or express trusts, but includes also such offices or relations as those of an attorney at law, a guardian, executor, or broker, a director of a corporation, and a public officer. (Black’s 4th)
- To capitalize with a view to the production of interest. Also, to put into the form of bonds, stocks, or other securities, bearing regular interest, and to provide or appropriate a fund or permanent revenue for the payment thereof.
To fund a debt is to pledge a specific fund to keep down the interest and reduce the principal.
- A generic term and all-embracing as compared with term “money,” etc., which is specific.
A sum of money set apart for a specific purpose, or availability for the payment of debts or claims.
In its narrower and more usual sense, “fund” signifies “capital,” as opposed to “interest” or “income”; as where we speak of a corporation funding the arrears of interest due on its bonds, or the like, meaning that the interest is capitalized and made to bear interest in its turn until it is repaid.
In the plural, this word has a variety of slightly different meanings, as follows:
Moneys and much more, such as notes, bills, checks, drafts, stocks and bonds, and in broader meaning may include property of every kind.
Money in hand; assets; cash; money available for the payment of a debt, legacy, etc.
The proceeds of sales of real and personal estate, or the proceeds of any other assets converted into money.
Corporate stocks or government securities; in this sense usually spoken of as the “funds.”
Assets, securities, bonds, or revenue of a state or government appropriated for the discharge of its debts.
An un-technical name for (1) the revenue or money of a government, state, or municipal corporation; (2) the bonds, stocks, or other securities of a national or state government. Money, warrants, or bonds, or other paper having a money value, and belonging to the state, or to any county, city, incorporated town or school district. The term applies to funds of every political subdivision of state wherein taxes are levied for public purposes. (Black’s 4th)
A term of variable content and meaning. All things which are moveable at the time of identification to the contract for sale, investment securities, and things in action. Also includes the unborn young of animals. (Black’s 6th)
“Goods” includes all things that are moveable at the time the security interest attaches. UCC 9-105(h)
The name formerly given to a place under the exchequer chamber, where the king’s debtors were confined. (Black’s 4th)
The holder of a bill of exchange, promissory note, or check is the person who has legally acquired possession of the same, by endorsement or delivery, and who is entitled to receive payment of the instrument. (Black’s 4th)
Holder in Due Course:
A holder who has taken a bill of exchange (check or note) complete and regular of the face of it, under the following conditions, namely: (a) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact. (b) That he took the bill (check or note) in good faith and for value, and that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any defect in the title of the person who negotiated it. (Black’s 4th)
- To accept a bill of exchange, or to pay a note, check, or accepted bill, at maturity and according to its tenor. (Black’s 4th)
To pledge a thing without delivering the possession of it to the pledgee. (Black’s 4th)
A written document; a formal or legal document in writing, such as a contract, deed, will, bond, or lease.
Anything reduced to writing, a document of a formal or solemn character, a writing given as a means of affording evidence. A document or writing which gives formal expression to a legal act or agreement, for the purpose of creating, securing, modifying, or terminating a right; a writing executed and delivered as the evidence of an act or agreement.
In the law of evidence. Anything which may be presented as evidence to the sense of the adjudicating tribunal. (Black’s 4th)
contracts. The writing which contains some agreement, and is so called because it has been prepared as a memorial of what has taken place or been agreed upon. The agreement and the instrument in which it is contained are very different things, the latter being only evidence of the existence of the former. The instrument or form of the contract may be valid, but the contract itself may be void on account of fraud. Vide Ayl. Parerg. 305; Dunl. Ad. Pr. 220. (Bouvier’s 1856 6th Ed.)
An instrument is a “note” if it is a promise and is a “draft” if it is an order. If an instrument falls within the definition of both “note” and “draft,” a person entitled to enforce the instrument may treat it as either. UCC 3-104(e). “Instrument” means a negotiable instrument (defined in Section 3-104), or a certified security (defined in Section 8-102) or any other writing which evidences a right to the payment and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary endorsement or assignment. UCC 9-105(I).
The most general term that can be employed to denote a property in lands or chattels. In its application to lands or things real, it is frequently used in connection with the terms “estate,” “right,” and “title,” and, according to Lord Coke, it properly includes them all.
More particularly it means a right to have the advantage accruing from anything; any right in the nature of property, but less than title; a partial or undivided right; a title to a share.
The term “interest” and “title” are not synonymous. A mortgagor in possession, and a purchaser holding under a deed defectively executed, have, both of them, absolute as well as insurable interests in the property, though neither of them has the legal title.
Interest is the compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance or detention of money. (Black’s 4th)
Pages 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230 Not Included in Free Edition – To Order the FULL Version in either Softcover or E-Book, Please Visit the Store.