Chapter 19: The Private / Public Matrix
If you have not seen the movie, The Matrix, then, you may want to go rent it right away in order to fully comprehend what I am saying here. In the movie, robots were harvesting “human energy” while people were asleep, and had their brains tapped into “The Matrix.” The Matrix wasn’t real, of course, it was virtual, however, people believed it was real, and suffered dire consequences as a result of that belief and understanding. They simply didn’t know life existed outside the Matrix. They truly believed that the Matrix was reality, and this allowed them to be used as “human cattle” to be farmed and harvested for energy that these robots fed off of and lived on.
We have a very similar scenario with people who live in this country or any other country that is really a corporation, with no government. The people are the government in this country, remember. So, the people, in their “private” capacity are the “government in fact,” and the “public officials” that work for us are the “government in fiction.” The corporate government, which I will occasionally refer to as “Disneyland” utilizes “public policy” and that is the law.
It is important to understand the difference between the “public mind” and the “private mind.” Your own thoughts, ideas, superstitions, and beliefs make up your “private mind.” When you think about getting stoned or you want to grow cannabis and you think about how to do it, those are “private thoughts,” as well when you actually do it, it is your “private” business. It is not the “public’s business.” If you go out and publish in the newspaper that you are going to be getting stoned at 4:20, on Friday, May 13, at the courthouse, and you are going to plant a seed of marijuana on the courthouse lawn, then you would be making your “private” business, “public” and it would become “public business.” Now, it can be regulated because you are affecting the “public good” or “public safety.” It may seem small, but there is a huge difference. The thing is that most likely, you didn’t know there was a huge difference hence you have been stuck in the “public mind.” This is especially important to remember when using social media. Once you make something public, it is no longer private, and therefore it is no longer yours to control, in every sense.
What exactly is the “public mind” then? Well, it’s when someone says, “You can’t fight city hall.” That is a weak and petty example for simplicity sake.
Well the “public mind” also says that “you can’t walk across the street against a red light,” but I do it anyways. Have you ever been at a light that’s red, and there’s no cars coming, and there is someone else standing there next to you, and you think, “Hey, what the hell am I doing standing here, this “sheep” can stay here, but I’m going to go walk across anyways?” Then, as you begin to walk across, the “sheep” starts to follow your lead, and walks across the street too. What just happened? Your basic societal conditioning (public mind) initially told you to stay put and wait for the light to change, but then your “private mind” kicked in and thought, “wait a minute, what am I doing standing here like an idiot?”, then as you began to move out of the public mind into the private mind, the other person, started to think for themselves too. They started using their “private mind” instead of being trapped in some delusional world of regulations that control their inner “programming.” Like people really need to wait for streetlights. Come on now.
It is a good idea to start to look at your thoughts and think about whether you are having “private” thoughts or “public” thoughts. Most of your thoughts should be private otherwise you probably watch a lot of television then most of your thoughts will probably be public. If you read and believe the newspapers, most likely your thoughts will be public based. One of the first things that need to be done for anyone to realize freedom is to realize the “freedom to think for yourself” which means learning to utilize the “private mind” and to stay as far away from the “public mind” as possible. The public mind is like Satan leading you to hell, saying it’s a cool place to go, and you’ll be comfortable there. The public mind is like a cancer or a virus running rampant through the mental thought processes, always trying to eat away at anything living and replace it with a mutated condition. I will not harp on this anymore, but STAY AWAY FROM THE PUBLIC MINDSET! Most of the information in this book is NOT FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION! This book will never become a public best-seller at least, I seriously doubt it.
Just like in the Matrix, the system is “harvesting our energy” to perform in our society in the “public” in the corporation. They are borrowing on our credit to manufacture goods for society. This is what was happening in the movie, except this is “for real.”
We are actually “flesh and blood,” but they are using us to borrow on, creating artificial principles, and they are assuming the use of our names. We will get further into that shortly. This is done, though the Strawman that was created through the Birth Certificate and the Account Number set up through Social Security. You are nothing more than a “human resource” to the bankers.
Now, the public, in the legal sense, is the artificial corporation. It’s everything that is registered. By registering something, you are making it public, in fact. The registration allows for the transfer into the public from the private. The registration of your vehicle. The registration of your firearm. The registration of your medical marijuana use to the state for “permission” to grow or use cannabis. The registration of your business. These are all acts which take the private enterprise or condition and make it public, and no longer subject to your absolute control.
In order to stay out of the public matrix, one must cancel all the unnecessary adhesion contracts one has undertaken in their lifetime. One must also be careful what one claims online in social media and forums. It is important to cancel all signatures on documents that have been brought into the public, which affect your rights, whether disclosed or undisclosed. Many times, adhesion contracts compel our attendance or responsibility without our knowledge. It’s all there in the “fine print,” as they like to say. Well, fortunately we have maxims of law that can never be removed from the public or private mind. One of them is that fraud vitiates all contracts. And fraud goes back to its inception. Which means, for the layman, that any contract you signed without FULL DISCLOSURE, or any contract that induced you to perform, which was done under fraudulent conditions, like non-disclosure of terms, or any contract that was forced upon you, and which you signed “under duress,” can be voided and is voided from the moment you realize it, however, to make that “public” one must cancel the signature and record that in the public record somehow. Get it certified or notarized and record it. This is particularly true if you have US citizen adhesion contracts and now realize that you choose not to be a US citizen any longer. Many people are abandoning their US citizenship for citizenship in their respective states. I cannot advise anyone on what to do. It is a personal decision and it depends on how contracted you are, personally, or whether or not you are an employee of the state or federal government. Benefits are for employees, and some people need them. I do not.
Remember, the public mind is the group mind. The group mind is like a flock of seagulls or a beehive, all one mind, not able to think independently. In the human case, it would be more like a group of lemmings. The public is stupid. If you ever go out in public, examine the stupidest person in the crowd. That is the public because, as a group mind, it breaks down to the lowest common denominator. The slowest person in the group holds back the whole group from becoming more agile and capable. Because the whole group cannot move without him.
You are only one of the public when you identify with the public.
The Right to Travel – (Public or Private?)
It has been mentioned that we are in contract in everything we do. Does it make sense then that the state, which is a corporation, could impair our right to travel freely upon the highways when the highways belong to the people? What right does the DMV have to license people and what right do the judges have to have those licenses suspended? Isn’t the DMV a corporation like the municipal government, and isn’t the courthouse a corporate fiction and aren’t the judges agents of that corporate fiction? How can a free person be compelled to have a driver’s license then and register their car (property)?
Let’s investigate this a little and see what the definitions are and what the courts have to say about it. Just giving it some thought, one would deduce that a contract must be in place before any right could be given up. The Driver’s License is in fact a contract. What about vehicle registration. There is no law compelling anyone to “register” their automobile. The registration itself appears to be a voluntary act. The application for the Driver’s License is a voluntary act as well. The whole purpose of the License is for those who are transporting goods or people “for hire.” In other words, it must be an occupation and business, like a taxi. Otherwise, there is no need for a Driver’s License.
The following is the California Vehicle Code concerning Registration and Licensing
ARTICLE 4. Service of Process [17450 – 17463] (Article 4 enacted by Stats. 1959, Ch. 3.)
The acceptance by a resident of this state of a certificate of ownership or a certificate of registration of any motor vehicle or any renewal thereof, issued under the provisions of this code, shall constitute the consent by the person that service of summons may be made upon him within or without this state, whether or not he is then a resident of this state, in any action brought in the courts of this state upon a cause of action arising in this state out of the ownership or operation of the vehicle. (Amended Ch. 622. Stats. 1971. Operative May 3, 1972.)
The acceptance or retention by a resident of this state of a driver’s license issued pursuant to the provisions of this code, shall constitute the consent of the person that service of summons may be made upon him within or without this state, whether or not he is then a resident of this state, in any action brought in the courts of this state upon a cause of action arising in this state out of his operation of a motor vehicle anywhere within this state.
(Amended Ch. 720. Stats. 1967. Effective November 8, 1967.)
(Amended Ch. 622, Stats. 1971. Operative May 3, 1972.)
(Amended Ch. 618, Stats. 1972. Effective March 7, 1973.)
In this next cited case, the court describes how the people can sign up for the benefit of the license and if they do sign up for one they are compelled to perform according to the contract, however, there is no forced compliance because one does not need to elect to have a driver’s license. And if you have a driver’s license that should not imply you are always driving or involved in a regulated activity. I have a fishing license, but sometimes, I go places where I don’t need it. Why do I have it then? Well, maybe I want to fish in a lake where they stock it, and have to maintain population levels. That doesn’t mean I’m always fishing though with my license.
– State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073 (Mont. 1926):
“2. Nor does it violate section 3 or section 14 of Article III of the state Constitution, nor the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, securing to the people the right of acquiring, possessing, and enjoying property, and prohibiting the taking of private property for public use or without due process of law, for, while a citizen has the right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place of business for private gain. For the latter purpose no person has a vested right in the use of the highways of the state, but is a privilege or license which the legislature may grant or withhold in its discretion, or which it may grant upon such conditions as it may see fit to impose, provided the imposition applies impartially. (Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 942, L.R.A. 1918B, 909, 169 P. 516; Gizzardelli v. Presbrey, 44 R.I. 333, 117 A. 359; Cummins v. Jones,79 Or. 276, 155 P. 171; Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Rapid TransitCo., 133 Tenn. 99, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1045, L.R.A. 1916B, 1143, 179 S.W. 635; Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 68 L. Ed. 598,44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257.)
“Such an Act does not purport to be, and is not in fact, a regulation of the use of the highways, nor does it attempt to transmute a private carrier into a public carrier against his will by legislative fiat, but merely makes a conditional offer of a special privilege, which the offeree may accept or not, as he sees fit. He is not entitled to the privilege as a matter of right, and, if he would accept, he must do so subject to the conditions attached to the offer. (Frost v. Railroad Commission (Cal.), 240 P. 26; Buck v. Kuykendall, above; People v. Yahne, 195 Cal. 683, 235 P. 50.)
State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073 (Mont. 1926) (1)
In the California Vehicle Code, once again, we find this definition of “commercial motor vehicle” which includes vehicle that require a class a, b, or c license. This gives us a clue.
DIVISION 6. DRIVERS’ LICENSES
CHAPTER 7. COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY PROGRAM
(b) (1) “Commercial motor vehicle” means any vehicle or combination of vehicles that requires a class A or class B license, or a class C license with an endorsement issued pursuant to paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 15278. (7318)
It also reads down below:
In the absence of a federal definition, existing definitions under this code apply.
If we go to the Federal definition, the United States Code, we get a slightly different definition which reveals even more about the true nature of the license. Federal definitions supersede state constructions. 49 U.S. Code § 31301. Definitions: In this chapter –
(3) “commercial driver’s license” means a license issued by a State to an individual authorizing the individual to operate a class of commercial motor vehicles.
(6) “driver’s license” means a license issued by a State to an individual authorizing the individual to operate a motor vehicle on highways.
If we go to United States Code, USC Title 18 CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Part I. CRIMES Chapter 2. AIRCRAFT AND MOTOR VEHICLES Section 31. Definitions:
(6) Motor vehicle.—The term “motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo.
(10) Used for commercial purposes. – The term “used for commercial purposes” means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.
According to Randy Quade, “Right to travel” is still the wrong use of the terms. Randy prefers “Liberty to use the common way.”
What is a “Person” and who are the People?
We already went over some of this in the chapter on the 14th Amendment, but now we will bring in some new definitions and examples of the use of the word “person” to designate a corporation thereby delineating privileges and immunities rather than inalienable rights.
The motor vehicle code defines “person” as follows:
470. “Person” includes a natural person, firm, co-partnership, association, limited liability company, or corporation. (Amended by Stats. 1994, Ch. 1010, Sec. 225. Effective January 1, 1995.)
When we read the term “includes,” those are the only items being included, everything else is excluded. That is how law is read and interpreted. I didn’t make the rule up. Since the term “natural person” is not defined separately, it would be intended only to be the same as a person, which brings us right back to the same definition.
“The word `person’ in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which normally includes in its scope a variety of entities other than human beings., see e.g. 1, U.S.C. § para 1.” Church of Scientology v. US Department of Justice, 612 F.2d 417 @425 (1979) (Verified)
The US Government’s Definition of the word “Person”
American Law and Procedure, Vol. 13, page 137, 1910;
”This word `person’ and its scope and bearing in the law, involving, as it does, legal fictions and also apparently natural beings, it is difficult to understand; but it is absolutely necessary to grasp, at whatever cost, a true and proper understanding to the word in all the phases of its proper use … A person is here not a physical or individual person, but the status or condition with which he is invested… not an individual or physical person, but the status, condition or character borne by physical persons… The law of persons is the law of status or condition.” (2) (Verified)
People are not persons. As you will see, persons are defined as non-sovereigns. A sovereign is someone who is not subject to statutes. A person is someone who voluntarily submits himself to statutes. In the United States the people are sovereign over their civil servants:
Romans 6:16 (NIV): “Don’t you know that when you offer yourselves to someone to obey him as slaves, you are slaves to the one whom you obey…”
Here is another case which clearly defines where the sovereignty lies, in the “people.” It even says that “persons” are those who “fill the different departments of government.” – Spooner v. McConnell (1838):
“That this river leads into the St Lawrence, through Lake Erie, and is within the country formerly called the Northwestern Territory; and to which the ordinance of the 13th of July, 1787, applied.”
“The sovereignty of a state does not reside in the persons who fill the different departments of its government, but in the People, from whom the government emanated; and they may change it at their discretion. Sovereignty, then in this country, abides with the constituency, and not with the agent; and this remark is true, both in reference to the federal and state government.”
Spooner v. McConnell, 22 F 939@ 943 (Verified) (Not completely related to the case, used in abstract) (3)
Here is a good example where the term “person” is held to be the government corporation. US Supreme Court in U.S. v. Cooper (1941):
“The Government admits that often the word ‘person’ is used in such a sense as not to include the sovereign but urges that where, as in the present instance, its wider application is consistent with, and tends to effectuate, the public policy evidenced by the statute, the term should be held to embrace the Government. And it strongly urges that all the considerations which moved Congress to confer the right to recover damages upon individuals and corporations injured by violations of the Act apply with equal force to the United States which, as a large procurer of goods and services, is as likely to be injured by the denounced combinations and monopolies as is a natural or corporate person.”
US Supreme Court in U.S. v. Cooper, 312 US 600,604, 61 S.Ct 742 (1941)
Here is another case, clearly defining “persons” as “corporations.” Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe (1979):
“The word ‘person’ for purposes of statutory construction, unless the context indicates to the contrary, is normally construed to include ‘corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.’ 1 U.S.C. § 1. And in terms of the protective purposes of the Acts of which § 194 and its predecessors were a part, it would make little sense to construe the provision so that individuals, otherwise subject to its burdens, could escape its reach merely by incorporating and carrying on business as usual. As we said in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 436 U. S. 687 (1978).
‘by 1871, it was well understood that corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis. It stands to reason that in reenacting this provision in the Revised Statutes, now codified in the United States Code, Congress was fully aware that it would be interpreted to cover artificial entities as well as individuals.’ – US Supreme Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 US 653, 667 (1979)
Now we look to Black’s Law 4th Ed. For the definition of “individual.”
As a noun, this term denotes a single person as distinguished from a group or class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation or association; but it is said that this restrictive signification is not necessarily inherent in the word, and that it may, in proper cases, include artificial persons. State v Bell Telephone Co., 36 Ohio St. 310, 38 Am.Rep. 583
As an adjective, “individual” means pertaining or belonging to, or characteristic of, one single person, either in opposition to a firm, association, or corporation, or considered in his relation thereto.
So, essentially, that have defined the “person” as a corporation and the preceding citations should establish that sufficiently. Likewise, an “individual” is a corporation. We also read previously how the word “may” actually means “shall.” So, the court is saying that “person shall, in proper cases, include artificial persons.”
Now let’s return to the fact that the State of so and so, California for instance, the STATE OF CALIFORNIA, is a corporation. The STATE OF CALIFORNIA is a corporation listed on Dunn and Bradstreet and therefore, is a foreign corporation in relation to the living man.
The Data Universal Numbering System, abbreviated as DUNS is a proprietary system developed and regulated by Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) that assigns a unique numeric identifier, referred to as a “DUNS number” to a single business entity.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 071549000
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 052714196
“Ens Legis. L. Lat. A creature of the law; an artificial being, as contrasted with a natural person. Applied to corporations, considered as deriving their existence entirely from the law.” —Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, 1951
Furthermore, the STATE OF CALIFORNIA corporation is a “political subdivision” of the UNITED STATES corporation, headquartered in the District of Columbia, as per 16 United States Statutes at Large 419 – FORTY FIRST CONGRESS SESSION III CHAPTER 62, 1871
CHAP. LXII. — An Act to provide a government for the District of Columbia.
And let’s not forget the “states” are included in the federal districting of the District of Columbia as far as their corporate capacities are concerned.
28 U.S. Code § 3002. Definitions:
(14) “State” means any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, or any territory or possession of the United States.
(15) “United States” means—
(A) a Federal corporation;
(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or
(C) an instrumentality of the United States.
Where does the natural man or woman stand in this situation then, if we are supposed to have the freedom to travel upon the highways without being harassed, molested or robbed by the revenue pirates masquerading as public servant “police officers?” Let’s investigate what is really going on here, when a police car pulls you over.
Infractions are not crimes – People v Battle Superior Court, Los Angeles (1975):
“This language causes us to doubt that the high court had infractions in mind when it dealt with the problem of successive prosecutions inasmuch as an infraction is neither a misdemeanor nor a felony under either the Vehicle Code or the Penal Code (Pen. Code, § 16; Veh. Code, § 40000.1). [50 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 6]
In summation, it is questionable whether the Legislature considers an infraction to be a ‘crime.’ The Legislature enacted section 19c of the Penal Code which deprives a person committing an infraction of the right to a jury trial and the right to counsel at public expense; however, both of these rights are guaranteed to one accused of a crime by sections 15 and 16 of article I of the California Constitution. We must, if we can, construe a statute in such a fashion as to preserve it from unconstitutionality. (In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal. 3d 930 [83 Cal. Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142].) By construing section 19c of the Penal Code to relate to noncriminal offenses we can avert a clash with the Constitution and achieve our goal, i.e., the continued viability of the statute.
“Inconsistency of Sections 19c and 1042.5 vis-a-vis 689 of the Penal Code
“ Section 16 of the Penal Code declares that ‘crimes and public offenses’ include not only felonies and misdemeanors but also infractions. Sections 19c and 1042.5 of the Penal Code deprive a person accused of an infraction of the right to jury trial. Yet, section 689 of the Penal Code declares that ‘no person can be convicted of a public offense unless by verdict of a jury.’ (Italics added.) (The 1968 amendment of section 16 of the Penal Code substituted the words ‘crimes and public offenses include:’ for the words ‘crimes, how defined. Crimes are divided into.’)
“If the Legislature intended to treat infractions as public offenses and if the charging of a public offense invokes the right to trial by jury, sections 19c and 1042.5, which deny a jury to one who commits an infraction, conflict with section 689. However, the same (1968) Legislature enacted section 19c, the pertinent amendment of section 16 and section 1042.5. Construing these sections in accordance with the precepts laid down in In re Kay, supra, we must conclude that it was not the intent of the Legislature to enact inconsistent statutes and, further, that when it added the term ‘public offense’ to section 16 it was not so categorizing infractions because if it did so, it would have caused inconsistency between sections 19c and 689 of the Penal Code. Support for this interpretation is found in the language of section 1042.5 which states that a defendant ‘charged with an infraction and with a public offense for which there is a right to jury trial’ (italics added) may be accorded a jury trial. Had the Legislature intended that an infraction be treated as a public offense, it would have worded the statute differently, for example, ‘an infraction and with some other public offense.’ [50 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7]
– People v Battle Superior Court, Los Angeles (1975)
In this previous case we learn that infractions are not crimes. If infractions are not crimes then pulling someone over for one, without a warrant, is against the Constitution. Probable cause must occur for an officer to make a criminal arrest. Aren’t they arresting you when they pull you over? Let’s see what this next case has to say about that.
Flashing Lights indicate an arrest is being made – The State of Washington v. Kim Stroud – (1981):
“In the present case, however, we conclude that Stroud was “seized”, for Fourth Amendment purposes, at the moment the officers pulled up behind the parked vehicle and switched on the flashing light. Had the operator of the vehicle attempted to drive off after being so signaled, he could arguably have been charged with a misdemeanor. See RCW 46.61.010 and 46.61.020.3 – The State of Washington, Appellant, v. Kim Stroud, Respondent. The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two. September 28, 1981.
Here is more from this same case. When you are pulled over and lights flash: you are seized and considered under arrest:
“In the present case, however, we conclude that Stroud was ‘seized,’ for Fourth Amendment purposes, at the moment the officers pulled up behind the parked vehicle and switched on the flashing light. Had the operator of the vehicle attempted to drive off after being so signaled, he could arguably have been charged with a misdemeanor. See RCW 46.61.010 and 46.61.020.3 Although Stroud, as a mere passenger, could not have been similarly charged, he was as effectively restrained from leaving the scene as was the person sitting in the driver’s seat. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers’ attempt to summon the occupants of the parked car with both their emergency lights and high beam headlights constituted a show of authority sufficient to convey to any reasonable person that voluntary departure from the scene was not a realistic alternative. Cf. United States v. Palmer, 603 F.2d 1286, 1289 (8th Cir.1979) (where officer stopped his car, got out, and repeatedly motioned and called defendants, standing across the street, to come towards him, a seizure occurred).
 Having determined at what point defendant’s person was ‘seized,’ the remaining and more difficult question is whether that seizure was reasonable, and therefore constitutional. We hold that it was not. To determine the reasonableness of seizures which are less intrusive than traditional arrests, courts balance the public interest in law enforcement against the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L.Ed.2d 357, 99 S.Ct. 2637 [30 Wn. App. 397] (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 54 L.Ed.2d 331, 98 S.Ct. 330 (1977); United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir.1979). Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of (1) the gravity of the public concern, (2) the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and (3) the severity of the interference with individual liberty. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878-83. Accord, State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 617 P.2d 429 (1980).
“In balancing these conflicting interests, we are bound by the standards set forth in Brown v. Texas, supra, and as adopted by our State Supreme Court in State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 611 P.2d 771 (1980) (suppressed contraband discovered on passenger in car parked late at night next to closed park in high crime area on ground that such criteria provided inadequate grounds for investigatory stop). But see State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424, 518 P.2d 703 (1974)4 (where police merely observed car in high crime area early in morning pull away from closed tavern on isolated part of block, there was a ‘well founded suspicion’ not amounting to probable cause allowing police to stop the suspects, identify themselves, require occupants to identify themselves, and explain their activity). In Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, the court observed:
“A central concern in balancing these competing considerations in a variety of settings has been to assure that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-655 [59 L.Ed.2d 660, 99 S.Ct. 1391] (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882 [45 L.Ed.2d 607, 95 S. Ct. 2574]. To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 663 [59 L.Ed.2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391]. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-562 [49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074] (1976). – 0 Wn. App. 392 (1981) 634 P.2d 316 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. KIM STROUD, Respondent. The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two. September 28, 1981. (4)
In other words, they are arresting you when they pull you over, and since infractions are not crimes they are not arrestable offenses. Therefore, the only way the police can pull you over is if you consent to it. Once pulled over, since you are now under arrest, anything you say can and will be used against you. So the police do not want you to know you are under arrest because if you did, they would have to read you your Miranda rights. They would rather not tell you, you are under arrest and have you blab away, confessing all kinds of facts they will get on tape recording. Since you are now under arrest, why would you give them your driver’s license anyways, if it can now be used against you to incriminate you? I don’t understand why anyone would now feel compelled to share that information with the officer. At that point, I would stay silent, asserting only my rights to be freed or to have a supervisor present, since my attorney is not there, and I have no witnesses. It’s good to always carry a recording device in the car, and close at hand at all times in case of situations like these. The next section tells us the procedure for arresting someone by giving them a citation to appear. If you were not under arrest, they would not use this language here.
Vehicle Code – VEH
DIVISION 17. OFFENSES AND PROSECUTION [40000.1 – 41610] (Division 17 enacted by Stats. 1959, Ch. 3.)
CHAPTER 2. Procedure on Arrests [40300 – 40618] (Chapter 2 enacted by Stats. 1959, Ch. 3.)
ARTICLE 2. Release Upon Promise to Appear [40500 – 40522] (Article 2 enacted by Stats. 1959, Ch. 3.) 40500
(a) Whenever a person is arrested for any violation of this code not declared to be a felony, or for a violation of an ordinance of a city or county relating to traffic offenses and he or she is not immediately taken before a magistrate, as provided in this chapter, the arresting officer shall prepare in triplicate a written notice to appear in court or before a person authorized to receive a deposit of bail, containing the name and address of the person, the license number of his or her vehicle, if any, the name and address, when available, of the registered owner or lessee of the vehicle, the offense charged and the time and place when and where he or she shall appear. If the arrestee does not have a driver’s license or other satisfactory evidence of identity in his or her possession, the officer may require the arrestee to place a right thumbprint, or a left thumbprint or fingerprint if the person has a missing or disfigured right thumb, on the notice to appear. Except for law enforcement purposes relating to the identity of the arrestee, no person or entity may sell, give away, allow the distribution of, include in a database, or create a database with, this print.
ARTICLE 2. Release Upon Promise to Appear [40500 – 40522] ( Article 2 enacted by Stats. 1959, Ch. 3.) 40504.
(a) The officer shall deliver one copy of the notice to appear to the arrested person and the arrested person in order to secure release must give his or her written promise to appear in court or before a person authorized to receive a deposit of bail by signing two copies of the notice which shall be retained by the officer, and the officer may require the arrested person, if this person has no satisfactory identification, to place a right thumbprint, or a left thumbprint or fingerprint if the person has a missing or disfigured right thumb, on the notice to appear. Thereupon, the arresting officer shall forthwith release the person arrested from custody.”
Next, we read from the Penal Code the requirements of the police officer upon placing someone under arrest. It is a crime to take you directly to the jail for booking because you have not been brought before a judge, who will issue a warrant if the judicial officer decides there is a cause of action. The police officer fails to do this every time and makes the arbitrary judgment that you are guilty and a warrant has issued, when it has not and therefore Due Process is denied. The officer cannot be both the injured party and the arresting party, when in fact he only witnessed a code or statute violation. Someone still has to determine a crime has actually been committed and even then, until the court has decided you are guilty, you are supposed to be innocent and no bail can be forced upon you or jail to hold you. That is unconstitutional. It amounts to armed kidnapping, and if the state employees who have contracts with the federal government are taking you outside the jurisdiction of the republic and forcing you into United states jurisdiction, we might even have a case of armed kidnapping across state lines which then brings a life term of imprisonment. I think some people have tested this out, but I have not YET.
Maybe I will have a chance to one day.
2011 California Code
PART 1. OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS [25 – 680]
CHAPTER 7. Other Offenses Against Public Justice
Universal Citation: CA Penal Code § 145 (through 2012 Leg Sess)
Every public officer or other person, having arrested any person upon a criminal charge, who willfully delays to take such person before a magistrate having jurisdiction, to take his examination, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Enacted 1872.)
California Code, Government Code – GOV CA GOVT § 26601
The sheriff shall arrest and take before the nearest magistrate for examination all persons who attempt to commit or who have committed a public offense.
Penal Code Section 207 –
Penal Code – PEN
PART 1. OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS [25 – 680] (Part 1 enacted 1872.)
TITLE 8. OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON [187 – 248] (Title 8 enacted 1872.)
CHAPTER 3. Kidnapping [207 – 210] (Chapter 3 enacted 1872.)
(a) Every person who forcibly, or by any other means of instilling fear, steals or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any person in this state, and carries the person into another country, state, or county, or into another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping.
209. (a) Any person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away another person by any means whatsoever with intent to hold or detain, or who holds or detains, that person for ransom, reward or to commit extortion or to exact from another person any money or valuable thing, or any person who aids or abets any such act, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life without possibility of parole in cases in which any person subjected to any such act suffers death or bodily harm, or is intentionally confined in a manner which exposes that person to a substantial likelihood of death, or shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole in cases where no such person suffers death or bodily harm.
California Code, Penal Code – PEN CA PENAL § 853.9
(a) (1) If written notice to appear has been prepared, delivered, and filed by an officer or the prosecuting attorney with the court pursuant to Section 853.6, an exact and legible duplicate copy of the notice when filed with the magistrate, in lieu of a verified complaint, shall constitute a complaint to which the defendant may plead “guilty” or “nolo contendere.”
“A person who is specified or designated in a warrant of arrest for a misdemeanor offense may be released upon the issuance of a citation, in lieu of physical arrest, unless one of the following conditions exists:…” … “The issuance of a citation under this section shall be undertaken in the manner set forth in Sections 853.6 to 853.8, inclusive.”
Gates v. Municipal Court (1992) [No. G011879. Fourth Dist., Div. Three. Aug 28, 1992.] (5)
The following section shows a citation is different than a complaint. If a notice is a citation and a citation is not a complaint, then they are two different things and therefore a citation or notice to appear do not fit the description of a verified complaint sworn under oath under penalty of perjury.
“California courts employ four kinds of accusatory pleadings: Citation, complaint, information and indictment.” (California Criminal Law Procedure and Practice, (Cont. Ed. Bar 2007), Arraignment Section 6.5, p. 142)
Service of process must be done by a third party not a party to the case, and if the officer is a testifying witness, then he cannot also be the one who served the notice to appear or verified complaint. Or he cannot testify to it. Service of process is defective because the party who wrote the complaint is also the person who served the complaint.
California Code, Penal Code – PEN CA PENAL § 740
Except as otherwise provided by law, all misdemeanors and infractions must be prosecuted by written complaint under oath subscribed by the complainant. Such complaint may be verified on information and belief.
Remember every time someone is charged for traveling without a license, a crime has been committed by the officer who charged that individual!
4th Amendment ruling – Conviction was upheld, but dissenting opinion warned this was the path to totalitarianism. Terry v Ohio, (1968):
“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251 (1891).
“On the one hand, it is frequently argued that, in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets, the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess. For this purpose, it is urged that distinctions should be made between a ‘stop’ and an ‘arrest’ (or a ‘seizure’ of a person), and between a ‘frisk’ and a ‘search.’
(In the above section, an arrest is given the exact connotation to a seizure.)
On the other side, the argument is made that the authority of the police must be strictly circumscribed by the law of arrest and search as it has developed to date in the traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment. It is contended with some force that there is not — and cannot be — a variety of police activity which does not depend solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen, and yet which stops short of an arrest based upon probable cause to make such an arrest. The heart of the Fourth Amendment, the argument runs, is a severe requirement of specific justification for any intrusion upon protected personal security, coupled with a highly developed system of judicial controls to enforce upon the agents of the State the commands of the Constitution. Acquiescence by the courts in the compulsion inherent in the field interrogation practices at issue here, it is urged, would constitute an abdication of judicial control over, and indeed an encouragement of, substantial interference with liberty and personal security by police officers whose judgment is necessarily colored by their primary involvement in ‘the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’ Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948).
“Our first task is to establish at what point in this encounter the Fourth Amendment becomes relevant. That is, we must decide whether and when Officer McFadden ‘seized’ Terry, and whether and when he conducted a ‘search.’ There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as ‘stop’ and ‘frisk’ that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment because neither action rises to the level of a ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Constitution. We emphatically reject this notion. It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs ‘seizures’ of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the stationhouse and prosecution for crime – ‘arrests’ in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that, whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a ‘search.’ Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a ‘petty indignity’.”
Con;t: “This Court has held, in the past that a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope. Kremen v. United States, 353 U. S. 346 (1957); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.  United States, 282 U. S. 344, 356-358 (1931); see United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 586-587 (1948).
“MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
The opinion of the Court disclaims the existence of ‘probable cause.’ If loitering were in issue and that was the offense charged, there would be ‘probable cause’ shown. But the crime here is carrying concealed weapons; and there is no basis for concluding that the officer had ‘probable cause’ for believing that that crime was being committed. Had a warrant been sought, a magistrate would, therefore, have been unauthorized to issue one, for he can act only if there is a showing of ‘probable cause.’ We hold today that the police have greater authority to make a ‘seizure’ and conduct a ‘search’ than a judge has to authorize such action. We have said precisely the opposite over and over again.
“In other words, police officers up to today have been permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants only when the facts within their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable cause. At the time of their ‘seizure’ without a warrant, they must possess facts concerning the person arrested that would have satisfied a magistrate that ‘probable cause’ was indeed present. The term ‘probable cause’ rings a bell of certainty that is not sounded by phrases such as ‘reasonable suspicion.’ Moreover, the meaning of ‘probable cause’ is deeply imbedded in our constitutional history. As we stated in Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 100-102:
“The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history. The general warrant, in which the name of the person to be arrested was left blank, and the writs of assistance, against which James Otis inveighed, both perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion. Police control took the place of judicial control, since no showing of ‘probable cause’ before a magistrate was required.”
“That philosophy [rebelling against these practices] later was reflected in the Fourth Amendment. And as the early American decisions both before and immediately after its adoption show, common rumor or report, suspicion, or even ‘strong reason to suspect’ was not adequate to support a warrant for arrest. And that principle has survived to this day. . . .”
This is important because the Courts are distinguishing between probable cause and unreasonable search and seizure. Both terms are used in the Fourth Amendment, but the use of these terms is exclusive. Probable cause must arise BEFORE reasonable search and seizure can be attained and this requires a warrant, unless the officer believes he or she has probable cause. The bar is set much higher, with Probable cause.
“. . . It is important, we think, that this requirement [of probable cause] be strictly enforced, for the standard set by the Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen. If the officer acts with probable cause, he is protected even though it turns out that the citizen is innocent. . . . And while a search without a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental search, it must be made with probable cause. . . . This immunity of officers cannot fairly be enlarged without jeopardizing the privacy or security of the citizen.”
“To give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path. Perhaps such a step is desirable to cope with modern forms of lawlessness. But if it is taken, it should be the deliberate choice of the people through a constitutional amendment.”
“Until the Fourth Amendment, which is closely allied with the Fifth, is rewritten, the person and the effects of the individual are beyond the reach of all government agencies until there are reasonable grounds to believe (probable cause) that a criminal venture has been launched or is about to be launched.
“There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today.”
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