Chapter 12: Lawyers, Judges, Word Manipulators & Other Con Artists
Now that the United States was set up completely, even down to the level of being a municipal corporation, the British Masonic bankers had to overcome one more thing in this country before they could really takeover. They had to “Write Laws.” This way they could give you a fine for jaywalking or arrest you for using drugs. This was the only way they could make it that easy to arrest you for the slightest offence. If Americans were free to actually go to the bathroom without permission, god only knows what the Americans could come up with next. So, to foil the Americans attempts to actually conduct the affairs of their nation for themselves, the Bar Association settled in America in 1878.
The American Bar Association (ABA) was founded on August 21, 1878, in Saratoga Springs, New York, by 100 lawyers from 21 states. The legal profession as we know it today barely existed at that time. Now we must consider, the state corporations/constitutions were all set up in 1879, exactly one year after the Bar Association settled into America and seven years after the creation of the municipal corporation called the government of the District of Columbia.
When I think of the term “legal bulldog,” one man comes to mind. Eustace Mullins. He has been in the courts representing himself for decades and you would never believe what they put him through. They even told him he couldn’t make any money off the books that he wrote!!!
Mullins understands the law very well, and he understands it from the viewpoint of understanding the “new world order” as well, meaning the plans of the Freemasons. That is why his book, The Rape of Justice is so unique. Eustace delves into areas that very few other authors can get near when they relate the Masonic conspiracy. Again, as in chapter 3, I will draw heavily from his book in this chapter to illustrate my points.
Here, Mullins discusses the inception of the Bar Association in America: “The professional organization by which the lawyers have become the Nomenklatura, or ruling, elite, in the United States is the American Bar Association. This organization selects, and for all practical purposes, elects judges to our courts. It not only “recommends” judges, but also passes on their qualifications, labeling them “able,” “mediocre,” or “not recommended.” The reasons for the latter unfavorable designation remain shrouded in secrecy, but are always based on political or ethnic prejudices. Rarely does it have any bearing on the character, the training, or the ability of the designate. “Not recommended” simply means that the elitists of the American Bar Association have decided to blackball someone who does not fit in to their narrow categorization. Such unfavorable decision is always spared anyone who has the necessary qualifications, the most important being membership in a Masonic lodge. The ABA system ensures that a small, dedicated group, existing in an atmosphere of conspiracy and secret goals, can dominate the selection of all judges in the United States.” (1)
“Like most invasions of our rights, the inspiration for the American Bar Association invasion came directly from England. Our Constitution guarantees our citizens equal rights under the law; the British Secret Service has sought to undermine this guarantee by decreeing that the laws of the United States shall be administered by persons who want unequal rights, or special licenses. The Constitution tried to prevent this by expressly outlawing grants of special privilege. (Titles of Nobility).” (2)
Mullins continues discussing the creation of the Bar Association in America:
“The American Bar Association had its inception at a meeting in the summer of 1878 of some seventy-five lawyers from eleven states. The guiding force of the group was Simeon E. Baldwin, a descendant of Roger Sherman, a Governor of Connecticut, and a Justice of the state’s Supreme Court. The ABA subsequently underwent three periods in its history: From 1878 to 1902, it was a strictly professional organization dedicated to improving the practice of law; from 1902 to 1936 was its era of national expansion, when it became a genuinely national organization, which sought to extend its control over other aspects of American life. It was in 1936 that the ABA adopted a federalized constitution, creating a monolithic organization which was tightly controlled by a small group of elitists. It also founded the National Association of Law Schools in 1900, giving it control of the crucial field of accreditation, and the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, giving it access to the statutes of every state.” (3)
(1) Rape of Justice, p. 119-120
(2) ibid, p. 120
(3) Rape of Justice, p. 120
How difficult is it to recognize the fact that if most judges are Masons and members of the Bar, and the British Masons and the Bar are controlled from England, as well, then the entire legal profession is one dark, sinister, conspiratorial brotherhood, which may or may not grant you justice or recognize your god given rights? It shouldn’t take too long to figure that one out.
Mullins then goes on to discuss who funded the ABA’s expansion and exactly how it got a foothold in the states to allow only licensed lawyers to practice:
“The appearance of the ABA as a genuine national force first came in 1909, when a group of British lawyers arrived in Chicago to set up a monolithic organization. They were actively assisted by John D. Rockefeller, who was then setting up the University of Chicago to promote the principles of British Fabian Socialism, with a gift of fifty million dollars. The Illinois legislature then passed a statute that only members of the legal union, the ABA, would be allowed to practice law within that state. With this act, the State of Illinois seceded from the constitutional union of states, by granting special privileges in violation of the Constitution. (Author’s Note: But, as we have already reviewed, Martial Law had already been declared, and the Constitution suspended, but it was not allowed to look like that any longer). This statute also set up a class system in the United States. Other states were persuaded to adopt the Illinois statute. California in 1927, and the other states in the 1930’s, until the ABA had achieved its goal of national power.” (4)
“Yale law professor Fred Rodell characterizes the union members of the ABA, the duly licensed and chartered “lawyers” as “purveyors of streamlined voodoo and chrome-plated theology,” whose “weird and wordy mental gymnastics” enable them to carry on a “high class racket.” There are now some 180 “approved” law schools in the United States, licensed by the ABA to turn out “approved” lawyers. On graduation these lawyers are still mere apprentices, because they have been taught little or nothing about how the legal system actually operates, or what a lawyer must do to earn his fees. They are not taught the classics of the law, such as the works of Coke and Blackstone, but they endure months of semantic quibbling about the law of contracts or the meaning of a household. This is to prepare them for the practice of the law merchant.” (5)
Next, Mullins discusses the slow departure from Constitutional law to that of commercial law or the Law Merchant:
“The authority of Constitutional law has been steadily eroded in the United States by the growing dependence upon the law merchant, and the consequent violation of individual rights of American citizens. This development flies in the face of James Madison, who wrote the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Madison stated that power must come from the people; “the government has only such powers as the people delegate to it through a social covenant, the Constitution, which is derived from God’s Covenant with man. This derivation limits the power of the process of law and the powers of government. This covenant cannot be contravened as it is “the law of nature and of Nature’s God.”
Mullins also writes: “The natural laws written by Madison and the other Founding Fathers laid down the separation of powers of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government and the nexus imperium, the law of checks and balances, safeguards which are now largely being ignored and contravened by the judiciary through the adept usage of admiralty law and jurisdiction of the law merchant. In modern times, the law of checks and balances has been redefined by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Jim Wright (who has since resigned), “We (the Congress) will write the checks and the people will have to provide the balances.”
(4) ibid, p. 121
(5) ibid, p. 121
A lot of what Mullins says, I know myself, to be true. He advises against hiring a lawyer at all costs. He claims it could cost you more:
“Few people realize that an association with a lawyer may turn out to be the most dangerous step you can take, possibly resulting in the loss of your home, job, family, and one’s life savings. They have no idea that lawyers often engage in one or more of the following practices during a single case of litigation — subornation of perjury; conspiracy to obstruct justice; and flagrant violation of the Constitutional rights of the opposing party.” … “Perjury, that is, false swearing under oath, is one of the most prevalent practices in our courts, not only by witnesses, but also by lawyers, who often coach witnesses to repeat carefully directed and totally false testimony. I once appeared with an attorney in a traffic case in New Jersey, which went on for about five hours in a small town courtroom. At the end of the case, the judge, who ruled against us, informed the attorney that of all the testimony heard that evening, his was the most incredible! Subornation of Perjury, that is, going over the prospective testimony of a witness, and instructing him what not to say or what he should say, is the linchpin of our present courtroom drama, the adversary system of justice. Two pit bulls are released into the arena, to tear at each other until one sinks into death. This system has little to do with justice, but much to do with power, profit, and augmentation of fees. The practice arose because a lawyer who did not know what his witness might say on the stand would be sitting on a keg of dynamite, wondering when it would go off. Many cases, which have been arduously prepared, have been lost in a twinkling when a witness goes beyond the scope of a question and volunteers information which destroys the client’s case.” (6)
Mullins states that because the lawyers do not know what a person will say, they must control everything all the way down to what the witnesses will say on the stand. They NEED you to work with them, or they lose control. Everything must be “under control” for the attorney to not have to work so hard or think too much.
Continuing, Mullins writes:
“For this reason, lawyers rely heavily on pre-trial depositions, or pre-trial discovery. Once these are typed up and presented to the court, they are set in stone, removing the fear that the witness will volunteer extra information or alter his testimony. Like Congressional speeches which are daily reprinted in the Congressional Record, the testimony may be subjected to intensive editing, alteration and deletion, all without any notice to the witness or the court. The altered deposition is then presented to the court, after a lawyer’s extensive changes, as “sworn testimony!” Should an error be exposed, it would be blamed on the court reporter”… ”The other tools of pretrial discovery are written interrogatories and requests for admission, both of which are also answered under oath. The interrogatories constitute one of the greatest abuses of parties. They were sometimes expanded to as many as 50 or even 100 questions.”… ”As I have repeatedly pointed out in Motions for Protective Orders against Depositions to the court, pretrial discovery is actually “pre-trial trial.” The lawyer actually conducts the hearing with himself sitting as judge and jury, with no actual judge being present. Judges have been universally hostile to my motions and have always denied them, indignant that a “layman” would question one of the most profitable and arrogant practices of the legal profession. I identified them as “Bills of Attainder,” which are absolutely forbidden by the Constitution, being too naive at that time to understand that the law merchant or admiralty procedures of our courts ban any and all Constitutional protections of citizens. Pretrial discovery is also modeled after the ancient Star Chamber procedures; the subject of the deposition is summoned to a room where he is placed under oath, with the understanding that anything he says may be used against him. As Roy Cohn pointed out, discovery has become the bread and butter of the legal profession. Previously forbidden by both common law and the Constitution, it is now the sacred cow of our legal procedures.” (7)
(6) Rape of Justice, p. 58
(7) Rape of Justice, p. 58-59
Mullins discusses here the way courts do away with issues that bother or confuse them:
“Civil procedure, as it is practiced in our courts can be learned in a few hours. We are speaking now of the basic practices. The ramifications of our civil procedure are in fact infinite; the present writer has contributed his modest addition to it by observing that under our present legal system, any case is in fact endless and can be continued ad infinitum, depending on the extent of funds of the rapidly impoverished parties to the action. This writer has found most attorneys not only unqualified, but unfamiliar with many aspects of legal practice, a discovery made when I repeatedly filed motions with attorneys, both in private practice and employed by government agencies, had no idea how to answer or to argue. Their way out of this dilemma was on one which they have relied constantly during this writer’s forty years of practice in the courts; they simply have the judge deny the motions without argument. The layman will exclaim, “But that impossible! The court’s duty is to hear and to resolve all motions of the litigants.” In a perfect world, this would be true. The dodge by which they ignore it is one of the most treasured privileges which judges have granted to themselves. It is called “judicial discretion.” The first line of defense for the judges is “judicial independence.” No one can influence a judge, because he is absolutely removed from any possibility of influence, whether family, financial or political. His second line of defense is “judicial immunity.” This is the claim that when a man puts on the black robe of ancient physical and ritual sacrifice of victims, dating from the time of the cults of Babylon, he is placed beyond any criticism or retribution, and removed from any liability for violations of morality, national loyalty, or religious concepts.” (8)
Obviously Eustace Mullins has been to court and has dealt with the system in a very serious and attentive way. The author has obviously exhausted his remedy over and over in the common, Constitutional sense of the word. Here is a brief summary of his experiences being railroaded and thwarted by the court system:
“In a previous letter, October 10, 1985, I had noted that ‘for 25 years I have filed suits in area courts in which the evidence in my favor was stricken or ruled inadmissible, while the evidence against me, including hearsay from mental patients and patients with brain damage, was admitted. I have sued 4 attorneys, all of which suits were dismissed on demurrers (insufficient cause of action) which is barred from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I went to the U.S. Attorney with a list of 42 consecutive motions I had filed, all of which were denied, while motions against me were perfunctorily granted. I later learned that this fellow was a political crony of ‘our crowd.’ I never heard from him to this day.” (9)
Mullins then discusses the tactics used by judges to overcome or sidestep the law at their own convenience:
“Of the three unholy practices of judges, the doctrine of “judicial discretion” is the most pernicious and the most frequently encountered. Briefly, this means that the judge has the option of personally ruling for or against any motion without going into its legal merits. He may also ignore it altogether by “taking it under advisement.” This means that he postpones his decisions for months, or even years, leaving the case in limbo. His fellow members of the legal profession, the opposing lawyers, eagerly accept this denouement, because their meters will continue to run throughout the period of the judge’s monumental wrestling with the merits of the motion, until he finally reaches his decision. In truth, little or no such “wrestling” ever takes place. The judge merely buries the motion until the agonized screams of the victims force the lawyers to request that he deliver his opinion.”
“Every order handed down within the confines of an American courtroom is delivered with a backup of force. Armed bailiffs stand on guard in the courtroom, not merely to intimidate those appearing, but also to arrest, incarcerate, or even to beat or kill anyone who challenges what is taking place. The attorney whom you hired is a willing participant to this force. He never informs you, when he hands you his bill, that he is bound as “an officer of the court.” You pay their fees but the lawyer’s primary obligation is to the court, that is, to the legal system and the practices for which it stands.”
(8) ibid, p. 62-63
(9) Rape of Justice, p. 64
Well, I would not argue with Eustace Mullins about the corruption of the courts and the lawyers. Here is what our law books say about lawyers and their clients.
The following is from “Corpus Juris Secundum”:
§4 ATTORNEY & CLIENT 7 C.J.S.
“His first duty is to the courts and the public, not to the clients, and wherever the duties to his client conflict with those he owes as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the former must yield to the latter.
Then, under section 2, we read the following concerning “Wards of the Court”:
“A client is one who applies to a lawyer or counselor for advice and direction in a question of law, or commits his cause to his management in prosecuting a claim or defending against a suit in a court of justice; one who retains the attorney, is responsible to him for his fees, and to whom the attorney is responsible for the management of the suit; one who communicates facts to an attorney expecting professional advice. Clients are also called “wards of the court” in regard to their relationship with their attorneys.”
Now, if you look up “Wards of Court” in Black’s 5th, it is defined as:
“Infants and persons of unsound mind.” Davis’ Committee v. Loney, 290 Ky. 644, 162 S.W. 2d 189, 190. Their rights must be guarded jealously. Montgomery v. Erie R. Co., C.C.A.N.J., 97 F.2d 289, 292. See Guardianship
In a court appearance, what you are doing is “appearing.” In the Bible, there are a few good quotes about the judges, lawyers and courts, so I like to use them when they are appropriate: Luke 11: 46, 52 – And He said, “Woe unto you also, ye lawyers! for ye laid men with burdens grievous to be borne, and ye yourselves touch not the burdens with one of your fingers.” .. “Woe unto you, lawyers! for ye have taken away the key of knowledge: ye entered not in yourselves, and them that were entering in ye hindered.”
So, what exactly do you think the Bible’s talking about? It’s talking about the fact that the lawyers are “re-presenting” us, and not “presenting” us. Which implies a cross-over or a filter or veil, between two worlds. Only the individual can present himself, everyone else can only re-present him.
Someone who speaks on your behalf does so because you are not qualified to do so. Like an interpreter of a foreign language. Well, would you trust a man on the street to interpret another language for you in a foreign town? Sometimes you have to, but in the end, if you are going to be staying awhile, (living in society) you may want to learn the language yourself. That way, when you ask, “how much is that?” your interpreter won’t be there in between pocketing the difference between $2.00 and $10.00. If you need someone to do that, you are at their mercy, and if they don’t play fair, or if they are professionals at distorting the meaning of words, and mass confusion, then you are just plain screwed.
Nobody can better know your story than you, and nobody can talk on your behalf, unless you are incompetent. Are you a “person of unsound mind?” Believe it or not, by the time our Founding Fathers were 18 years of age, they had a full working knowledge of the law. Enough to start a revolution, build a new country, and write a Constitution. This book would have been required reading by age 10.
The costs alone, and were just talking financial, can ruin your entire life. Lawyers and courts are the biggest racket going. Here, Mullins discusses the financial implication of bringing about a suit in court:
“A typical eighty partner firm pays a mean income per partner of $360,000 per year on $938,000 of gross revenue, which means that the firm must gross $29 million annually, or $80,000 for every day of the year. Merely organizing the file and indexing documents in a lawsuit can cost from $2,500 to $5,000, while the drafting and filing of a complaint costs upwards of $10,000. No wonder people sneer, “sue me,” knowing that few people can afford such expensive justice, regardless of the merit of their complaint. A single motion before the court will cost from $5,000 to $30,000. The present writer sometimes filed as many as 3 motions at a time, during a period of maintaining 8 or more cases in state and federal courts. None of the motions were the one or two paragraph motions such as those filed by opposing attorneys. My motions ran from 5 to 10 pages of documented legal arguments, with ample quotations from precedents and legal authorities. I discovered that the judges rarely bothered to read these motions, much less, allowed them to be argued in court.”
Con’t: “I routinely filed interrogatories or answered the opponent’s interrogatories, which the Post states costs $5,000 for each answer. Oral depositions are billed at $1500 to $2000 per day per partner, with half that fee charged for the ever present associate, plus $300 to $500 per day for the court reporter and costs of the written transcripts. Litigation only a few months old can already have accrued costs from $50,000 to $100,000, with little or no progress being made towards a solution.” (10)
When trying to represent yourself, it can be difficult at times, because the judges and attorneys know that you may not go along with all of their games. They constantly ask you questions like “do you understand everything and has anyone coerced you into pleading this way or that…?” If you try to do things by yourself, sometimes they even lock you up, just for trying to represent yourself!! This is what Mullins has to say about this travesty of justice:
“By statute, private citizens are forbidden by law from filing any paper with the court, unless they have previously filed the case themselves, thus notifying the court that they are attorney of record, and are representing themselves. In recent years, emphasis has been placed on filing “in propria persona,” as a proper person, rather than as attorney pro se, the theory being that one thereby escapes being tainted as an officer of the court, or of being subject to the jurisdiction of the court. However, anyone who enters a courtroom is presumed by the sitting judge to be under the jurisdiction of his court, and those who deny it can protest all the way to their serving of a six month sentence for “contempt of court.”
As far as “trial by jury” goes. The jury should not be influenced in its thinking, correct?
In an article titled “Raising the Bar – The Trial of William Penn,” the author, Paul Mark Sandler of the Daily Record in 2007, writes:
“Trial lawyers who lack familiarity with great trials of the past may as well be trying cases by the seat of their pants. Surely one of the great trials in Western Civilization is the trial of William Penn in 1670. This is the same William Penn who received from King Charles II of England in 1681 a large land grant, “Penn’s Woods,” which Penn named after his father and subsequently became known as the state of Pennsylvania. Penn established the colony of Pennsylvania so that Quakers and others could enjoy religious freedom.”
“But in the summer of 1670, when Penn was 26 years old and after he had become a Quaker, he was arrested in London on a charge of disturbing the King’s peace. The charge resulted from Penn preaching nonconformist religious views at an outdoor meeting in London at a time when the monarchy was aggressively suppressing religious dissent.”
“At the conclusion of the trial the jury retired to deliberate its verdict. Upon the jury’s return, foreman Edward Bushnell reported to the court simply that the jury found that William Penn had spoken on the street, which was no violation of the law at all.”
“The judge was outraged and overcome with anger. He commanded the jury to retire again and render the verdict of guilt. Nevertheless, the jury returned and again stated that the verdict was that Mr. Penn had simply spoken on a street and not violated any law. The indignant judge confined the jury “to the hole,” in Newgate Prison, and instructed the foreman Bushnell that the jury would remain in the hole without food or water until a proper verdict was rendered.”
“Three more times the jury went out and returned the same verdict. When the jurors persisted in refusing to go out any more, the judge fined each of them and ordered them imprisoned until the fines were paid.”
“Such harsh treatment was not unprecedented. Juries in 1670 were very much under the thumb of the Crown: if a jury delivered a result that was unsatisfactory to the Crown, jurors were imprisoned and fined. In fact, after the verdict in the William Penn case, foreman Bushnell (sometimes reported as Bushnel or Bushel) was imprisoned for alleged misconduct as a juror. He sought and achieved his own release by writ of habeas corpus. (See Vaughn’s Reports, 135.) The Writ was issued by Lord Chief Justice Sir John Vaughn of the Court of Common Pleas. Interestingly, this was the first time the court had issued such a writ.
(10) Rape of Justice, p. 68-69
Doug Linder writes, in The Trial of John Peter Zenger: An Account (2001):
“No country values free expression more highly than does the United States, and no case in American history stands as a greater landmark on the road to protection for freedom of the press than the trial of a German immigrant printer named John Peter Zenger. On August 5, 1735, twelve New York jurors, inspired by the eloquence of the best lawyer of the period, Andrew Hamilton, ignored the instructions of the Governor’s hand-picked judges and returned a verdict of “Not Guilty” on the charge of publishing “seditious libels.” The Zenger trial is a remarkable story of a divided Colony, the beginnings of a free press, and the stubborn independence of American jurors.
“The Zenger trial established no new law with respect to seditious libel, but in unmistakable terms it signaled the public’s opposition to such prosecutions. Concern about likely jury nullification discouraged prosecutions, and press freedom in America began to blossom. A half-century after the Zenger trial, as members of the First Congress debated the proposed Bill of Rights, one of the Constitution’s principal drafters and great-grandson of Lewis Morris, Gouvernor Morris, would write of the Zenger case: “The trial of Zenger in 1735 was the germ of American freedom, the morning star of that liberty which subsequently revolutionized America.”
In Rape of Justice, Mullins writes:
“Trial by jury, which was demanded as a right in our Declaration of Independence, and which is now guaranteed by our Constitution, is now threatened, not as a principle, but as a method which has been corrupted by the machinations of our legal system. Jury trial has been diminished by the tactics of the “adversarial” lawyers, and also by the carefully loaded “instructions” which the judge delivers to the juries.”
Here is what Thomas Jefferson had to say about “Trial by Jury”:
“I consider trial by jury as the only anchor yet imagined by man by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”
And here is what John Adams had to say regarding right to “Trial by Jury”:
“It is not only his right, but his duty…to find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment and conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the court.”
So, regardless of what any judge or prosecutor says, It is your duty to choose according to your own conscience, and they will do anything to keep you from knowing this and exercising it. Jeff Jones, affiliated with the Oakland Cannabis Buyers Cooperative, now a member registration service, was arrested for handing out leaflets for “Fully Informed Juries” to understand they may make these decisions for themselves, without influence. This happened at the time of the Brian Epis trial. Brian is a medical marijuana patient who was brought up on federal charges, and it became the first medical marijuana case to go to trial. The government tried to keep all information concerning anything to do with medical marijuana out of the trial and testimony, and evidence, and to keep the jurors from hearing anything at all regarding this. Jeff Jones was doing a very honorable service by informing these jurors of their rights. He was arrested for “influencing and jury tampering” related charges. These are not the exact charges, so please don’t quote me word for word here. The point is that the judges and prosecutors don’t want the juries to know they have these rights and they should be using them. Instead, they repeatedly tell jurors that they must vote on the guilt determined by whether the “law was broken or not.” They’ll say things to the jury like “did this person, or did they not, violate this code etc., and does the evidence show they did, or not? That is what you must vote based on, not anything else!”
It is a criminal act to influence a juror and this should apply to the judges who give them these instructions. Most people in this country believe, if you ask them, that the laws in this country are meant to protect the people and that the people pass the laws they want to keep a free and protected society. Most people would say that the people pass the laws that are best for the society as a whole, and that’s why we have laws and that’s why we need them. Well, I am here to say right here and now that that is total nonsense and is based on media manipulation. There are NO laws that the people pass to protect themselves and the laws are not passed to protect society, but rather property, and to keep the rapists of individual liberties free to do as they please. There is so much collaboration between the judges, the Masons, the lawyers and the ABA, the Crown of England and the corporations and the administration (corporate U.S. government) and banking cartels that there is no way that conflict of interest doesn’t exist. It is clearly evident when examined closely. If the judges, at least most, are Masons, and or members of some other fraternal organization, and the Bar is influenced or controlled by Great Britain, and the ABA makes and writes the laws, and corporate power brokers sit in positions within the ABA, and those same lawyers represent the largest corporations, and they interchange corporate with government positions; then who can question whether there is a conspiracy or there is at least a conflict of interest? And that’s not to mention the “Separation of Powers” there is supposed to be, which is non-existent. That appears to have been removed with all the other acts which separated the people from their Constitution.
In the following quote, Mullins relates the conflict of interest from corporate membership in the A.B.A.:
“The ABA maintains a number of active sub-commissions which constantly review and redraft laws controlling the daily lives of all Americans. Their recommendations, like their “approvals” of candidates for judgeship, are always accepted by the pertinent Congressional committees as worthy of being drafted into law without changing so much as a comma, yet no citizen has ever elected any member of an ABA commission to any national office. Typical of these secret commissions is the ABA’s Section on Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law, which was exposed in the Senate Judiciary Hearings of February 3, 1974, under the title, “The Organized Bar : Self-Serving or Serving the Public?”…”The Committee found that the incoming chairman of this influential ABA section was Theodore Bowes, a member of a secret ABA operation known as “the Tuesday Group.” Bowes was a former General Patent Counsel for the Westinghouse Corp., and a prominent Washington lobbyist in the field of patent law. The “Tuesday Group” was a clique of lawyers which drafted the Scott Amendments, proposals which would exempt many presently illegal patent practices from anti-trust laws. The “Tuesday Group” then persuaded Senator Hugh Scott to introduce them on the Hill. Scott was a Washington politician who enjoyed many of the perks of a prominent political figure.”….”The Judiciary Committee found that other ABA Sections were headed by lobbyists from leading corporations; the chairman of the Environmental Controls Committee of the ABA comes from a large Richmond, Virginia law firm representing Humble Oil, three power companies, three railroads, General Motors, a gas pipeline company and a chemical corporation. He seemed an ideal choice to draft regulations on pollution. The Judiciary Committee further stated, “The Coal Committee (of the ABA) is headed by a lawyer from Consolidation Coal Co; his vice-chairman is the lawyer for the National Coal Association; the Oil Committee chairman, the General Counsel of Cities Service and his vice-chairman is General Counsel for Humble Oil; the Forest Resources Committee (of the ABA) has a chairman whose law firm represents U.S. Plywood, Champion Paper etc.” (11)
I think by now, the term “conflict of interest” can safely take on a broader term, like outright “conspiracy.”
As far as the judges go, they are much, much worse. I, myself, do not judge others, so I will not say that any lawyer or judge in particular is a bad person, unless I know them to have been by example, however, the positions of the lawyers and especially, the judges are the most corrupt political positions that exist. That is not to say and please don’t misunderstand me here, because people often do when I say this, that every judge or lawyer is bad person. The position is what is corrupt, which means in time, most likely, they will all become thoroughly corrupt.
(11) Rape of Justice, p. 123-125
The Masonic connection inside the A.B.A and most particularly, among judges, and even Supreme Court judges is the one that brings in the most conspiratorial elements. The relationship between judges and Masons is described by Mullins, “Judges maintain unadvertised affiliations in one or more religious, fraternal and political groups. Preeminent among such groups is the Masonic fraternal organization. The majority of Masonic members never go beyond the three degrees of the Blue Lodge. They are never informed that the higher degrees are forbidden, under pain of death, to disclose any of the machinations of the higher degrees to any member of the Blue Lodge. This does not mean that members of the Blue Lodge reap no advantages from their membership. On the contrary, they continually receive favorable treatment in the banks, in the courts, and from other businessmen. The courts are predominantly extensions of the Masonic brotherhood. Most lawyers and judges are fellow lodge members. Preferential treatment is extended to all members of the brotherhood who come before the court.”
Continuing, Eustace Mullins writes:
“Although money remains the ruling factor, the guiding principle of the legal system remains it’s allegiance to the Masonic order. In many areas, the local bench is merely a chapter of the Masonic Lodge. Because of the great secrecy maintained by the lodges, no accurate figures can be given as to the number of American lawyers and judges who are members of a Masonic lodge. Of the current total of 707,000 American judges and lawyers, it seems a good estimate that at least 500,000 are lodge members. It could be as high as 90%. Figures have been established for England, in Stephen Knight’s best-selling book, “The Brotherhood.” Shortly after publishing this book, which immediately became a best seller, Knight, who was a young man, died suddenly. Interested persons have been unable to obtain details of his death. Knight states that “the Law Society (the English equivalent of our Bar Association) is one of the most Masonic institutions in the world. Ninety percent of its members are Masons.” He points out that this situation itself creates great inequities, because the Law Society is the final arbiter as to who will receive legal aid and who will be denied it. In practice, a non-Mason has no chance of receiving legal aid in a suit against a Mason.”
“Knight says that fifty to seventy-five percent of all English judges are Masons. This figure is probably close to that in the United States. Lawyers soon become aware that if they do expect to have any clients, and if they wish to win cases in court, they must join the Masons, because of most of their client referrals will come from this source.” …
“It is a rule that a Masons must always rule in favor of his fellow Mason. In the Masonic Handbook, the command reads, “Whenever you see any of our signs made by a brother Mason, and especially the grand hailing sign of distress, you must always be sure to obey them, even at the risk of your own life. If you are on a jury, and the defendant is a Mason, and makes the grand hailing sign, you must obey it; you must disagree with your brother jurors, if necessary, but you must be sure not to bring the Mason in as guilty, for that would bring disgrace upon our order.”… “You must conceal all crimes of your brother Masons…except murder and treason, and these only at your own option, and should you be summoned as a witness against a brother Mason, be always sure to shield him. Prevaricate, don’t tell the truth in this case, keep his secrets, forget the important points. It may be perjury to do this, it is true, but you are keeping your obligations.”…”If you cheat, wrong or defraud any other society or individual, it is entirely your business. If you cheat government even, Masonry cannot and will not touch you; but be very careful not to cheat, wrong or defraud a brother Mason or Lodge. Whoever else you may defraud, live up to your (Masonic) obligations.” (12)
This stands against several court rulings, two of which are as follows:
“Equal protection to all is the basic principle on which rests justice under the law.” Pierrer v. State of Ln. 59 S. St. 536, 306 U.S. 354, 83 L. Ed. 757.
As well as:
“Prejudice of or bias on the part of the trial judge may constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws.” Osborne v. Purdome, 250 S.W. 2d 159
The Masonic/Bar Association/Judiciary connection is the grossest violation of human rights ever. This is about as criminal as it gets but only as far as the people allow it.
(12) Rape of Justice, p. 143-145
According to Paul Fisher in his book, Behind the Lodge Door: “…The Supreme Court was stacked with Freemasons during the three Presidential terms of 32nd degree Freemason, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Five of the nine Justices were his Scottish Rite brothers. The others shared Masonic views. From 1941 to 1971, five to eight Masons sat on the Supreme Court in any given year.”
Here is something really interesting, which reveals just how much power the Masons have in Congress and the Judiciary, as well as the Executive branch:
Recorded in the Congressional Record-Senate, Sept. 9th, 1987, it discusses the nomination of a judge to the Federal Judiciary being questioned in the Senate Judiciary Committee on the basis of the nominee’s membership in the Masons. Here are some excerpts from the Congressional Record, Sept 9, 1987:
“I am writing in response to your letter of May 28, 1987, which was received June 4. You request the views of the American Bar Association on the interpretation of certain ethical standards applicable to judges, specifically those involving potential invidious discrimination. You indicate your request arises in the context of the Senate’s consideration of Judge David B. Sentelle’s nomination to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. As you know, the American Bar Association has already approved Judge Sentelle as “well qualified” for the Federal judiciary, first on August 5, 1985, in connection with his nomination to the United States District Court and most recently on February 3, 1987, in connection with his nomination to the United States Court of Appeals. Our committee is not in a position, nor would it wish, to comment further on his qualifications. …Mr. Simpson: “I do not want to create controversy, but I think this totally unwarranted delay in the consideration of the nomination is truly one of the most absurd things I have witnessed as a Member of the Senate. I have been a Mason since 1959. The two men who flank me as I speak are both Masons-our majority leader and the Senator from North Carolina. Mr. THURMOND. Me, too. Mr. SIMPSON. And Senator STROM THURMOND. I did not see our distinguished senior colleague here. Senator THURMOND is one of the senior Masons in this body. There are 18 of us on both sides of the aisles, an extraordinary array of some of the most remarkable people in this body. SAM NUNN, JIM McCLURE, CHARLES GRASSLEY, BOB DOLE, BENNETT JOHN-STON, JOHN STENNIS, JIM EXON, JESSE HELMS, QUENTIN BURDICK, JOHN GLENN, MARK HATFIELD, FRITZ HOL-LINGS, LLOYD BENTSEN, ROBERT STAF-FORD, our majority leader, and myself; along with about 60 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives; along with a list of our Presidents: George Washington, James Buchanan, James Garfield, Warren Harding, Andrew Jackson, Andrew Johnson, William McKinley, James Monroe, James Polk, Teddy Roosevelt, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, Harry Truman, and Gerald Ford. Not exactly the kind of suspicious people you would think may not match the test to be on the Federal judiciary. It was really appalling to me, and I will leave it at that. I will mention no personalities. The people involved in this are very lovely and committed people. It is my pleasure to hold the 33d degree in Masonry, which is the highest that can be conferred. I believe Senator BYRD holds that distinction, also, and came through what is known as the Scottish Rite in Masonry. Eighteen Senators are Masons, as are Presidents. Forty-one members of the Federal judiciary are presently Masons, some appointed by President Kennedy, some by President Johnson, some by President Ford, some by President Carter. I could go on at length on this richly absurd matter, Mr. President, but I shall not. I just say that Masonry in this country is the bedrock. There are many buildings in this remarkable city that have been laid with the corner-stone ceremonies of the Master Masons. …
“Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I have already made a statement on this subject for the record. I will not repeat it now. But I just want to say this: I was astounded that this question was raised in the Judiciary Committee. I guess about half of the members of the Judiciary Committee are members of the Masonic Order. I have been a member since 1925 and as was stated by the able assistant leader here, Senator SIMPSON, it simply means people who believe in God and love their fellow man. In short, that is about what it stands for. I commend the majority leader, who is a 33d-degree Mason and Bob Dole, who is a 33d-degree Mason. I happen to be one. I think the Masons have done a lot of good in the world. You have to be a Mason before you become a Shriner and the Shriners are maintaining hospitals throughout the Nation to treat little crippled children and to cure burns, a most worthy cause.
Con’t: “I just want to say that of our forefathers who established this Government, a lot of them were Masons. George Washington, who laid the cornerstone for the original Capitol, was a Mason. In 1803, he laid the corner-stone and did it with a Masonic apron. So I hope the question about Masonry being raised to try to keep one from becoming a judge is now finally settled, that will be the end of it, and we will not hear any more on it.” (13)
Mullins discusses the fact that Equity Law has superseded Constitutional law:
“The overweening power of the judge in the American legal system has increased inversely to the decline of Constitutional guarantees of individual rights, and the concurrent rise of equity law. Equity originates from the Latin Aequitas, meaning equality of justice. Equity is defined by Sir Henry Maine in “Ancient Law” as “anybody or rules existing beside the existing original law or civil law, founded on distinct principles, and claiming, incidentally, to supersede the civil law in virtue of a superior sanctity inherent in those principles, principles stemming from praetor edicts.” This is in reference to the annual proclamation on administrative law which was added to each year by the praetor, who corresponded to the lord high chancellor in English law. Equitable jurisdiction had been established in England by the reign of Edward III. Equity had exclusive jurisdiction where it recognizes rights unknown to the common law, such as trusts; equity has concurrent jurisdiction where the law recognized the right but did not give adequate relief; and auxiliary jurisdiction when the machinery of the courts was unable to procure the new evidence.” (14)
That would be a good thing to remember when you take the final chapters into consideration. Mullins also goes on to say:
“Maine goes on to deplore the evils of this double system of judicature.” …”The existence of this double system of judicature is a powerful secret weapon, which both judges and lawyers use against the public, giving them a decisive tactic which they can deploy, just when the citizen believes that at last he will receive justice in the court.” … “Thus the idea of balance has been abandoned, not only because of the adversary system, but also because the scales of justice, instead of signifying harmony, have been converted into the scales of commerce, in which commodities are weighed to determine their price before the sale. Equity law was a tremendous move in this direction, allowing first the admiralty courts, and then the law merchant, to supersede the Constitutional law. In the law merchant, all law is concerned with the handling of economic disputes, and the scales of justice have become the scales of the trader, or the broker.” (15)
As I have said over and over, there is clearly a conflict of interest here. How can anyone ever get justice in the American courts? Are the American courts really American courts of justice at all? An example that Mullins uses in his book is a defense filed by Alan Stuart in Arkansas on July 3, 1978 noting that a “Hearsay Substitute had filed the complaint against him, in violation of the United States Constitution, and that a Hearsay Substitute was his accuser, whereas he had the right to face his accuser. Stuart pointed out that the District Attorney served as both an “Officer of the Court” under the judiciary, and as a law enforcement official under the executive department, which placed him in flagrant violation of the doctrine of separation of powers, and the system of checks and balances set up by the Constitution. Stuart also pointed out that the title “Officer of the Court” is an unconstitutional Title of Nobility that all lawyers are automatically part of the Judicial Branch of the Government, whether elected, hired, or appointed. Article 1, Section 9 and 10 forbid Titles of Nobility. With the Hearsay Substitute being a lawyer, and the judge also a lawyer, a conflict of interest exists by having lawyers, or Officers of the Court, represent both sides. Stuart deposed that all lawyer judges have to disqualify themselves because of conflict of interest, which prevents them from presiding over a fair trial. This would seem to provide a useful alternative to the present abuses committed by judges who claim to be operating under “due process of law.” (16)
(13) Rape of Justice, Page 38-39; https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1987-pt17/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1987-pt17-3-1.pdf
(14) Rape of Justice, p. 139
(15) Rape of Justice, p. 140-141
(16) ibid, p. 150
The original Supreme court in this country was uncovered recently by a couple of researchers. One was Leroy Schweitzer of the Montana Freemen, who I will get into in a bit, and the other is discussed by Mullins in his book. Mullins claims Walt Mann, a legal critic tells us “that the seal of the Supreme Court is not the standard judicial seal of the blindfolded maiden and the scales of justice, it is a copy of the Seal of Office of the President! Notes appearing in the U.S. Code, 28 USC 44 and 28 USC 88, appendix 1, indicate that the present Supreme Court is not the true Supreme Court, but an imposter. The original Supreme Court still exists in the District of Columbia, but its name was changed during Roosevelt’s presidency in order to have a court which would support his National Recovery Act, legislation which was copied directly from the corporate state of Mussolini by Gerard Swope, the President of General Electric, and longtime vassal of Bernard Baruch.” (17)
Also Mullins writes: “The original Supreme Court is defined in the Constitution, Art III, and the 1789 U.S. Statutes at Large, the Judiciary Act. Since Roosevelt superseded it, U.S. courts have lacked all first instance trial prosecution and trial jurisdiction. Thus the U.S. Criminal Code does not contain specifications of crimes, but specifications of overt acts, that is, criminal contempt’s of violations of previous injunctive orders. The courts rely on the injunctive process based on the violation of a court order, rather than providing a legal trial under the Constitutional principles where evidence is argued and admitted or denied, with a jury making the final decision. Under this injunctive process, only the overt act of violation of the injunction itself need be proven to obtain a conviction. The “information” which has taken the place of indictments for violations of laws, has only to claim that a violation of the injunction had taken place. The crime itself will never be prosecuted.” (18)
Continuing, with the issue of Codes, Mullins writes:
“The U.S. Criminal Code itself was originally a civil code, because the Criminal Code, Title 18, was included in the Civil Judicial Code and the Aliens and Foreigners Control Code, Title 8. The 14th Amendment was then written in order to provide the government with authority to treat American citizens as aliens and foreigners as decided by Frost v. RC, 271 US 583, 596-7, which defined us as mere aliens, and Lehigh RR. v. Russia, 21 F. 2d 396, which ruled that the law enforcement powers in America apply only to foreigners, foreign relations, and international affairs.” (19)
That last sentence was the killer. Mullins was talking about the 14th Amendment and who it relates to. I showed earlier how it created a new citizen. The United States citizen. This citizen is a foreigner to the state and states are foreign to the United States. The UNITED STATES, remember, is a corporation and resides in the District of Columbia and anything outside of that is “foreign.” And remember, there are two (2) distinctly different US governments operating, one with Article III courts, and one with Article I courts, and both of these are foreign to each other, in some respects. And that the law enforcement powers in the US only apply to foreigners!
Here are a couple citations from law; the first one I mentioned earlier and will quote once again:
In 20 Corpus Juris Secundum [Corporations] at 1786; “The United States government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state.”
Now that this has been cleared up, as far as “foreign” goes, it may be a little easier to understand with this citation: This first one only reflects the “state,” the second one reflects people, or rather “persons.”
States – 81 Corpus Juris Secundum at 7-8 – “Generally, the states of the Union sustain toward each other the relationship of independent sovereigns or independent foreign states…” —
And from United States v. Otherson (1979): “Upon introducing the provisions which eventually became 18 U.S.C. 242, 18 U.S. Code § 242. (Deprivation of rights under color of law) its sponsor Senator Stewart, explicitly stated that the bill protects all “persons.” He noted that the bill “simply extends to foreigners, not citizens, the protection of our laws.”
(17) Rape of Justice, p. 193
(18) ibid, p. 193-94
(19) ibid, p. 194
So, this is exactly as I said before. The laws are there to protect “property,” not people. “Persons” are defined in law as “corporations” and the people were fitted to the classification of “goods” which could be taxed, within the taxing districts now called “states.” One of the main contracts you sign which puts you into the classification of this “person” is when you sign on the “Voter Registration” form, at the top, it asks, “Are you a U.S. Citizen?” and then it says you must be a U.S. citizen in order to fill this out, and everyone checks that.
The 1874 US Codes and 1872 The California Codes are not Law.
Eustace Mullins makes a great point when he talks about the Code, Criminal and Civil. Lawyers are there to interpret the codes for you. They are the ones that are “licensed” to do this. They hold the keys to the secrets of the mysterious practice we call “law,” but which is in reality a twisted contortion of reality and facts. In fact, codes are not laws at all. That is why they are called “codes.” If codes were laws, they would call them “laws” and not “codes.” A code implies you need a “code breaker” to figure it out. That is exactly what a lawyer is hired to do. To crack the code or at least to twist the facts so that they can fit into the code regulations. In fact none of the codes were ever passed into law by proper procedure. That is because they didn’t need to once they declared Martial Law and Congress passed the Reconstruction Acts and then they moved everything into the District of Columbia by contract.
First, let’s look at the US and State Code and investigate its history. Recapping, the District of Columbia was set up in 1871. Then, in 1878 the Bar Association came into being in the US. In 1879, California had a new constitution. The following US Code information is taken directly from wiki:
“Early efforts at codifying the Acts of Congress were undertaken by private publishers; these were useful shortcuts for research purposes, but had no official status. Congress undertook an official codification called the Revised Statutes of the United States approved June 22, 1874, for the laws in effect as of December 1, 1873. Congress re-enacted a corrected version in 1878. The Revised Statutes were enacted as positive law, but subsequent enactments were not incorporated into the official code, so that over time researchers once again had to delve through many volumes of the Statutes at Large.” (20)
According to the preface to the US Code:
“From 1897 to 1907 a commission was engaged in an effort to codify the great mass of accumulating legislation. The work of the commission involved an expenditure of over $300,000, but was never carried to completion. Only the Criminal Code of 1909 and the Judicial Code of 1911 were enacted. In the absence of a comprehensive official code, private publishers once again collected the more recent statutes into unofficial codes. The first edition of the United States Code (published as Statutes at Large Volume 44, Part 1) includes cross-reference tables between the U.S.C. and two of these unofficial codes, United States Compiled Statutes Annotated by West Publishing Co. and Federal Statutes Annotated by Edward Thompson Co.”
The first thing we learn from this is that this undertaking was done by a “private publisher.” The point was to “codify legislation.” Well, what’s the point of codifying something if it’s subject to fluctuation by judicial decisions? The only point there is in codifying something is to “set in stone” some legislation and its numerous applications and rules. The whole act of creating US codes or any “codes” is to establish a rule and set parameters to control something. The excuse was to make it easier to find and locate precedent. Our law in this country was meant to be written by the legislature, ruled on by the Judicial and Carried out by the Executive. Each one of these powers are separated and play their roles in the three branches of government. The establishment of codes is contradictory to this concept, in that the legislature writes and codifies the laws, the judicial keeps court rulings in line with them, and the executive carries them out and enforces them. Also, take notice that West Publishing Co. is the owner of these US Codes. They are copyright protected. Think about that for a moment. Let’s see how “Code” is defined in Webster’s and then Black’s 4th.
A system used for brevity or secrecy of communication, in which arbitrarily chosen words, letters, or symbols are assigned definite meanings. (Webster’s)
A collection, compendium or revision of laws. A complete system of positive law, scientifically arranged and promulgated by legislative authority. (Black’s 4th)
What they admit here is that “code” is not law, it is “legislated authority.” In other words, corporate law.
Thomas Marvin Maxwell, the author of several very important books The Motor Vehicle Code is Not Law, The California Code is Not Law, Civil Rights Fraud, and Identity Fraud, points out several extremely important facts about this situation. He shows that this was done in all the states, but you’ll have to do the research for your own state. Remember here, he is now talking about California Code, not US Code. In the introduction to his book, The California Code is Not Law, Maxwell points out:
“The confusion and the general lack of public understanding of the law made it very easy for the code to be put into place. Plans to “codify” the law in California had been pursued by the early 1850’s, but were totally unsuccessful, until after the Civil War was over. Then in 1868, the legislature enacted, “An Act to provide for the revision and compilation of the laws of the state of California and the publication thereof.” Stats 1868 ch. CCCLXV — There is no written record of what the 1868 commission did. But it is known that their work was not completed within the two years that they were given. In 1870, they were, in effect “fired” when the legislature enacted, “An Act Establishing a Commission for the Revision of the Laws” Stats 1870, ch. DXVI.” “Clearly there was no authority to “codify” the laws in the manner of the Field’s New York work. Yet this is exactly what was done. It was even admitted that the Code Commission went “a little beyond” the authority granted by the statute. They in fact went way beyond the delegated authority of the statute. Though the Penal Code did include the California penal statutes from 1850-1851, it was still mostly a direct import of the New York law. The Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure were primarily New York law. The Political Code was entirely New York law.”
“There was also an attempt to get the real “statute law” in California repealed. This was unsuccessful in 1872, and proved to be a great frustration to the Code Commission over the years. It was not until 1955 that they got statutes repealed based on the existence of the code. But, what was done in 1955 is easily challenged as unconstitutional.”
According to a report from Law Library Journal Titled ‘History of the Codes of California’:
”the first report of the Joint Committee to examine the Codes prepared by the Revision Committee in its review of the Penal Code says: “this act does not provide for the adoption of any new system of law, but simply reenacts the existing law, with some modifications, amendments, and additions…” Further on we read the following:
“The interpretation of the Civil Code of California has been the subject of a series of articles published in volumes 3 and 4 of the West Coast Reporter by Professor Pomeroy. Professor Pomeroy contended that the codes must be treated as merely a supplement to the common law system, altering its rules only to the extent that the intent to do so clearly appeared.”
In other words, the Codes were claimed to do nothing to affect the common law. However, the next paragraph is critical of what Pomeroy claimed. The author goes on to say:
“Pomeroy’s method of interpretation is not applicable to the provisions of the code with regard to estates and future interests which were taken by Field from the New York Revised Statutes of 1829. The purpose of this revision of the law, as is clearly shown by the comprehensiveness of its terms and the notes of the revisers was to supersede completely the common law system.”
So, therefore, Pomeroy claims the California Codes had no intent behind them to supersede common law, but the author of the History of the Codes of California makes the claim that “estates and future interests” are being affected. What this means is that in cases of equity, common law will not be supreme any more. Then Maxwell goes on to say how the code itself says that it is not law:
“Interestingly enough, the Code itself stated that it was not and could not be statute law. In the original Political Code at Section 4479 it stated: “If the provisions of any law passed at the present session of the legislature contravene or are inconsistent with the provisions of either of the four codes, the provisions of such law must prevail.”
Additionally, it is significant to take note of the original Political Code at Section 4494, where it reads: “The codes passed at this session of the legislature must not be published as part of the statutes passed at this session, but provision must be made by law for their publication.”
“The original four divisions of the code were allegedly established by the passage of four Senate Bills, specifically, SB. 221, An Act to establish a Penal Code, SB. 363, An Act to establish a Code of Civil Procedure, SB. 375, An Act to establish a Political Code, SB. 430, An Act to establish a Civil Code.”
“Every statute law that had been passed by the legislature up through 1872 were assigned “chapter numbers” and subsequently published in the volumes entitled “Statutes of California.” No chapter numbers were ever assigned to the Senate Bills that established the code. They were not published in the Statutes of California for the year 1871-72.”
“As a result of the foregoing facts, there is no official record of the text of these original divisions of the code as they existed at the time the governor signed them. These four bills, which are to this day, stored in the archives at the Secretary of State’s Office, display uncounted “handwritten changes.” “crossouts,” “paste-overs,” etc. None of these changes to the type set and printed bills are dated or initialed by anyone. It is virtually impossible to determine whether any of the changes were made AFTER the Governor signed them.”… “No chapter numbers, and unpublished as Statutes of California. The original four divisions of the code SIMPLY WERE NOT AND ARE NOT LAW.”
This makes the Statute “positive law.” It is required that all laws be published in the Statutes at Large in order to become “positive law.” —
“….Provided, however that whenever titles of such [United States] Code shall have been enacted into positive law the text thereof shall be legal evidence of the laws contained, in all the courts of the [federal] United States, the several states, and the territories and insular possessions of the [federal] United States [within the 48 states].” – 1 U.S.C. Section 204(a)
Maxwell then writes: “It is important to note that from 1874 through 1880, Amendments to the Code were published in separate volumes from the statutes. Clearly, another indication that “someone” knew that they were not equal to the Statutes of California. Though, after the 1879 Constitution came into being, the publication of statute law and code amendments was consolidated into one volume. But the title to the consolidated volumes still “told the truth.” They were entitled Statutes of California and Amendments to the Codes.”
“History clearly shows that the Code Commission, the legislature and the courts each had a different perspective on the code. The Code Commission from day one insisted that the mere existence of the code superseded the statutes. Yet the legislature kept passing general statutes alongside the code for about 100 years.”
“In Lewis v Dunn, 134 Cal 291, (1901) it was found that the 1901 legislation was unconstitutional pursuant to Article IV, Section 24 of the 1879 Constitution. Virtually the entire work of the legislature in 1901 was “thrown out.”
“In 1903, the legislature tried to get an amendment to the constitution that would exempt the code from Article IV, section 24. The amendment failed to pass, and was apparently never attempted again.”
“Article IV, SEC. 24. Every Act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be expressed in its title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an Act which shall not be expressed in its title, such Act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in its title. No law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title; but in such case the Act revised or section amended shall be reenacted, and published at length as revised or amended; and all laws of the State of California, and all official writings, and the executive, legislative, and judicial proceedings shall be conducted, preserved, and published in no other than the English language.”
Here is the text of that case: Lewis v Dunn, 134 Cal 291, (1901):
“Revision of Code—Constitutional Law—Improper Enactment— Insufficient Title. — The act of March 8, 1901 (Stats. 1901, p. 117), entitled “An act to revise the Code of Civil Procedure of the state of California, by amending certain sections, repealing others, and adding certain new sections,” is unconstitutional and void, both because the law revised was not re-enacted and published at length as revised, and because it does not embrace but one subject, expressed in its title, as required by section 24 of article IV of the state constitution. The mere reference to the Code of Civil Procedure does not express any subject.
“The title of the act in question (Stats. 1901, p. 117) is as follows: “An act to revise the Code of Civil Procedure of the state of California, by amending certain sections, repealing others, and adding certain new sections.”
“The said Code of Civil Procedure was not “re-enacted and published at length as revised.”
“The first impression made upon the ordinary mind by a comparison of these constitutional provisions with the title and body of the act is, that in the latter there is a clear failure to comply with the former. It seems as though the mind of either layman or lawyer might accept with safety the construction which, at first blush at least, is so obvious, and we do not think that the reasoning of counsel for respondent, or authorities cited, overcome this obvious view, or rightly lead to an opposite conclusion.
“In Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 1 it was contended that a certain provision of law did not affect rights involved in a civil proceeding, because found in the Penal Code, but this court said: “The position is not tenable. We have here a code system which is, for convenience and partial classification, divided into four codes, to each of which a name is given; but they are inseparably interwoven, and no one of them is complete in itself, or absolutely confined to a particular subject. Therefore, clear enactments of substantive law establishing rights— like section 294—are not to be held inoperative because found in any particular code.” It was also said in that case,—touching the provision in the Penal Code for the recovery of certain expenses in a civil action,—“It would hardly be contended that the provision about liability in a ‘civil action’ is inoperative because found in the Penal Code.” How, then, can it be rightly said ‘that a mere reference in the title of an act to the Code of Civil Procedure—or to any other code—expresses any subject? If so, what subject? If the reference had been merely to “civil procedure,”—if it had been “an act concerning civil procedure,”—it is doubtful if it would have been in accordance with the clear intent of the constitution as to one subject. There is no definition, in our laws, of “procedure,” nor can any satisfactory definition of it be found in the general authorities.
“Complaint is made that the rule as above stated would put the legislature to great inconvenience when it desired to make a great many amendments or indulge in a great deal of legislation at one session or at one time. That consideration could not, under any circumstances, destroy a constitutional provision. But—without impugning the wisdom of any provision of the act before us —it is quite apparent that the very purpose of the constitutional provision in question is to prevent the evils which might come from hasty, inconsiderate, or wholesale legislation. Statutes which cannot be enacted in the manner prescribed by the constitution should not be attempted. A scarcity of statutory laws, and want of facility for passing them, are not among the evils of the times.
“Our conclusion is, that, for the reasons above stated, the-said act of March 8, 1901, is unconstitutional, and void for all purposes, and is inoperative to change or in any way affect the law of the state as it stood immediately before the approval of said act. – CHARLOTTE A. LEWIS, Administratrix, etc., Petitioner, v. FRANK H. DUNNE, (1901) Judge of the Superior Court, etc., Respondent 134 Cal. 291 Supreme Court California (Verified) (21)
1879 California Constitution
The following is Article IV, Section 25 (VERY IMPORTANT in relation to drug charges and victimless crimes.)
SEC. 25. The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say:
First—Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of Justices of the Peace, Police Judges, and of Constables.
Second—For the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors.
Third—Regulating the practice of Courts of justice.
Fourth—Providing for changing the venue in civil or criminal actions.
Sixth—Changing the names of persons or places.
Seventh—Authorizing the laying out, opening., altering, maintaining, or vacating roads, highways, streets, alleys, town plats, parks, cemeteries, graveyards, or public grounds not owned by the State.
Eighth—Summoning and impending grand and petit juries, and providing for their compensation.
Ninth—Regulating county and township business, or the election of county and township officers.
Tenth—For the assessment or collection of taxes.
Eleventh—Providing for conducting elections, or designating the places of voting,
Twelfth—Affecting estates of deceased persons, minors, or other persons under legal disabilities.
Thirteenth—Extending the time for the collection of taxes.
Fourteenth–Giving effect to invalid deeds, wills, or other instruments.
Fifteenth—Refunding money paid into the State treasury.
Sixteenth—Releasing or extinguishing, in whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability, or obligation of any corporation or person to this State, or to any municipal corporation therein.
Seventeenth—Declaring any person of age, or authorizing any minor to sell, lease, or incumber his or her property.
Eighteenth—Legalizing, except as against the State, the unauthorized or invalid act of any officer.
Nineteenth—Granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity.
Twentieth—Exempting property from taxation.
Twenty-first—Changing county seats.
Twenty-second—Restoring to citizenship persons convicted of infamous crimes.
Twenty-third—Regulating the rate of interest on money.
Twenty-fourth—Authorizing the creation, extension, or impairing of liens.
Twenty-fifth—Chartering or licensing ferries, bridges, or roads.
Twenty-sixth—Remitting fines, penalties, or forfeitures.
Twenty-seventh—Providing for the management of common schools.
Twenty-eighth—Creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers in counties, cities, cities and counties, townships, election or school districts.
Twenty-ninth—Affecting the fees or salary of any officer.
Thirtieth—Changing the law of descent or succession.
Thirty-first—Authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children.
Thirty-second—For limitation of civil or criminal actions.
Thirty-third—In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable.
At this point we can see that the Government of the United States, controlled now by the British bankers had set up a new constitution in California in 1879. This was the new constitution for the Federal district inside the geographical boundary of California, for the newly freed black slave 14th Amendment “persons.”
Next, from Thomas Marvin Maxwell’s excellent book, ‘The California Cods is not Law,’ we have a section which reveals what happened.
The 1879 Constitution is Void
The following is the “text” of an affidavit that can be used to demonstrate that the 1879 constitution is not and cannot be construed as ever having been lawfully in effect in California as one of the United States of America:
The 1879 quasi-constitution has no lawful effect due to the following:
“It is clearly documented that the effective date of the quasi-constitution was repealed November 8, 1960.
“Virtually the entire quasi-constitution of 1879 was repealed and replaced from 1949 through 1976 without any lawful authority. The plaintiff can find no source of any lawful authority to “repeal” whether it be the quasi-constitution of 1879 or the organic constitution of 1849.
“There is a fundamental, indisputable difference between the act of “amending” and the act of “repealing.”
a. Amend. To improve. To change for the better by removing defects or faults. To change, correct, revise. Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Ed.
b. Repeal. The abrogation of annulling of a previously existing law… To revoke, abolish, annul, to rescind, or abrogate by authority. Black’s law Dictionary 6th Ed.
“The following is a listing of at least the great majority of repealing that took place which was beyond any authority to “amend” or “revise” if the quasi-constitution of 1879 was actually lawfully in effect.
Article I, Section 1-2 repealed November 5, 1974
Section 3 repealed November 7, 1972
Section 4 repealed November 5, 1974
Section 8 repealed November 8, 1966
Section 9-24 repealed November 5, 1974
Section 26a repealed November 8, 1949
Article II. Repealed November 7, 1972
Article III, Repealed November 7, 1972
Article IV, Section 1 repealed November 8, 1966
Section 1b-5 repealed November 8, 1966
Section 7-21 repealed November 8, 1966
Section 22a repealed November 8, 1966
Section 23a repealed November 8, 1966
Section 25a repealed November 8, 1966
Section 25 ½ repealed November 8, 1966
Section 25.7 repealed November 8, 1966
Section 28 repealed June 8, 1976
Section 31d-38 repealed November 8, 1966
Article V repealed November 8, 1966
Article VI repealed November 8, 1966
Article VII repealed November 8, 1966
Article VIII repealed November 8, 1966
Article IX, Section 4 repealed November 4, 1963
Section 10-13 repealed November 5, 1974
Section 15 repealed November 5, 1974
Article X, repealed November 7, 1972
Article XI, repealed June 2, 1970
Article XII, repealed November 5, 1974
Article XIII, repealed November 5, 1974
(Ed. Note that the quasi-constitution for 1879 never specified “income” being taxed, only property. The people were considered the property, through the Districting extension of the word “state” done during Reconstruction and argued against by Johnson.)
Article IV, repealed June 8, 1976
Article XV, repealed June 8, 1976 (Check)
Article XVI, Section 2-9, repealed November 6, 1962
Section 12, repealed November 6, 1962
Section 115-21, repealed November 6, 1962
Article XVII repealed June 8, 1976
Article XVIII repealed November 3, 1970
Article XIX repealed November 4, 1952
Article XX, Section 1 repealed November 7, 1972
Section 2 repealed November 3, 1970
Section 3.5 repealed November 3, 1970
Section 4 repealed November 3, 1970
Section 5 repealed June 8, 1976
Section 9 repealed November 3, 1970
Section 10, 11 repealed June 8, 1976
Section 12-14 repealed November 3, 1970
Section 15 repealed June 8, 1976
Section 16 repealed November 7, 1972
Section 17-17 ½ repealed November 3, 1970
Section 19-21 repealed June 8, 1976
Article XXI, repealed November 7, 1972 (note that a new Article III, section 2, acknowledged the existence of the 1849 Constitution as the authority for the statement of the boundaries of California.)
Article XXII, Section 3 repealed November 8, 1960
Section 4 repealed November 8, 1949
Section 5 repealed November 8, 1949
Section 7 repealed November 8, 1949
Section 8 repealed November 8, 1949
Section 10-12 repealed November 8, 1960
Article XXII (totally) repealed June 6, 1972
Article XXIII repealed June 8, 1976.
Article XXIV repealed June 8, 1976
Article XXV repealed November 8, 1949
Article XXVI repealed November 3, 1970.
Article XXVII repealed November 5, 1974
End of Book section (The California Code is Not Law, Thomas Marvin Maxwell, 1997)
By proposing to the United States citizen voters a constitution which included provisions “similar” to their previous state constitution the rights given and secured would appear to be similar to those which belonged to “state citizens” however, it becomes obvious to anyone looking back into history that the plan all along was to eventually repeal these provisions. It may have taken 75 years for it to happen, but a constitution which was voted on by US citizens could eventually be changed by US citizens as well, and this would be far easier if this was all being done under Martial law or territorial courts. Now where were all these U.S. citizens “residents” of? They resided in the District of Columbia, which had a newly formed municipal corporation, since 1871.
The following is extracted from the law journal titled History of the Codes of California – Law Library Journal. This was used as part of the basis for Maxwell’s research. This explains the entire fraud of the California Codes.
“The formation of the state constitution which was ratified in November 1849 was the first step towards making order out of chaos. The first legislature which met in December 1849 also accomplished a great deal:
“Though theoretically the law of the conquered country remained, under well settled principles of international law, unchanged until superseded by statute; practically, the majority of the population of the new territory regarded themselves as bound by the common law of England, modified by American tradition, rather than by the civil law of Spain and Mexico. Even the most conservative of the new settlers, in so far as they observed any system as controlling, ignored the civil law and treated common law as their rule of conduct, both as private citizens and as magistrates exercising judicial functions.”
“The clause of the Constitution of 1849 guaranteeing the separate property of the wife brought on lively debates between the champions of the civil law and the advocates of the common law. Governor Burnett in his message to the first legislature (1849-50) strongly recommended the adoption of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Practice of Louisiana, suggesting that the common law control the matters of crimes, evidence and commercial law, he being of the opinion that the Louisiana Codes were peculiarly adopted to conditions of California.
Members of the San Francisco bar became so agitated at the Governor’s recommendation that they petitioned the Assembly to adopt the common law as modified by the American states. A small group of attorneys led by John W. Dwinelle filed a petition with the Senate urging the adoption of the civil law. “
“The common law of England was adopted as the law of California by the enactment of a statute passed on the 13th of April 1850, which reads as follows;
“The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the constitution or the laws of the state of California, shall be the rule of decisions in all the courts of this state.” In the report of the “Civil and Common Law,” the common law is defined as “English Common Law, as received and modified in the United States; in other words, by the American law.”
“The abolishment of the distinction between forms of pleading in actions at law and suits in equity was made by the adoption of the Civil Practice Act in 1850. This reform being adopted practically at the same time as the formation of the state government, the distinctions between procedure in law and equity have been practically unknown to California law.
“In deciding the question whether or not intent is shown to depart from the common law, the courts have given weight to the annotation of the Code commissioners of California, which to a large extent are a repetition of the notes of Field himself. These notes refer to adjudicated cases.
“In interpreting section 1927 of the Civil Code, the court in the case of Baranov v. Scudder says: “the notes of the commissioners who prepared the Civil Code indicate that the section was not intended to be a reenactment of the common law, but that it was borrowed from the Civil Law.” The common law rule was held to be changed.
“The whole arrangement of the Civil Code; its division of subject matter into persons, property, and obligation, follows the Code Napoleon. In addition to this and other contributions from the French Civil Code may be mentioned sections 1025-1033 in regard to accessions to personal property, sections 1014-18 on alluvion and section 1027 on the formal requisites of an olographic will.”
“The Political Code proposed by the commissioners for New York was the model for the Political Code of California. … This code has, however, not been adopted in New York.”
“The validity of the amendments to the Codes adopted in 1901 was soon assailed by the Supreme Court of California in Lewis v Dunne. The court there held that the amendments were not constitutionally enacted, on the grounds that each of the codes constituted more than one subject and that neither could now be validly enacted because of the provisions of our constitution requiring each act to embrace one subject, which must be expressed in its title, and that neither can be amended in a single act if the amendments involve two or more of these subjects, and also, that no complete revision of either code can be made without publishing at length the sections not affected by the revision, as well as those revised or amended.” – History of the Codes of California – Law Library Journal
The next section extracted, contained in Maxwell’s book, is from the California Law Review on the California Statutes 1849-1953 (No earlier than 1975) where we get a little more information about the Code Commission just prior to 1872.
“Very little record remains of the internal functioning of the 1870-74 Code Commission, except for the glimpses which can be obtained from reading Lindley’s California Code Commentaries. This remarkable work, which covers a period from January of 1872 to January of 1874, is in part a self-justification by which Lindley sought to convince his readers of the propriety of his convictions. These convictions were so strong that they led to his resignation as a code commissioner on January 5, 1872, on the eve of the adoption of the 1872 codes. The resignation was the culmination of vigorous differences of opinion within the commission and it occurred one month after the convening of the 1871-72 session to which the commission reported. No better summary of Lindley’s reasons for resignation can be given than the one in his letter to the legislature in January, 1872, in which he said:
“The codes are not completed. Not one of them, nor a single section or line, should be adopted until they have had a careful, thorough, patient, professional examination. This examination should be had irrespective of the question of time or expense. A well perfected system of Codes will be a great blessing and a saving of millions of dollars, while an imperfect one will produce infinite confusion.”
“Some sections of the new code were given an advanced effective date although the codes generally were to go into effect on January 1st 1873. The four codes were not published as part of the Statutes of 1871-72 and were not given chapter numbers, due in part at least to the length of time which was needed by the commission to put them into shape for publication.”
Con’t: “The 1872 codes were published as separate documents by the State Printer and sometime therafter a private publication was offered by H.S. Crocker and Co. which contained annotations by the code commissioners. No other state publication of the 1872 codes was ever made, according to the study made by Parma and Armstrong in 1929. Private publishers of the codes and statutes were not long in discovering the difficulties caused by the failure to repeal the legislation preceding the 1872 codes, by the ambiguities in the commissioners’ publication of Statutes Continued in Force, and, as time passed, by the failure to integrate current legislation into the code system. These were defects which cumulated in effect as the years passed.”
COMMISSIONS FOR THE REVISION AND REFORM OF THE LAW (1880-1911)
“There was, understandably, no interest in the legislature for several sessions in the problem of statutory revision. The adoption of the 1879 Constitution, however, presented some serious problems in the adaptation of our statute law to the new constitutional provisions, and these problems confronted the legislature which convened in January, 1880. Outgoing governor William Irwin, having anticipated this problem, appointed a commission of three members to revise the codes in order to conform them to the new constitution.”
“The Assembly Judiciary Committee authored the bill which became Chapter 222 of the Statutes of 1895, creating a three member commission to revise all the statutes of the state. This act provided for a non-partisan permanent commission whose members were appointed by the Governor for two year terms commencing on April 1, 1895. The members were required to be lawyers who had been admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of California for more than five years, and they were to be paid at the rate of $4,000 per year. The commission was directed to revise the four 1872 codes and all statutes passed by the legislature; and it was given broad power to recommend any changes in the statutes which were thought desirable. Finally, the commissioners were directed, when requested by the legislature or any committee thereof, to attend at sessions of the legislature and act as “legislative counselor or advisor, in drafting or passing upon the form of any bill, or proposed bill, pending or to be introduced by the legislature.”
The legislature never ended up completing its work and kept on the same general plan of attempting to complete the work. This continued until the 1920’s.
Continuing from the California Law Review:
“Many of the resolutions and acts passed by the legislature between 1915 and 1925 which called for work in the field of statutory revision were directed to the Legislative Counsel. They called for a study and report concerning the statutes in such diverse fields as those concerning highway laws, insurance laws, general corporation laws, municipal corporation laws, school laws, and special assessment district laws. Several attempts were made to secure a study by the Legislative Counsel of the systems used in other jurisdictions for the compilation and codification of statute law. No provision was made for augmenting the Legislative Counsel’s very small staff in connection with any of these projects, however. With one exception, therefore, the record of those sessions does not show that the requested reports were submitted and when the 1925 legislature decided to undertake a revision of the statutes governing criminal procedure, it created a commission for that purpose.”
“The 1927 legislature received the report of the special commission on criminal procedure, and enacted most of its recommendations into law. That session also enacted several measures destined to inaugurate the program for the revision and codification of California’s statute law which has continued to the present time.”
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